

Fo 464/12

W
1854

SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office

(20801)

Copy No.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

ARABIA

(PERSIAN GULF, SAUDI ARABIA,
AND THE YEMEN)

PART 11

January to December 1957

SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter I.—PERSIAN GULF

No. and Name	Date	SUBJECT	Page
General Correspondence			
1 Sir Michael Wright No. 5	1957 Jan. 4	United Kingdom position in the Persian Gulf	1
2 Sir Bernard Burrows No. 12	Jan. 24	United Kingdom position in the Persian Gulf	4
3 Sir Bernard Burrows No. 43	April 2	Situation in Trucial States of Persian Gulf	8
4 Sir Bernard Burrows No. 49	April 15	Persian Gulf: Annual review for 1956	13
5 Sir Bernard Burrows No. 65	May 16	Present conditions in Buraimi	25
6 Mr. Gault	June 5	The political situation in Bahrain in early 1957	29
7 Sir Bernard Burrows No. 69	May 23	The Tenth Meeting of the Trucial Council Held in Dubai on the 13th of May, 1957.	34
8 Sir Bernard Burrows No. 71	May 24	Settlement of certain frontiers in the Trucial States of the Persian Gulf	36
9 Mr. Riches No. EA 1642/15	May 30	Jurisdiction in the Persian Gulf	38
10 Sir Bernard Burrows No. 1041 G.	May 27	The future of the Persian Gulf States	41
11 Mr. Gault No. 83	June 20	Operations against dissident Omanis	45
12 Mr. Selwyn Lloyd ... No. 93	July 11	Anglo-American talks on the Middle East	48
13 Mr. Selwyn Lloyd ... No. 104	July 26	Conversation between the Secretary of State and Shaikh Sabah as-Salim on July 22, 1957 On the subjects of the present unrest in Oman, the need for a solution of outstanding problems between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Saudi Arabia and the situation in Palestine.	60
14	—	Record of conversation between the Secretary of State and Mr. Dulles at 10 Downing Street on July 31, 1957 Arms for the rebels in Oman.	62
15 Sir Bernard Burrows No. 116	Aug. 28	Future British policy in the Persian Gulf	63
16 Sir Bernard Burrows No. 127	Sept. 11	The rebellion in central Oman	68
17 Commercial Secretariat No. 1100/1/34/57	Sept. 20	Bahrain trade statistics, June and July, 1957	73
18 Mr. Selwyn Lloyd ... No. 141	Oct. 17	Direct contacts between the Persian Gulf Shaikhdoms and neighbouring foreign countries Sir Bernard Burrows draws attention to a significant evolution in the course of the last year in the attitude of Her Majesty's Government.	75

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter I.—PERSIAN GULF (continued)

No. and Name	Date	SUBJECT	Page
19 Sir Bernard Burrows No. 150	1957 Nov. 15	The Eleventh meeting of the Trucial Council Held in Dubai on the 6th of November, 1957.	76
20 Sir Bernard Burrows No. 151	Nov. 15	The Iranian claim to Bahrain	79
21 Sir Bernard Burrows No. 162	Dec. 13	Elections to the Municipal Councils of Manama, Muharraq, Hedd and Rifa'a	81

Appendix—Biographical Notes

22 Mr. Gault No. 97	July 11	Leading personalities in the Persian Gulf	[1
-------------------------------	---------	--	-----

Chapter II.—SAUDI ARABIA

23 Mr. Parkes No. 82	Dec. 20	Saudi Arabia: Annual review for 1956	85
24 Sir Harold Caccia ... No. 42	Feb. 15	Visit of King Saud to the United States January 29 and February 10, 1957.	91
25 Memorandum by Eastern Department, Foreign Office	July 17	Summary of Anglo-Saudi negotiations between October 1955 and November 1956	95
26 Mr. Furlonge No. 63	Aug. 5	King Saud's visit to Ethiopia	97

Chapter III.—THE YEMEN

27 Mr. Monteith No. 4	Jan. 18	Yemen: Annual review for 1956	98
28 Mr. Monteith No. 8 S.	Feb. 12	Communist activity in the Yemen	102
29 Mr. Monteith No. 11	Mar. 20	Final despatch of Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on leaving the Yemen	104
30 Mr. Kemp No. 16	May 14	Relations of the Yemen with the Soviet-Egyptian Bloc	107
31 Mr. Kemp No. 17	July 21	First impressions of the Yemen	109
32 Mr. Selwyn Lloyd ... No. 69	Dec. 20	Talks with Prince Badr Visit to London from the 10th to the 21st of November, 1957.	112

Appendix—Biographical Notes

33 Chancery, Taiz No. 1015/1/57	Feb. 11	Leading personalities in the Yemen	[1
---	---------	---	-----

SECRET

SUBJECT INDEX

[The figures denote the serial numbers of the documents]

CHAPTER I.—PERSIAN GULF	CHAPTER I.—PERSIAN GULF (continued)
Anglo-American talks on the Middle-East—12.	Rebellion in central Oman—16.
Annual report on the leading personalities—22.	Situation in the Trucial States of the Persian Gulf—3
Annual review for 1956—4.	Trade statistics, June and July 1957—17.
Arms for rebels in Oman—	United Kingdom policy in the Persian Gulf—15.
Conversation between the Secretary of State and	United Kingdom position in the Persian Gulf—1 and 2.
Mr. Dulles on July 31, 1957—14.	
Buraimi, present conditions in—5.	CHAPTER II—SAUDI ARABIA
Contacts between the Persian Gulf Shaikhdoms and	Annual review for 1956—23.
neighbouring foreign countries—18.	Anglo-Saudi negotiations between October 1955 and
Elections to the municipal councils of Manama,	November 1956, summary of—25.
Muharraq, Hedd and Rifa'a—21.	King Saud's visit to the United States—
Frontiers in the Trucial States of the Persian Gulf,	January 29 to February 10, 1957—24.
settlement of—8.	King Saud's visit to Ethiopia—26.
Iranian claim to Bahrain—20.	CHAPTER III—THE YEMEN
Jurisdiction in the Persian Gulf—9.	Annual report on the leading personalities—33.
Meeting of the Trucial Council, the Tenth—7.	Annual review for 1956—27.
Meeting of the Trucial Council, the Eleventh—19.	Prince Badr's talks in London—32.
Oman situation—	Communist activities in the Yemen—28.
Conversation between the Secretary of State and	Final despatch of Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on
Shaikh Sabah As-Salim on July 22, 1957—13.	leaving the Yemen—29.
Operations against dissident Omanis—11.	Impressions of the Yemen—31.
Persian Gulf States, the future of the—10.	Relations of the Yemen with the Soviet-Egyptian
Political situation in Bahrain in early 1957—6.	Bloc—30.

SECRET

SECRET

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
ARABIA—PART 11

CHAPTER I.—PERSIAN GULF

EA 1071/1

No. 1

UNITED KINGDOM POSITION IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received January 7)(No. 5. Secret)
Sir,*Bagdad,*
January 4, 1957.

I have read with great interest Sir R. Stevens' despatch No. 140 of the 8th of December, 1956, about the Persian Gulf. I am in broad agreement with the arguments and views which he advances. At the same time I have the honour to submit the following observations from the point of view of this post.

2. In the first place I would dissent from the statement in the last sentence of paragraph 5 of Sir R. Stevens' despatch that Iraq has no very great interest in the Persian Gulf provided she can preserve her present authority in the Shatt-al-Arab. The Persian Gulf affords the only direct access of Iraq to the sea. It is the outlet for such of her oil as is not piped to the Mediterranean through the territory of other countries. It is the route for the export of most of her agricultural produce and for the import of heavy supplies for her development. It is also the route by which she may expect military aid in the event of a threat from Communist Russia. Any hostile Power controlling the Strait of Hormuz would gravely endanger her security. If the pipeline to Kuwait is constructed, her direct interest in freedom of navigation in the Gulf will be increased. An interesting pointer to the Iraqi attitude can be seen in the reaction of the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Yusuf al-Gailani, to the recent explosions in Kuwait. He showed a kind of fierce joy. He hoped that it would be an object lesson to the Ruler whom he had found far too complacent about Egyptian penetration of the Gulf. A further sign of Iraqi interest is the friendliness they have shown to the Rulers of the Gulf States, particularly Kuwait, Bahrain and Muscat, and their readiness to second officials to Bahrain, Dubai and Sharjah.

3. But there is more to it than this. Opinion in Iraq has never forgotten that Kuwait was historically a part of the province of Basra. It is considered that the Government of India was responsible for seeking to detach Kuwait artificially from the Ottoman Empire for reasons of imperial strategy. Nuri has repeatedly said to me, on the latest occasion within the last few weeks, that in his own view and that of those in authority in Iraq, as well as of public opinion, there should either be some form of integration or association between Iraq and Kuwait or the boundary should be adjusted in Iraq's favour. Further, Nuri is constantly reminding me that the inhabitants of the el-Hasa area in Saudi Arabia, which contains a large portion of Saudi Arabian oil, are of the Shia faith. He maintains that they ought logically to form part of Iraq and that, if they were given the opportunity, they would themselves prefer to be united with their Shia brethren in Iraq rather than remain under the reactionary, corrupt and narrowly Wahhabi rule of Saudi Arabia. He maintains also that the American oil interests in the area would be better treated and better assured under Iraq. I have little doubt that if there were sufficiently severe internal troubles, or perhaps a break up, in Saudi Arabia, Nuri or any other Iraqi Prime Minister would welcome an appeal from the inhabitants of the el-Hasa region, which they might even seek to engineer, for Iraq to come to their assistance and perhaps take them over. In parallel there is of course the traditional claim of the Crown Prince to the Hejaz.

4. These ideas have been kept in check by a number of restraining factors. Among these are Iraq's preoccupation with her own development; American interest in Saudi Arabia; and the British position in Kuwait

SECRET

and the Gulf, coupled with Iraq's hitherto close and friendly relations with us. So long as Iraqi friendship with us persists, she would certainly prefer to see the independent existence of the Gulf Shaikhdoms guaranteed by us as the alternative to their falling under the control of Saudi Arabia, particularly when Saudi Arabia is associated with Egypt. But if Iraq became hostile to us, or if our ability or willingness to maintain our present relations with Kuwait and with the Gulf States were to diminish, the situation might change rapidly.

5. For these reasons, in addition to those advanced by Sir R. Stevens, which indeed they reinforce, it is evident that the possibilities of rivalry, disturbance and perhaps armed quarrels in the Persian Gulf are not far below the surface. They might involve Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait, as well as the Shaikhdoms, in a conflict or conflicts in which we ourselves would be concerned not only from the point of view of our interest in and obligations towards Kuwait and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, but also in terms of our relations with Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States.

6. Moreover, there is the consideration, although it is beyond my competence to comment upon it, that the Persian Gulf is presumably of concern and importance to Pakistan, for whom it affords a commercial and strategic link with her Moslem neighbours.

7. I have for some time been reflecting on these ideas with special reference to Iraq and Anglo-Iraqi relations. I had independently come to much the same provisional conclusion as Sir R. Stevens that it was to our advantage that the situation in the Persian Gulf should develop in a way which would be acceptable to the larger States with an interest there such as Iraq, and should not lead to constant collisions between our Gulf policy and their interests, real or imagined. Association of the Gulf States with the Bagdad Pact offers obvious attractions in this connection provided Iraq remains a member of the pact; and it is to be hoped that future Iraq Governments might feel reassured both about internal developments in the Gulf and our relations with the Gulf States, if they saw that these were being conducted in a manner compatible with the security and interests of Iraq with the Bagdad Pact acting as a link.

8. Moreover, association with the Bagdad Pact offers, at least in theory, the advantage that it could take place gradually and by stages, beginning, for example, with some link with certain aspects of the pact such as counter-subversion or the work of the Economic Committee, and perhaps developing eventually into full membership of the pact whether through a federation or otherwise.

9. Much would presumably depend upon whether it is judged that such a gradual process of association with the pact would assist and contribute, or the reverse, to a solution of the problem which is of concern to their neighbours as well as to themselves of how the internal administration of the Gulf States is to be developed and modernised, and whether it would facilitate or on the contrary complicate perhaps fatally the role of mentor and co-ordinator in the Gulf States at present exercised by Her Majesty's Political Resident. On this it is of course for Sir B. Burrows to express an opinion. Change is presumably bound to come anyway, whether slowly or quickly. If so, the point is whether the process of change might be expected to take place more acceptably and safely on the lines here discussed or on others.

10. There is the further point that whatever policy we pursue we must face the fact that there is a strong tide running of Arab nationalism and xenophobia. The "British presence" in the Gulf is widely regarded as "imperialistic" and anachronistic. If we take no new line we shall be accused of clinging to the past. Equally, if we attempt to associate the Gulf States with the Bagdad Pact our enemies and critics in the Arab world will no doubt condemn this as "a new imperialistic plot," and it may be that our action would serve to divide still further the rulers from the ruled in the Gulf. Assuming for the purpose of the argument that progressive association with the pact were welcomed by Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, as well as by the rulers of the States themselves (an assumption which may be false), we should at least have embarked on a policy which had a number of powerful supporters as well as opponents. But that it would meet with strong opposition in many quarters can hardly be doubted.

11. Certainly, I suppose, it must be taken as read that it would excite the hostility of Egypt with all the resources of fomenting trouble which are at her disposal, although

it may be argued that we must reckon upon Egyptian hostility whatever we do and that as a counter-weight we should at least be bringing some additional forces to play in the Gulf of our side. Still more formidable, perhaps, is the question of the attitude of Saudi Arabia, particularly if the United States were not in full agreement with us. It is beyond my competence to offer an opinion whether the effect, as must be feared, would be to alienate Saudi Arabia still further and to drive her back towards Egypt at a time when we are particularly anxious to detach her from Egypt, or whether, if the Americans were co-operating with us, this could be avoided. If the former were the case, this must weigh materially in the scales against the proposal.

12. No doubt other and alternative policies are being considered. It may be that a scheme of federation with continuing British protection is thought to be feasible on a basis which might be acceptable both to the Gulf populations and to the neighbouring States without any

link with the Bagdad Pact. It is also possible to think of some form of Persian Gulf Council, composed of Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, ourselves and the United States, which might assume some responsibilities in the Gulf. It would be beyond the scope of this despatch, or of my competence, to attempt to analyse all the arguments and possibilities. I would only like to repeat the two main points I have tried to make, namely, first that Iraq has a strong interest in the affairs and future of the Gulf, and second that, always provided the Bagdad Pact continues to exist and develop, it would probably be easier to co-ordinate our interests in the Gulf with those of Iraq within the framework of the Bagdad Pact than outside it.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Ankara, Bahrain, Karachi, Tehran, Washington and to the Political Office with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

EA 1051/2

No. 2

UNITED KINGDOM POSITION IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Sir Bernard Burrows to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received January 29)(No. 12. Secret)
Sir,*Bahrain,
January 24, 1957.*

I believe that you would wish to have some comments from me on Tehran despatch No. 140 (10512/1/56) of the 8th of December and Bagdad despatch No. 5 (1073/1/57) of the 4th of January about policy in the Persian Gulf. I disagree with so much of what is said in these despatches that it is hard to know where to begin. I hope I may assume that it is not for me to prove the importance to the United Kingdom of our position in the Gulf. There is ample documentation on this in ministerial statements over the past few years (leaving aside earlier statements to the same effect which related more directly to the connection between our position in the Gulf and that in India). If so my comments can be directed more briefly to the question of the method of maintaining this position and of dealing with the problems which arise between us and other States bordering on the Gulf.

2. I do not know what is the justification for the assumption that the Gulf States and our relationship with them cannot continue more or less as they are. It is surely a principle borrowed from the Americans and alien to our own system of political thought that anything which has existed for a hundred years, such as our relations with the Gulf States, must necessarily be wrong or must necessarily change. There are undoubtedly pressures for change both internal and external. These can mainly be traced to outside influences imported by the Press and radio or by the natives of other Arab States who have temporarily settled in the Gulf. These pressures have not yet produced any visible effect in Muscat or, with some very small exceptions, in the Trucial States. In Qatar they have led to some individual acts of sabotage but not to any cohesive political movement. But the State itself is also notably weak, owing to the temperament of the Ruler and the dynastic rivalries of his family. In Bahrain the political movement reached its widest extent, but there has been a general sigh of relief at its suppression and a widespread feeling of satisfaction that it is now possible for the ordinary citizen to go about

his business without being bothered by politics. The experiment and failure of political organisation in Bahrain has added to the self-confidence of the Shaikhs, one of whom recently declared that they and we together could hold Bahrain indefinitely. It has also led the Ruler to make unexpected progress on the road of administrative reform and of bringing into participation with the Government a wide range of nominated but representative persons in various age groups and walks of life. We may, in fact, here be seeing the tentative beginnings of a system of functional representation distantly related to that of modern Portugal, and certainly better fitted to local conditions than democracy in its ordinary sense. The experience of democracy in other Middle Eastern countries should surely make us hesitate to introduce it here. There is quite a lot to be said for a reasonably efficient feudalism.

3. Kuwait is the biggest question mark. There, one has an unusually virile and resilient collection of Shaikhs faced with a political movement which while still unformed in comparison with that in Bahrain is of a potentially higher calibre. The most difficult and dangerous factor is the presence of so many foreign Arabs who have their own reasons for being hostile to us and no vested interest in the continuance of the Kuwaiti State in its present shape. We were trying to broaden the basis of our relationship with Kuwait by establishing contact with other than the senior Shaikhs and there was some hope that the Kuwaitis were beginning to see the defects from their point of view of the Egyptians, Lebanese and Palestinians whom they had allowed to enter Kuwait in such numbers, and who in many cases were beginning to seem more of a bar to the advancement of the native Kuwaitis than were the handful of much more highly qualified British officials. The intervention in Egypt put a stop for the time being to these hopeful tendencies and by stirring up to its maximum degree the previously existing anti-British feelings of the foreign Arabs imposed a cruel burden on the Ruler's not very strong shoulders. He had already in the past often asked us not to make things too difficult for him and

SECRET

for the maintenance of his basically friendly relationship with us by preventing him from expressing his feelings as an Arab or letting his subjects do so. It is in its way quite a tribute to the strength of our position in Kuwait that the Ruler's feelings and the basic facts of our relationship have withstood a strain so much greater than he could ever have believed it possible for us to impose. More recently the general atmosphere has begun to improve, though our trade may be found to have suffered permanent loss and the estrangement from us of all the more progressive elements will last for a long time. The Shaikhs are better able than those in Bahrain or Qatar to maintain themselves and their authoritarian powers without our aid, but at the same time many of them understand fairly clearly that if it was not for our protection the risks of absorption into Iraq or Saudi Arabia would be great and with it would go their own power and their personal share of the Kuwaiti revenue. The chief danger, though a fairly long-term one, is that the reformist-nationalist movement should capture the State from within and be so committed to an anti-British line that they would be forced to insist on a change in the relationship with us even though this fairly obviously meant the end of Kuwait as a separate entity. It is possible on the other hand that if we do not on our side make any obtrusive innovations in our attitude towards Kuwait the political movement may turn more in the direction of internal agitation, in which case its evolution may be more like that in Bahrain and the Shaikhs may understand more clearly the need both for administrative reform and for our support. It is too early yet to say which of these possible lines of development is the more likely.

4. In short, the events of November last have quite seriously affected our position in Kuwait and Qatar, have strengthened it at least temporarily in Bahrain and have not caused any essential change in the Trucial States and Muscat. We may hope by patience to recover some of the lost ground in Kuwait. Qatar will probably remain rather unstable, but the problems it presents are likely to be of manageable size, and its oil will, on present evidence, be exhausted in twenty years.

5. As regards the possibility of external change I would regard any idea of federation as based on purely fanciful analogy. The Gulf States are intensely parochial. Their interests and economic circumstances

are different one from another and they have in many cases intense jealousies of their neighbours. The commotion caused by our proposals to federate the States of the Aden Protectorate should perhaps also be a warning against undue zeal in this direction at the present time. The idea of any association with a group of Powers outside the Gulf is equally distasteful to them except in so far as many, though not all, of the Rulers and many of their subjects wish to be regarded as good Arabs and pay lip-service and in some cases make financial contributions to Arab causes. Most of them feel deeply about Palestine. Many of them, even some of the more responsible and otherwise friendly ones, have looked up to Colonel Nasser as the one hope of a moral renaissance of the Arabs. Their views on the Bagdad Pact are almost all coloured by Egyptian propaganda. In so far as they have a sentimental attachment to Arabism it is to the variety advocated by Cairo and Damascus. The only thing I can think of which might tempt the Kuwaitis away from their traditional reliance on us would be an attempt by other Arab States to guarantee Kuwait's independence in the same way as some of these States have recently arranged to replace in Jordan the financial guarantee previously provided by us. If there were to be any talk of associating the Persian Gulf States with other States in the outside world Kuwait would tend to join the Egypto-Syrian-Saudi Axis. Qatar would tend to join Saudi Arabia. The present Rulers of Bahrain and Muscat might view with some sympathy the idea of becoming associated with the Bagdad Pact but in Bahrain the Ruler would be more strongly influenced by the thought of the political opposition which any such step would arouse among his subjects, and the Sultan of Muscat would feel that he was not yet ready to play a part in an international grouping of this kind and that he preferred at present to rely on his ancient friendship with us. In time, however, and if oil is found in Muscat, this country would be much the most likely candidate for membership of or association with the pact. My considered view is therefore that any attempt by us to associate the Persian Gulf States in any way with the Bagdad Pact (with the possible exception of Muscat in the distant future) would not only be doomed to failure but would be the step most calculated to destroy our position and to drive at least Kuwait into precisely the opposite camp. I believe that Colonel Nasser once said that in our attempt to get

SECRET

Jordan into the Bagdad Pact we were transferring that country from one of our pockets to another and that this gave him the opportunity to snatch it out of our grasp on the way. The same risk applies with equal force to Kuwait.

6. The best thing that can be hoped for is that practical ties may be built up or strengthened between Iraq or Pakistan and the Persian Gulf States. The water and oil pipeline projects will play an important part in this direction as regards Kuwait. The supply of teachers and other officials from Iraq has already begun in Kuwait, Bahrain and the Trucial States. Pakistan has supplied military and police personnel to Bahrain and Muscat (although hitherto with unfortunate restrictions on their use). A good deal more could usefully be done on these lines. I would hope that it might be one of our tasks in Iraq and Pakistan to bring this conception of technical assistance without political strings into the minds of the Governments as a better way of extending their influence in the Gulf than by imperialistic designs on the Kuwait frontiers and on Gwadar respectively.

7. Greater contact of this kind with Persia is unfortunately not acceptable for reasons of history, religion, temperament and latterly because of the Persian occupation of Farsi and Arabi. In this connection I have felt for some time that it is a pity from the point of view of our relations with the Gulf States that we appear to be obliged, no doubt on account of the unusually friendly present state of our relations with the Persian Government, to talk to them in a friendly manner about their various territorial ambitions in the Gulf instead of as previously merely saying that their claims on Bahrain and other islands were not subjects which we could discuss. I am sure that our apparently rather more forthcoming recent attitude on these subjects has contributed to their belief that they could seize Farsi and Arabi without any serious consequences. The Ruler of Bahrain has commented that nothing like this has happened in the Gulf since the establishment of the Maritime Truce a hundred years ago. It would seem desirable that the Persian Government should be warned that any similar escapade with regard to the inhabited islands of Abu Musa and Tanb would not be received with so quiescent an attitude on our part.

8. There are a number of matters affecting the division of the sea-bed, and claims to islands which ought to be discussed at

some time between us as representing the Persian Gulf States and Iraq and Persia. We have already made proposals with regard to the southern islands in dispute with Persia in which the Persians did not seem interested (Sir R. Stevens' letter to Mr. Shuckburgh No. 1081/27/55 of May 2, 1955, and related correspondence). The northern islands cannot usefully be discussed without Saudi Arabia. We had practically reached agreement as between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait except with regard to the "Neutral Zone Islands" but the essence of the bargain was that Kuwait would get Farsi while Saudi Arabia would get Arabi and the other small islands to the west and south of this. If we cannot turn the Persians out of Farsi it would seem at first sight as though we would have to look for another bargain, for example, one by which in return for recognition of Arabi (if the Persians left it) and the other islands for Saudi Arabia we would get for Kuwait Saudi Arabia's recognition that the "Neutral Zone Islands" belong to Kuwait and not to the Neutral Zone. These and other frontier matters outstanding with Saudi Arabia are at present in suspense owing to the impossibility of discussing them without also discussing Buraimi. If it were at all likely that by bringing Persia into the discussions we could isolate this question of the northern islands and discuss it separately from Buraimi this would be a considerable gain. I would be doubtful whether the Saudis would agree to a discussion on these terms, but there is perhaps no harm in making the attempt. Similarly, there is nothing inherently to prevent us discussing sea-bed boundaries with Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Persia, and it would be a useful test of Iraq's intentions with regard to the Kuwait-Iraq frontier if we were to do so; but it would be fatal to open this question before the Kuwait-Iraq pipeline arrangements had been completed. Moreover, the only urgent sea-bed delimitation from our point of view is that between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. This, again, should theoretically be combined with a discussion with Persia on the position of the median line down the Gulf, since both the Saudi and Bahraini sea-beds will be bounded on the north-east by this line, but it is presumably inconceivable that the Persians should at present be willing to discuss a sea-bed frontier dividing them from Bahrain. Another possibly relevant consideration is that the search for oil in the Oatar sea-bed has proved unsuccessful, and

it is quite likely that the Shell Company will soon abandon their concession there. If so it would be improbable that any other company would take it up and we would be left with no practical necessity to define the sea-bed between Qatar and Persia. The conclusion to be drawn from this may be that in certain cases if we can unilaterally lay down safe areas in which companies holding concessions can operate they may be able to satisfy themselves that there is no oil in other sea-beds as well and the delimitation of other areas might therefore lose its urgency. While therefore I agree that the determination of various territorial and sea-bed claims between the States bordering on the Persian Gulf is highly desirable, I remain sceptical of the prospects of undertaking any such determination on a large scale or with a large number of the States involved, and I believe it may be better to proceed piecemeal as and when opportunity offers.

9. Finally, I would urge that our existing relations with the Persian Gulf States should continue to be regarded as a major British interest, that it should be recognised as normal for them to develop internally in their own way with such advice as we may from time to time find it necessary to give, but usually only in extreme cases of mal-administration or danger of subversion,

and that neighbouring countries should be persuaded to accept our position here as one of the facts of life and as representing the general wishes of the legitimate Rulers and most of the peoples of the area. It could perhaps be emphasised that our relations are not intended to be exclusive except as regards defence and foreign affairs, and that there is ample opportunity for commercial, technical and every other kind of relationship between these States and their neighbours, but if these neighbours wish to make their relationships acceptable to the Gulf States their approach should be based on the acceptance of the Gulf States as they are, both internally and externally, and not on the preconception that in either aspect they must or should suffer early change.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Bagdad, Tehran, Ankara, Karachi, Washington, Political Office with the Middle East Forces and to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Beirut in the light of his comments on the Persian Gulf in his letter to Mr. Gore Booth No. 1057/13/56 of December 20, 1956. I am also sending copies of the correspondence to Gulf posts.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

EA 1019/3

No. 3

SITUATION IN TRUCIAL STATES OF PERSIAN GULF

Sir Bernard Burrows to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 9)(No. 43. Confidential)
Sir,*Bahrain,
April 2, 1957.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of an interesting though somewhat depressing despatch from Her Majesty's Political Agent for the Trucial States regarding the important changes which have taken place in that area during recent years and their probable effect on these States and on our relationship with them.

2. Mr. Tripp brings to light the curious paradox that by pacifying and opening up the hinterland of the Trucial Coast we have unwittingly weakened the power of those conservative and unsophisticated elements of the population who might most effectively have resisted the penetration of ideas hostile to us from the rest of the Arab world. We are left, as so often before, in an uneasy middle position between obscurantist Rulers attached quite deeply to us by tradition or self-interest and reformist elements with whose desire for administrative improvement we sympathise but who have no similar attachment to us. What is new is that this situation should be beginning to face us even in the Trucial States.

3. One of the most troublesome aspects of the problem is that concerned with the growth of education in the Trucial States. There is an almost unlimited demand for education. Even the Rulers profess to want it for their subjects or at least have not the strength of mind to say that they do not want it. But the only available teachers are Arabs from the north who are already proving themselves the spearhead of pan-Arabism, and doing their best to involve the Trucial States in outside political events and indirectly at least preparing the ground for internal political change.

4. Our answer to these problems consists at present in persuading the Rulers to introduce reforms or improvements and in ourselves conferring benefits on the inhabitants by contributing to the material development of the area. The first course is handicapped by the poor quality of some of the Rulers, though I think that Mr. Tripp is perhaps too severe in condemning them all so roundly. The second is handicapped

by the niggardly amounts which have so far been made available by Her Majesty's Treasury for expenditure on the development programme. Perhaps the best hope for the future is that here as elsewhere the representatives of the Egyptian brand of Arab nationalism will overplay their hands and that quite a large body of opinion will become tired of their interference. The resilience of the Shaikhs and of the old order generally has been a marked feature of recent history in Kuwait and Muscat and, with our help, in Bahrain. Abu Dhabi, Fujairah, Umm al Qawain and Ajman are likely to tend of their own accord in the same direction. The Qawasim and the Dubai Rulers are less resolute and have a more difficult problem. It is too early yet to see how they will deal with it, but it is certain that they will need all the help and guidance that we can give them.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Bagdad, Tehran and Beirut, the Governor of Aden, Commander-in-Chief East Indies, Commander British Forces Arabian Peninsula, Political Officer Middle East Forces and Gulf Posts.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

Enclosure

Political Agency, Trucial States,(No. 6. Confidential)
Sir,*Dubai,
February 15, 1957.*

In this despatch, which I have the honour to submit to your Excellency, I shall attempt to summarise some of the important changes which have occurred in the Trucial States in the past few years, and to assess the probable course of developments in the immediate future, with particular reference to their effect on the position enjoyed here by Her Majesty's Government.

2. Since the end of the Second World War conditions in the Trucial States have been gradually changing, and in 1956 the

pace accelerated. While it would be unwise to exaggerate the pace of this change, there is no doubt that these Shaikhdoms, although still a backwater by comparison with other Persian Gulf States, can no longer be regarded as an entirely stagnant one. There has been a transformation in the outlook and opinion of the more enlightened sections of the community, which in its turn has affected the outlook of an even wider number of Trucial States' inhabitants.

3. It would, indeed, be surprising if no change had taken place here over the past decade. Whereas before the Second World War the Trucial Coast was a distant and rarely visited outpost of the Indian Empire, the area after 1945 increased in importance, not only as a possible oil-bearing region, but also because of its strategic position covering the Persian Gulf oil routes. It was to be expected, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government would interest themselves more closely in the Trucial States, and a significant symbol of this new interest was the increase in British representation here from a single Residency Agent to two Political Agencies, staffed with career diplomatists. British political officers and representatives of the oil companies have entered the hinterland of the old Pirate Coast of Oman in a way scarcely foreseeable even twenty years ago. This increased contact with the outside world has had no small effect on the internal affairs of the shaikhdoms. Recently, however, we have not had the field entirely to ourselves. The impact on the Shaikhdoms of events and ideas from the Gulf and elsewhere in the Middle East has made itself felt to such an extent that it looks like becoming a major threat to our position.

4. Arab radio propaganda—in particular from Cairo—with its steady volume of pro-Arab and anti-British broadcasts has made a powerful impression. For the illiterate of the Trucial States the radio is their only window on the world. For the semi-literate Arab propaganda is an intoxicating mixture of fact and fiction, tending to discredit honoured tradition and historical ties. Films have had a lesser effect, because of the cinema's restricted audience. More recently Arabic newspapers and magazines, especially Egyptian, have begun to contribute to the process of psychological change. Another factor—and one not to be underestimated—has been the increased travel abroad undertaken by nearly all sections of the local community; Rulers go to India for medical

treatment, to Cairo and Lebanon for distraction; merchants go to Europe and the Far East in search of business; even simple bedouin travel as far as Kuwait for medical treatment or for work. Travel on this scale from the Trucial Coast was unheard of before 1945, so that more and more of the local people are witnessing changes elsewhere and have begun to question the comparative backwardness of their own Trucial States. Foreign ideas have also been introduced by the immigrant foreigner and perhaps the most direct influence—and one that has caused us increasing anxiety of late—has been that of the Palestinian and Egyptian teachers in the schools of Sharjah, Dubai and Ras al Khaimah, although this influence is at present limited to the boys in school. In the past two years two events of immediate concern to the Trucial States have accelerated the transformation of the area. In May 1955 the exile of Shaikh Juma bin Maktum and his sons from Dubai opened up opportunities for improving the administration of the State and encouraged the more enlightened inhabitants to work for some advance from the rigid traditionalism which had hitherto inhibited all attempts at progress. In October 1955 the Saudis were expelled from Buraimi and with them went the fear of foreign incursions and intrigues directed from the oasis; this made it possible to concentrate on trying to improve the administrations and conditions generally throughout the Trucial States. It was, therefore, only after October 1955 that Her Majesty's Government was able to contemplate a comprehensive development programme, designed gradually to introduce more enlightened administrations and to improve the desperately poor conditions of the area. This programme in itself has to some extent encouraged the process of psychological change since, although very little has yet been achieved materially, more people in the area have been made aware of the need for and possibility of progress, despite the limited resources available.

5. The most obvious of all the changes since 1945 have been the improvement in public security and the general pacification of the area. As a result, a collection of relatively untouched and primitive tribal groups have been developing into more settled and sophisticated communities. This in turn has produced new and complex problems. Pacification and a more ordered way of life have also resulted in a significant shift of power. New power groups have arisen and on the result of the continuing

THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN
CLOSED UNTIL
..... UNDER FOI
EXEMPTION No. 27 (1) (a)

The problem of succession in Abu Dhabi is particularly acute. The new groups of more educated Trucial Omanis will grow as education spreads and will increasingly challenge the power and authority of the Rulers. And it is these groups which, if they retain their ideological affinities with Middle Eastern thought, can also be counted on to question the value of their Rulers' treaty relations with Her Majesty's Government. They will surely dispute the present influence which the British enjoy in this area, for they are the section of the community which is most susceptible to propaganda and the emotional appeal of pan-Arab nationalism, whether under a Nasser or any other emancipated "Arab" leader. The growth of these groups would appear to be assured, since the Trucial States are at present largely dependent for their news and views on radio propaganda and Palestinian and Egyptian teachers. Whatever control we achieve over education here, I do not think we can hope entirely to eradicate the anti-Western slant which current Arab teaching, feeling and thought seem to embody. The evolution of these more literate classes is therefore fraught with political significance for both Her Majesty's Government and the Trucial Rulers.

12. At present our relations are with the Rulers only and they are good. The Rulers respect the strength of Her Majesty's Government, at least in their own States. However, secure in the knowledge that Her Majesty's Government have vital interests here, they flirt with other Arab States and in some cases extract an annual subsidy from Saudi Arabia. The Rulers believe, I think, that in the last resort Her Majesty's Government would prevent their creditors from foreclosing.

13. It might be argued that we should be content with things as they are and not anticipate any deterioration in a situation which has been so far generally to the advantage of Her Majesty's Government. I do not think, however, that these Rulers (and in due time, their sons) will always remain acceptable to their people; certainly if they pursue their present unenlightened and selfish ways and fail to adapt themselves to change, it is unlikely that they would be

tolerated for long. On the other hand, there is nothing inherently wrong in the principle of autocratic government in the Trucial States for the immediate future, provided there are enlightened and reasonably progressive Rulers. If, however, the Rulers in to-day's altering circumstances continue to neglect their States and to spend the greater proportion of their States' revenue on their own and their families' pleasures, they will not retain the respect of their people and will not remain indefinitely acceptable, I submit, to Her Majesty's Government. The Rulers will face a growing demand for better government and if this is not forthcoming, the demand will soon become an excuse on the part of the rising, more politically-minded generation to call for a change of government. Her Majesty's Government may well find itself, as a result, placed here in the unenviable position of holding the ring between the two contestants and indeed eventually becoming the deciding factor, according to which side secures our support. As opposition to the Rulers increases, so the Rulers will tend to turn to Her Majesty's Government, because Her Majesty's Government is their most effective support. It is not, however, outside the realms of possibility for some of the Rulers—and I have in mind the Qawasim Rulers particularly—to make use of the opposition groups, and in the manner of the Sultan of Lahej in Aden, ally themselves with the opposition groups against Her Majesty's Government, believing this to be the most effective way of retaining their own position.

14. If the analysis set forth above is broadly correct, our dilemma would appear to be how to encourage illiterate and backward Rulers, still rooted in the worst of Bedouin tribal tradition (and these tribes of the Trucial Coast have little in common with the classical bedouin of Arabia), to move with the times and thereby remain acceptable as governors of their people. At the same time we have to counter the tendency of the coming generation to grow up believing firmly that Western imperialism is responsible for the ills of the Middle East and therefore, by inference, for their own backward condition. We have also to ensure that growing exasperation among the young middle class does not culminate in a popular explosion which might dislodge the Rulers, thereby endangering the interests of Her Majesty's Government in the Trucial States.

I have, &c.

J. P. TRIPP,
Political Agent.

SECRET

SECRET

EA 1011/5

No. 4

PERSIAN GULF: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1956

Sir Bernard Burrows to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 24)

(No. 49. Confidential)
Sir,

Bahrain,
April 15, 1957.

I have the honour to submit my Annual Report for 1956 and to enclose chronological records of the events of the year in the various Gulf territories.

2. Almost all other events of the year were overshadowed by those which followed the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt in the early days of November. But even before this it was notable how greatly outside events were influencing the Gulf States. The general pattern was that local trends were caught up in the waves of excitement which traversed the Arab world during the year and were brought to a much more acute form of expression than they would otherwise have reached so soon. These events shed a fierce light on the characteristics of the various Rulers and Governments enabling one to gauge more sharply than before the abilities and shortcomings of each. Only Muscat was relatively unshaken by the storm without and was able to continue a steady course of consolidation.

3. There were, however, signs by the end of the year that parochialism was still strong and that there were limits to the amount of politics which could be absorbed by the inhabitants of the Gulf States. The questions which press most urgently for replies in a review of the year's history are what lasting changes have been brought about in these States and in their relationship with the outside world and in particular whether their relationship with us has undergone any lasting alteration and whether we are yet any nearer being able to predict the future shape of political organisation in this area.

4. One lasting change is that the inhabitants of the Persian Gulf are now more accessible to outside ideas, particularly those that come to them in Arab guise. But the year has also shown that such ideas are not given practical effect unless there is a local organisation on which they can act, and a situation of discontent, tension or instability to focus them on the local scene. Examples of this were provided by the quiet that prevailed in Muscat and Oman after the

removal at the end of the previous year of the Saudi puppets from Buraimi and of the Imam Ghalib who was bolstering his claims of independent sovereignty in Oman by appeals to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League, and secondly by the rapid improvement of the internal situation in Bahrain which followed the elimination in November of the Committee of National Union which had by then degenerated from a partly genuine local reform movement into a mouthpiece of Egyptian propaganda.

5. Speaking very generally it was possible to hope in the earlier part of the year that the drive of Arab nationalism and Egyptian propaganda would not have any revolutionary effect in the Gulf. It was turning people's thoughts to the outside world, but the more flagrant attempts of the Egyptian radio and its local agents to involve the Persian Gulf States openly in wider causes were not meeting with unmixed success. We were sometimes asked how long we were going to put up with all that was being said and done against us, but on the whole there was a useful respect for our underlying strength and diplomatic ability and the foreign Arabs were beginning to be regarded as a rather dangerous nuisance. The evolution of the Suez affair from August until November gave a series of rude shocks to these assumptions. The fact that we waited for Israel to start and then intervened not against her but against Egypt was widely held to show either that our objective was not simply to restore our own interests in Egypt, which would have been intelligible, but to assist Israel's imperialistic ambitions, or that we had not felt able or willing to take on the Egyptians by themselves and had therefore arranged for the Israelis to help us. The most important casualty when we had to leave Egypt without obtaining what were thought to be our objectives, was the respect for our political skill. It was difficult for people here to understand what could have led us to appear side by side with Israel and France, the two chief enemies in the minds of even the friendliest Arabs, and how we could have apparently miscalculated the amount of action we could take before United States and United

SECRET

Nations pressure made us stop. The importance of these reactions lay not so much in increasing the hostility of our enemies but in shaking the confidence of our friends.

6. Another important effect of these events has been to narrow the range of our contacts and support. Most of the Rulers realised that people opposed to us were also in the long or short run opposed to them and that they and we therefore had a common interest in the maintenance of security. The middle elements of the population, notably the more responsible merchants, continued to wish for stability and security but were seldom prepared to take any steps themselves to help to maintain it, particularly when faced by organised propaganda or political pressure from outside or inside the State. The more advanced elements, such as the sons of merchants who had been educated abroad, school teachers and, in the case of Kuwait and Qatar, some of the younger members of the Ruling Family showed the most marked change of attitude. We had previously hoped to be able to find some common ground with these people's internal political aspirations and it seemed possible that some of them might develop into moderately respectable political movements of the type with which we have found it possible to live in certain colonial territories. We had felt the possibility of helping to make a bridge between the old régime and these reformist elements using our experience of constitutional development and administration to guide in the direction of gradual rather than violent change and with the hope that if such change occurred we should find ourselves on reasonably good terms with any new régime. But these ideas have for the time being at any rate been eclipsed. This is particularly noticeable in Kuwait where the embryo political movement achieved its first real prominence as the protagonist of Egyptian-inspired measures hostile to us during the Suez crisis rather than as the champion of internal reform. In Bahrain the movement having gone too far was suppressed without difficulty and with a good deal of popular satisfaction and the Ruler was at the end of the year showing commendable zeal to broaden the basis of the administration by the formation of councils and municipalities, provided that this could be done by nomination rather than by election. It is quite possible that our hope of peaceful and gradual internal evolution without any serious change to the external relationships of the Persian Gulf States was all along a

vain one and that the best we can expect for a considerable time to come is that the Administration should be improved from above, and some of the major popular grievances be thus removed.

Bahrain

7. The High Executive Committee continued in January to press the Ruler and his Government to carry out measures already promised, *e.g.*, the revision of the draft penal code by a Moslem jurist, the completion of the labour law and the creation of the councils to supervise the work of the Education and Health Departments and the municipalities. In February elections were held for the six elected members of the Education Council. The candidates recommended by the committee were returned by a very large majority. At the same time the committee began openly to oppose the strengthening of the State Police by the recruitment of about one hundred Iraqis which had been informally arranged the previous November. There were two reasons for this—one unwillingness to see the police force become more effective—the other hostility to the concept of the Bagdad Pact, and consequently to the introduction of Iraqis into Bahrain.

8. There followed the disturbances at the time that you, Sir, passed through Bahrain early in March. These were intended primarily to bring to your notice the feeling against Sir Charles Belgrave, Adviser to the Bahrain Government. There is some reason to think that the demonstration was mainly got up at the last minute and, I believe, that it would very likely not have occurred had it not been for the news received during the same day of the dismissal of General Glubb by the King of Jordan, and for the fact that large crowds were in any case on the move in Bahrain following on a hotly contested football match between the teams of Manama and Muharraq. Nevertheless, it was symptomatic of the general state of tension, and this was even more clearly revealed a week later by further incidents arising out of an unimportant quarrel in the vegetable market and ending with the shooting of five Bahrainis by the police. A strike and further minor disturbances followed and quiet was only restored after a new political settlement which the Political Agent negotiated at the request both of the Ruler and of the committee. The terms of the settlement included the recognition of the

committee under its new name of Committee of National Union and the establishment of an administrative council consisting of four members of the Ruling Family and three officials. Nothing was included in the terms about the departure of Sir Charles Belgrave, but after further political manoeuvrings it was announced in early June that Mr. Smith, Director of Customs, would be appointed Secretary to the Government on his return from leave. This was intended to imply that there would be a change at the Adviserate and for a time had a calming effect, but by August it was felt to be necessary that a more specific announcement should be made to the effect that the Adviser had asked the Ruler to allow him to retire and that this would take place in 1957.

9. The Anglo-French intervention in Egypt on October 31 led to the outbreak of disorders in Manama and Muharraq on November 1, 2 and 3 and the declaration of a general strike. These took an anti-British line, several buildings occupied by British concerns or individuals being set on fire as well as the Bahrain Government Public Works Department offices and the British director's flat over them. Europeans living in the middle of Manama were evacuated, in accordance with a plan previously made by the Political Agency, to the Bahrain Petroleum Company's European staff compound at Awali twelve miles away. There was some minor looting of houses and flats vacated by those evacuated but there was no molestation of Europeans, nor were there any fatalities among the Arabs, although the police used riot guns and tear gas on several occasions. On November 2 the police became unable to maintain order and the British army was requested to assist by patrolling certain areas and reopening and holding open the road to the airport. These tasks were successfully performed by the army without the use of force or firearms. This was, I think, the first occasion on which British soldiers had been used in an internal security role in the Persian Gulf. In the early morning of November 6 the five leading members of the Committee of National Union were arrested by the police. At the same time the Ruler declared the committee dissolved. About fifty other trouble-makers were also arrested later. The five leaders were tried towards the end of December by a special court set up by the Ruler and on conviction were sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment for the three more important ones and ten years each for the two others.

The three sentenced to fourteen years were thereupon despatched in a British warship to St. Helena for detention there in order to get them away from Bahrain where their remaining could cause trouble. This was agreed to by Her Majesty's Government at the express request of the Ruler. The strike had fizzled out by the middle of the month and things had by then more or less returned to normal. Anti-British feeling among the general run of Bahrainis was notable for its absence after the strike was over and reasonable opinion, which is in the majority, was not sorry to see the committee's power broken.

10. In spite of the ending of the committee's activity, the constitutional developments which it had caused to be brought into existence went on at the specific wish of the Ruler. Consideration was given to the structure of the Government when the Adviser should finally leave since it was obvious to all that one man could no longer adequately run the Government by himself as Sir Charles Belgrave has been in the habit of doing. The labour law had been completed, by agreement between employers and employees, and only awaited the Ruler's assent. The moment of the disturbances in November was also made use of by the Ruler to enact the penal code, less those sections which dealt with personal status and to which alleged religious objection had been raised in 1955.

11. On November 6 the flow of crude oil from Saudi Arabia to the Sitra refinery was cut off by order of King Saud in sympathy with the general Arab attitude to Britain and France and had not been turned on again by the end of the year. This meant that the production of the Sitra refinery, on which the income tax accrued to the Government, was reduced by six-sevenths. However, the Bahrain Petroleum Company was able to bring in some crude oil from Iran which reduced the overall loss of production to rather more than a half.

Kuwait

12. Mention has been made in the General Section of this report above of the effects on Kuwaiti opinion of the Suez intervention. This did not lead in Kuwait to such dramatic incidents as in Bahrain, but its long-term effects are likely to be greater. Kuwait has always been closer to the northern Arab world than any of the other Gulf territories, both geographically and ideologically.

Long-standing suspicion of Iraq made it all the easier for the Egyptian and Syrian brand of Arab nationalism to gain support and an ideal instrument has been to hand in the hundreds of foreign Arab school teachers, of whom curiously enough it seems that on the whole the Jordanians and Palestinians are worse from our point of view than the Egyptians.

13. Internal power has continued to reside almost exclusively with the Ruling Family. The creation of a "Supreme Council" consisting of members of the Family only was an expedient devised by the Ruler to co-ordinate the views and activities of the various shaikhly heads of departments rather than an attempt to broaden the basis of the Administration. It appeared to be fulfilling this limited function quite well. In spite of the jealousies between various members of the Ruling Family, particularly with regard to the succession, they remained capable of presenting a fairly solid block to the outside world, particularly when their own interests appeared to be threatened.

14. Apart from the impact of Arab nationalism and of the Middle East situation the chief matter of foreign affairs during the year has been the fluctuating course of the negotiations with Iraq for bringing water from the Shatt-al-Arab. Early in the year the Ruler, acting apparently on the advice of other members of his family, said that he had decided against the proposal that the water pipeline should be coupled with the lease of land to Iraq on the Kuwait-Iraq frontier for the development of the Iraq port of Umm Qasr. The Iraq Government let it be known, however, they did not wish to make the supply of water dependent on agreement about the lease, and in May the Ruler announced that Kuwait was prepared after all to accept the water agreement. Further delay ensued up to the end of the year while certain details were being worked out. Under the terms of a new Civil Air Agreement the maintenance and administration of the Kuwait airport was handed over to the Kuwaitis on June 30. It was hoped that the technical facilities would continue to be managed by International Aeradio who were expected to sign an agreement with the Kuwait Government. No difficulties occurred with regard to the Kuwait-Saudi Neutral Zone in spite of an increase in the scale of operations there by the two American oil companies who hold the concessions from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia respectively.

15. In addition to the delay about starting the Shatt-al-Arab water scheme there was characteristic confusion about the other major development project under consideration, namely, the new harbour works. Other development proceeded more satisfactorily, particularly the building of roads and moderate and small-sized houses. The general level of economic activity remained high and there was increasing evidence that the oil revenues were being spread among a wide section of the inhabitants thus contributing in large measure to the stability of the State and making it more difficult for extremism or agitation to obtain a preponderant influence. The continuing increase in the State expenditure appeared to be bringing nearer the time at which there would not be much left over even from the colossal revenues being received from the oil industry unless these revenues continued to rise at a rate faster than could hitherto be foreseen. This thought if projected a few years into the future is somewhat disturbing in that Kuwait may not after all be able to build up a reserve large enough to make a significant contribution to its income if the oil revenues should decrease and because if a halt has to be called to increases in expenditure the adjustment may be somewhat painful. On the other hand, Kuwait, unlike Saudi Arabia, is getting value for practically all the money spent and, if there are no balances to be invested outside Kuwait, we and the Ruler will at least be spared the present criticism that such balances ought to be spent on the other Arab States rather than put aside in British securities.

16. The year was probably the most difficult for us since the beginning of our connection with Kuwait. We have survived it with our relationship outwardly intact but more openly questioned than ever before. Kuwait's characteristic as an independent Arab city State has become even more marked and our ability to influence its development has become less, at any rate for the time being. Our trade has suffered some decrease which may be lasting. Our position has become more exclusively dependent on the traditional goodwill and self-interest of the Shaikhs. They came some way towards realising that the same forces which oppose us were really opposed to them. They were inclined to underestimate the strength of these forces. One of the unsolved questions was whether if these forces became obviously stronger the Shaikhs would continue to be able and

willing to put them down or whether some Shaikhs at least would feel inclined to make a deal with them at our expense.

Qatar

17. The increase in the influence of foreign affairs on the Gulf States has been perhaps more startling in Qatar than elsewhere because it has for so long been among the most backward and the least open to foreign influence other than that of Saudi Arabia. Yet in 1956 we have seen a pro-Egyptian demonstration ending with the throwing of stones at the windows of the Political Agency, a partial strike in sympathy with the Algerians, the sabotage of oil installations, organised or inspired from outside, and a general increase in the strength of Egyptian propaganda and of its local agents. The other noteworthy event has been the withdrawal from Qatar of Abdullah Darwish who has for many years been the Ruler's chief henchman and who had dominated both the economic and political life of the country. There has been a continuance of dynastic rivalry between the Ruler's son Ahmed, who has acted for the Ruler on every possible occasion, and his cousin, Khalifa bin Hamad, who was showing increasing signs of asserting himself in opposition both to the Ruler and to the British Adviser. The subversive tendencies of another branch of the Ruling Family, the Beni Ahmed, added yet further evidence of the instability of the Ruling Family as a whole and therefore of the State. It was no doubt partly this disunity among the Ruling Family, contrasting markedly in this respect with family affairs in Kuwait and Bahrain, which gave so good an opportunity to hostile propaganda and subversion from outside. Matters sometimes seemed to be getting beyond the power of the Ruler who tended to withdraw from public affairs but he remained capable of reasserting himself when absolutely necessary and he remained on the whole conscious of the value to him of his ties with us, even though he took all the opportunities provided for complaining of the difficulties which were made for him by our general Middle East policy. Ahmed, about whose capabilities there had previously been very serious misgivings, showed some signs of improvement as an administrator and, having taken over from Abdullah Darwish the duties of the Ruler's representative with the oil companies, fulfilled this function better than might have been expected.

18. The fall of Abdullah Darwish was due to three main factors. He had for long been cordially disliked by almost all the Ruling Family, who agreed on this point as on practically nothing else, largely on account of his excessive influence over the Ruler and the overweening manner in which he displayed it. He had also long been disliked by the merchant community of Doha as a too successful competitor and as using his political position to further his commercial advantage. Finally the label of being pro-British was successfully attached to him partly because during 1956 this was the best stick with which to beat any dog, partly because he worked closely with the British Adviser and the other British officials and with certain British commercial interests. It appeared unlikely at the end of the year that he would be able to return to live in Qatar for a considerable time to come, though he was making occasional short visits there and part of his business interests were being maintained by his two brothers. It is on the whole probably healthy for Qatar that he has gone, though temporarily the vacuum he has left has contributed to the general instability and it is in some ways a pity that probably the cleverest man in the Persian Gulf States should have had to take his undoubted gifts elsewhere.

19. The Qatar Petroleum Company has had its usual ups and downs but on the whole relations both with the Government and with labour were better at the end of the year than at the beginning. The most notable developments affecting the future were that the company agreed to increase their production from nearly 6 million to 8 million tons a year in 1957 and disclosed that their estimate of the total oil reserves in Qatar was about 180 million tons, from which it can be deduced that production can continue for no more than about twenty years and will thereafter come to an end. It proved difficult to persuade any of the Qataris to draw the necessary conclusions from these facts about the allocation of their revenues in the meanwhile. The Shell Company had virtually no political difficulties but suffered material disaster when its under-water drilling rig was wrecked while being removed from the second location in which they had unsuccessfully drilled, and had to be abandoned.

Trucial States

20. Two divergent tendencies were apparent throughout most of the year. One

was that the more "advanced" of the States, namely Sharjah and Dubai, were becoming more seriously subjected to outside influence operating through foreign Arab school teachers, and latterly through the impact of the general Middle East situation, in a sense inimical to our interests. The other was that with the help of the small development fund provided by Her Majesty's Government and by dint of borrowing officials from neighbouring administrations, considerable and satisfactory progress was made in development plans and in building up an administration in Dubai. There was thus in some sense a race as to whether we could improve economic conditions and get the Rulers to provide more efficient administrations quicker than revolutionary nationalism could spread its tentacles even into these remote areas. One of the problems met with was that in order to improve the administration it was necessary for us to put great pressure on the Rulers, who do not understand the advantages of modern systems of government and in any case do not feel any obligation to provide benefits for their subjects, and that in doing this we had inevitably to appear more prominently and thus to give some slight appearance of truth to criticisms of our colonialist position on the Trucial Coast. Another much worse dilemma was that of education. Not only is this passionately desired but it is essential in order to provide the minimum of administrators and in order that the inhabitants of the Trucial States shall get better jobs with oil companies and therefore bring more money into their States. But so far no means has been found of bringing in education without at the same time bringing in dangerous ideas.

21. Among the more important administrative improvements brought about during the year was that at last a beginning was made in settling frontiers between the Trucial States. It had not been either necessary or possible to do this during the first 150 years of our connection with the Trucial Coast because we were concerned only with the coastal towns, and it was impossible to move in the interior anyway, but latterly with security having been made virtually complete by the establishment of the Trucial Oman Scouts, and with the extension of oil prospecting into hitherto untried areas, it became for the first time feasible and necessary that the task should be carried out. The work done up to the end of the year, largely in the first instance by Mr. J. F.

Walker, produced remarkably little serious quarrelling between the Rulers but a good deal of the more difficult settlements remained to be done. It early became apparent that in a number of cases frontier settlements between the Trucial States would have to be partly conditional on settlements of the frontiers between Muscat and these States. In the one or two acute cases which had arisen of frontier disputes between Muscat and Sharjah or Ras al Khaimah it was made abundantly clear that this would be one of the most difficult parts of the task. Even apart from this complication the completed frontiers will unfortunately not look clear cut or tidy since owing to the haphazard nature of the settlement of part of the area and the difficulty of communications many enclaves and isolated pieces of territory will have to be left if we wish to reflect the real allegiance of the inhabitants concerned rather than geographical and administrative convenience.

22. Oil exploration continued actively in Abu Dhabi and was begun in Sharjah but so far the results have continued to be disappointing.

23. The aftermath of the Saudi occupation of Buraimi occupied a good deal of attention during the early part of the year. Some economic rehabilitation was successfully undertaken with funds provided by Her Majesty's Government but relations between the Muscat and Abu Dhabi administrations in the oasis were for some time difficult largely owing to a matter of personalities and to the differing methods and standards of government. These difficulties were cleared up later in the year and a modicum of economic prosperity returned at least to the Abu Dhabi villages. Security in the oasis was in no way endangered and memories of the Saudi occupation began to fade. The Trucial Oman Scouts continued to operate throughout Abu Dhabi territory as defined in the statement issued by Her Majesty's Government at the time of the reoccupation of Buraimi and did not meet with any evidence of Saudi activities within the territory. The approved expansion of the Trucial Oman Scouts continued satisfactorily.

Muscat

24. As already stated the year was a quiet one. The Sultan was one of the very few Rulers in this whole area who welcomed action being taken against Egypt and quite a large proportion of the population appeared

to react in much the same way in spite of the efforts of the Indian Consul to whip up sympathy for Egypt. The only other matter of foreign political interest was the intermittent propaganda campaign waged against Muscat, or rather against the alleged activities of British Imperialists in Oman, by a small group of expatriate Omanis in Cairo and Saudi Arabia led by the ex-Imam's brother and Saleh bin Isa, who had formerly been one of the leading Shaikhs in the Sharqiyah. Reports were from time to time received of the training of an "Omani Army" in eastern Saudi Arabia, but it did not appear that this constituted any serious menace to the integrity of the Muscat frontiers. No significant progress was made in the long-drawn-out discussions arising from the wish of the Pakistan Government to acquire Gwadar.

25. The most important development during the year was undoubtedly the consolidation of the Sultan's power in the interior over which he had assumed control by the Nizwa expedition at the end of 1955. His methods were mainly three in kind. One was to increase the training efficiency and mobility of his armed forces, which were organised under a single commander and disposed at strategic centres in the interior and on the coast. These forces continued to be led by British officers, recruited individually and not seconded from the British Forces, and began to achieve a higher standard of discipline and effectiveness. Their only active operation was a brush with unfriendly tribesmen in the Sharqiyah, which resulted in the wounding of a British officer and the deaths of two of his men. The offending tribesmen were subsequently surrendered to the Government. Co-operation with the Trucial Oman Scouts in Buraimi and with the R.A.F. was developed in a satisfactory manner. The power of the Muscat Armed Forces to intervene effectively anywhere in Sultanate territory was greatly increased by the construction by the Iraq Petroleum Company of a road through the Wadi Samail by which it was to be possible to go from Muscat to Fahud in about six hours. The second aspect of the Sultan's policy for the interior was to leave things as much alone as he could. Some of the ex-Imam's officials were reinstated and it was made clear by all possible means to the inhabitants that no major innovations were to be brought about. Indeed the Sultan went so far as to reinforce in Muscat itself restrictions on such matters as smoking,

which is contrary to the strict religious tenets of the Omanis of the interior, in order that the visiting Shaikhs might not be shocked at what they saw there. Thirdly, the Sultan began introducing medical care into the interior as it had been found that that was one innovation the people really wanted. He made plans for posting Indian and Pakistani doctors at various points, and accepted the gift of a Mobile Clinic from Her Majesty's Government, which was put in charge of a Pakistani doctor and paid for from British funds, and which had begun by the end of the year to prove of the greatest possible value in bringing medical attention to villages in the neighbourhood of Muscat where it had never been received before.

26. Oil exploration continued to move very slowly, at any rate so far as results were concerned. Some oil of dubious quality was found by Cities Service in Dhofar, but the Iraq Petroleum Company's drill at Fahud proved most disappointing and the company got into trouble with the Ruler when they had to tell him that drilling there would have to be brought to an end and that they had not yet got another location to which they could move the rig. Some argument was also caused by the Sultan's apparent wish to introduce an Income Tax Law for Dhofar at the request of Cities Service but without consulting the Iraq Petroleum Company. The latter company were afraid that if this was done they might not later be able to satisfy the United Kingdom revenue authorities that they were paying a corresponding tax in Muscat which would exempt them from the payment of United Kingdom Income Tax.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

Chronological Summary of Events in the Persian Gulf, 1956

BAHRAIN

February

Arrangements made for Mr. Sanhoury, Egyptian jurist, to visit Bahrain to study draft penal code and draft a civil code. Elections for Education Council. Tuberculosis hospital of 60 beds opened by Ruler.

March

Visit of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Bahrain and demonstration against the Adviser. Strike and disturbances arising from police firing on a crowd.

March

Colonel Anwar Sadat, Egyptian Minister of State, passed through Bahrain on his way to Karachi.
High Executive Committee changed its name to Committee of National Union and is recognised by Ruler.
Creation of Administration Council.

April

Elections for Health Council.

May

Discussions between Ruler and Committee of National Union.
Ruler signed charter for Bank of Bahrain.

June

Publication of report of Board of Enquiry into disturbances of March 2 and 11.
Decision by Ruler acting on Her Majesty's Government's advice to allow the Adviser to retire.
Establishment by Committee of National Union of "Scouts."

July

Renewed criticism of Adviser by Committee of National Union.

August

Appearance of "Scouts" and enactment of Public Order Ordinance by Government.
Retirement of Adviser announced for early in 1957.

September

First publication of *Al Khaliq* newspaper.
Subscription list opened for Bank of Bahrain shares.
Employment census took place.

October

Draft of Labour Ordinance completed.

November

Disturbances and strike as a result of Anglo-French intervention in Egypt.
Reinforcements of British troops brought to Bahrain.
Committee of National Union arrested.
Settlement of dispute between certain telephone subscribers and Cable and Wireless over call charges.
Oil supply to Sira refinery of Bahrain Petroleum Company cut off by Saudi Arabia.
Smallpox outbreak.
Al Khaliq ceased publication on the destruction of its premises during the disturbances.

December

Trial and conviction to terms of imprisonment of five members of Committee of National Union. Three were deported to St. Helena by arrangement with Her Majesty's Government.

KUWAIT

January

7 Visit of the Right Honourable A. R. W. Lowe, Minister of State at the Board of Trade.

January

18 The Ruler informed the Political Agent that he had decided not to proceed with the Shatt-al-Arab water scheme.
Collection of funds in Kuwait for the Syrian Army.
25 Collections in Kuwait on behalf of the Jordan "martyrs."
28 Official announcement in the Kuwait Government Gazette that the Supreme Council, composed of many of the leading members of the Ruling Family, had decided to reject the Shatt-al-Arab and Umm Qasr agreements.
29 The Political Agent had occasion to speak to the Ruler about the undesirable anti-Western and political tone of the Education Department's cultural season lectures.

February

1 The new Kuwait Government Department of Telegraph and Telephone took over responsibility for running the telegraph and telephone services in Kuwait.
The new sand/lime/brick factory at Shuwaikh started production.
23 Shaikh Abdullah al-Mubarak As-Sabah arrived in Egypt for a ten-day semi-official visit.

March

1 Work started on the runway at Kuwait Airport to make it suitable for the use of turbo-prop and jet aircraft.
3 Mr. E. A. V. de Candole, Public Relations Adviser to the Kuwait Oil Company in London, opened an office in Kuwait town.
28 Shaikh Abdullah al-Mubarak As-Sabah informed the leading members of the clubs that no more newspapers would be allowed to be published in Kuwait until the proposed Press Law had been promulgated. The weekly newspaper *Akhbar al-'Usbu'* also ceased publication.
31 The new Civil Air Agreement was signed by the Ruler.

April

17 Representations were received from Iraq about the Shatt-al-Arab water scheme and a renewed invitation from King Feisal to the Ruler to visit him there.

May

6 Officers of the Public Security Department carried out a series of raids and arrested a number of suspected Communists of Iraqi, Persian and other nationalities.
19 Mr. J. Forrest was seconded from the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation to fill the post of Technical Manager at Kuwait Airport.
23 The Ruler informed the Political Resident that the Supreme Council had recently reviewed the question of the Shatt-al-Arab water scheme and were ready to accept it subject to certain conditions.

June

1 Shaikh Abdullah al-Mubarak As-Sabah arrived in London as guest of the C.I.G.S.
10 The Ruler, accompanied by Shaikhs Jabir al-Ahmad and Sabah al-Ahmad, left Kuwait for State visits to Bagdad and Damascus.

June

13 Mr. Mohamed Abdul Ghani, newly-appointed Pakistani Trade Agent, arrived in Kuwait.
Collection in Kuwait for the Algerian rebels.
30 Maintenance and operation of Kuwait aerodrome was handed over to the Kuwaiti authorities.

July

5 The Ruler informed the Political Agent that he accepted the draft for the Shatt-al-Arab water agreement but would prefer that the Iraqi Government suggested a realistic as opposed to a nominal rent for the land which they would make available for the pipe-line.
Work on the runway at Kuwait Airport was completed and Finance Department was subsequently informed that it was fit for use by Viscount aircraft.
Shaikh Abdullah Jabir as-Sabah, President of the Department of Education and of the Law Courts, visited England.
July 25- Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmad and Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmad, sons of the late Ruler, visited England.

August

16 A shut-down of shops took place in support of Colonel Nasser's policy of nationalising the Suez Canal. Crowds gathered in the evening and had to be dispersed by the Security Forces. A number of the crowd were injured.
The Committee of the Clubs presented a petition to the Ruler protesting about the undue violence used by the Security Forces on August 16.
28 The Ruler complained about the inefficiency of the Post Office and asked for improvements.

September

6 Kuwait received an invitation to attend the Arab League Petroleum Congress in Cairo.
22 The contract for the civil works side of the Power Station B project was signed by the Austria/Kuwait Company.

October

1 Shaikh Abdullah al-Mubarak As-Sabah as Acting Ruler announced that the Civil Aviation Department would be attached to the General Department of Aviation at the Public Security Department and that an Egyptian, Mustafa Sadek, formerly director of the Kuwait Aero Club, had been appointed director.
6 The dissatisfaction of Kuwait Airways with the performance of the two Hermes aircraft supplied to them and maintained by B.O.A.C. came to a head. Kuwait Airways suspended the Hermes services and subsequently (on November 28) B.O.A.C. negotiated the termination of their agreement to run these aircraft.
7 Shaikh Saqr bin Sulian, Ruler of Sharjah, visited Kuwait.
16 A delegation of four Members of Parliament visited Kuwait.
28 Mass meeting took place at the Secondary School in protest against the arrest of the five Algerian leaders. Shops and Government Departments closed.

November

3-4 Shut-down of shops in support of Egypt protesting against Anglo-French aggression. A start of the boycott of French and British customers; committee of merchants set up to boycott British goods. Anti-British and anti-French slogans appeared in the streets.
4 Petition to the Ruler asking for approval to collect subscriptions for the Egyptian cause; the setting-up of offices to register volunteers for service with Egyptian forces; approval to cancel contracts with British firms and to boycott British and French goods and customers.
7 Suspension of postal services to Israel.
14 Shaikh Abdullah al-Mubarak As-Sabah agreed a form of "urgent" procedure for the granting of Kuwait visas for prominent Iranian nationals.
19 The Ruler decided not to proceed for the time being with the allocation of a concession for the Kuwait seabed.
25 Collections for the Egypt Fund throughout Kuwait. The total amounted to approximately £1 million.

December

10 Sabotage at Ahmadi. Ten explosions occurred in the areas of Mina-al-Ahmadi, Ahmadi and Magwa and one well was set on fire.
14 The burning well at Ahmadi was extinguished.
Rumours circulated that the British engineered the sabotage as a pretext for bringing in British troops.
The Ruler approved the recommendations by Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, consulting engineers, for the new intake area for the Shatt-al-Arab water scheme.
30 An attempt was made by a person or persons unknown to set fire to the Political Agency.

QATAR

May

17 Ruler left on State visit to Saudi Arabia.
June 23- Ruler absent on State visit to Syria and Aug. 17 thereafter in the Lebanon and Switzerland.

August

16 Demonstration in sympathy with Egypt. Some damage done to Agency. Naval landing party called in.

September

Early Shaikh Khalifah bin Ali attacks Abdulla Darwish, this leading to the decision that Abdulla Darwish might not return to Qatar.
Late Ruler partially withdraws handing over much of work to Shaikh Ahmed.

October

28 General strike in response to Cairo and Damascus radios in support of Algerians. But strikers not paid.
Oct. 31- Strikes, demonstrations, one instance of sabotage and volunteers to fight in Egypt as a result of British intervention on Suez Canal. But apart from sabotage no damage to persons or property.

December

20 Sabotage of oil well at Dukhan.

TRUCIAL STATES

January

- 1 Majlis at the Agencies in Dubai and Abu Dhabi attended by Rulers and notables.
- 10-18 Visit of Sir William Lindsay, K.B.E., of P.D.T.C. Ltd., to Trucial States.
- 11-14 Visit of Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Anderson, Information Officer of the Residency, Bahrain.
- 15 Hon. M. S. Buckmaster, Political Officer, Abu Dhabi, begins his tour of Liwa.
- 21 Visit of General Sir Charles Keightley, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Forces to Sharjah and Buraimi.
- 25 Mr. J. M. Edes arrived to take over duties of Assistant Political Agent.
- 29 Visit of Air Chief Marshal Sir Dermot Boyle, Chief of Air Staff, to Sharjah.
- 31 Visit of Brigadier J. E. A. Baird, C.B.E., to Sharjah.

February

- 5 Return to Dubai of Shaikh Rashid, Regent of Dubai, from a hunting trip in Persia.
- 10 Departure of Mr. A. A. Acland, Assistant Political Agent, to Kuwait.
- 21-23 Visit of H.M.S. *Loch Fada* to Dubai.
- 23 Visit of Mr. Tripp, Political Agent, to Buraimi, Tarif and Mirfa.

March

- 4 Exile of Hamed bin Majid bin Fateim from Dubai.
- 12-19 Visit of Dr. Melville Mackenzie of the Ministry of Health.
- 14 Arrival of Mr. L. A. Coles to take over new duties as B. 6 at the Agency.
- 16 Arrival of Mr. J. F. Walker, from Residency, Bahrain, for further work on frontiers.
- 26-28 Visit of His Excellency the Political Resident to Dubai, Sharjah and Muscat, accompanied by the Political Agent.
- 26 Majlis of Trucial States Rulers at the Agency.
- Visit of Mr. A. W. Van Ollenbach to the agricultural trial scheme at Ras al Khaimah.
- 29 Visit of H.M.S. *Superb* to Dubai.

April

- 9 Visit of the Political Officer, Abu Dhabi, the Hon. M. S. Buckmaster, to Muscat and Buraimi.
- 9-16 Visit of Shaikhs Huzza and Zaid to Muscat. Shaikh Huzza continued to India for an operation.
- 10 Mr. J. F. Walker completed his preliminary announcements of internal frontiers and returned to Bahrain.
- 11 Departure of Mr. R. Featonby, Agency Administration Officer, to United Kingdom for his marriage.
- 21 The birthday of Her Majesty The Queen celebrated at the Agencies in Dubai and Abu Dhabi.
- 22 Visit of the First Sea Lord, Earl Mountbatten of Burma and Countess Mountbatten.
- Visits to Dubai of H.M.S. *Loch Insh* and H.M.S. *Loch Alvie*.
- 22-23 Visit of His Excellency the Political Resident and Lady Burrows to Sharjah, Dubai, Ras al Khaimah and Dhaid.

May

- 1-2 Visit of Mr. J. S. H. Shattock, C.M.G., O.B.E., Political Representative with M.E.L.F., Cyprus.

May

- 3 Return of Mr. Featonby from the United Kingdom with his bride.
- 16 Arrival of Wimpeys group for preliminary surveys and trial borings at entrance of Dubai creek.
- Return of Mr. J. F. Walker from Bahrain to continue his frontier work.
- 24-28 Visit of Mr. W. P. R. Mawdsley, Registrar of the Chief Court of Bahrain.
- 26-30 Visit of Shaikh Rashid, Regent of Dubai, to Kuwait for discussions on educational developments in Dubai.

June

- 4 Visit of the Political Agent to Bahrain for discussions.
- 7-9 Visit to Trucial States of Colonel Gerald de Gaury.
- 16-18 Visit to Dubai of His Honour Judge C. H. Haines, C.B.E.
- 18 Strike of the Air Ministry Works Directorate employees at Sharjah.
- 25 The 9th Meeting of the Trucial Council.
- 30-31 Visit of H.M.S. *Loch Alvie* to Umm al Quwain and Ras al Khaimah.

July

- 6 Dubai police force established.
- Return of Shaikh Zaid from India.
- Political Officer, Abu Dhabi, begins tour of Liwa to trace reports of Saudi gun-running.
- 9 Departure of Political Agent for leave in the United Kingdom.
- 16 Departure of Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan on his summer holidays.
- 18-20 Visit of Mr. G. G. Stockwell of British Petroleum to Trucial States.
- 21 Completion of trial borings at entrance of Dubai creek.
- 22-23 Visit of H.M.S. *Loch Fyne* to Dubai.

August

- 9 Departure of the Hon. M. S. Buckmaster for leave in the United Kingdom.
- 25-27 Visit to Dubai and Sharjah of Mr. G. L. Puri, Indian Consul at Muscat.
- 26-29 Visit of H.M.S. *Loch Fada* to Dubai.

September

- 8 Arrival of Shaikh Abdurrahman Dajjani, the new Qadhi for the Dubai Court.
- 15 Seismic party of P.D.T.C. Ltd. begins operations in Sharjah territory.
- 17 Commencement of anti-malarial spraying campaign in Buraimi.
- 26 Return of Political Agent to Dubai from home leave.
- 29 Departure of Mr. A. Plummer, of the British Red Cross.

October

- 3 Visit of Political Agent to Ajman, Umm al Quwain, and Ras al Khaimah.
- 6 Shaikh Huzza returns to Abu Dhabi from India.
- 10 Return of the Hon. M. S. Buckmaster from United Kingdom leave.
- 11-12 Visit of Mr. Brooman White, M.P., to Trucial States.
- Visit of Political Agent to El Hamra, Abu Dhabi and Buraimi.
- 14 Return of Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan to Sharjah.
- 20 Official opening ceremony of the new Agency building, Abu Dhabi.
- 30 Visit of Ruler of Abu Dhabi to Das Island.

SECRET

November

- 1 Opening of a new dispensary in Ras al Khaimah.
- 5 Burning of garage roof in Assistant Political Agent's compound.
- 7 Unsuccessful attempt to burn W/T transmitters in Sharjah.
- 14-17 Visit of Political Agent to Bahrain for discussions.
- 18-23 Visit of H.M.S. *Loch Fyne* to Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Ras al Khaimah.
- 20 Opening of a new dispensary in Buraimi.
- 24 Arrival of Sayid Abdul Salaam el Rouf, an Iraqi municipal expert, for a three months' study of Dubai.

December

- 1 Return of Mr. J. F. Walker for further work on internal frontiers.
- 5 Visit of Mr. N. M. P. Reilly, Economic Counsellor at Her Britannic Majesty's Political Agency, Kuwait, to Dubai.
- 19 Arrival of Mr. Yuill at Ras al Khaimah for water conservation study.
- 26 Departure of Regent of Dubai on hunting expedition to Persia.
- 28-30 Visit of Political Agent to Abu Dhabi.

MUSCAT

1955

December

- 31 Sultan arrived in Muscat, following capture of Nizwa and flight of Imam Ghalib.

1956

January

- 4-9 Visit of Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Anderson, Information Officer of Residency, Bahrain.
- 11-14 Official visit of His Excellency the Political Resident in H.M.S. *Loch Lomond*.
- 21-22 Visit of Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Forces.
- 23-24 Visit of United States Consul-General at Dhahran.
- Arrival of Sir William Lindsay, chief local representative of Petroleum Development (Oman).
- Jan. 31-Courtesy visit of U.S.S. *Duxbury Bay*.
- Feb. 2

February

- 9 Sultan left for Salalah by road.
- 9-19 Consul-General's tour of Rostaq, Buraimi, Fahud and Oman Proper.
- 23 Visit of Mr. Charles Kendall, Muscat Government Purchasing Agent in the United Kingdom.
- Geological party visiting Jebal Qaur fired on by Beni Hinah owing to misunderstanding.
- Work begun on Wadi Hawasinah route to Ibri.
- Cities Service (Dhofar) begin second drilling operation.

March

- 2-4 Her Majesty's Consul-General visited Nakhl in Ma'awal country, fort of late Imam's régime.
- 5 Mr. N. Mc L. Innes, Minister for External Affairs, left for the United Kingdom for hospital treatment.
- 15-18 Mr. L. A. Tillin, of Desert Locust Survey, Sharjah, and Pakistan Locust Party visit Muscat.

March

- 19-21 Visit of Dr. MacKenzie, Principal Medical Officer United Kingdom Ministry of Health, and Dr. Grant, Senior Medical Officer, Bahrain Government.
- 28-29 Visit of His Excellency the Political Resident and the Political Agent, Trucial States.

April

- 7-9 Visit of American Consul, Dhahran.
- 9 Arrival in Muscat of Shaikh Hazza, brother of Ruler of Abu Dhabi, en route to India for medical treatment.
- 14 Shaikh Ahmed bin Hillal of Wadi Madha murdered by Shihuh tribe and re-opening of Wadi Madha dispute between Muscat and Sharjah.
- 16-20 Her Majesty's Consul-General visited Sultan at Salalah.

May

- 13 Smallpox (22 cases) reported in Gwadur.
- 16-17 H.M.S. *Loch Insh*—ceremonial visit.
- 26-29 U.S.S. *Valcour*—ceremonial visit.
- All Palestinian schoolteachers at Saidiya School, other than Headmaster and Master of English, discharged.

June

- 12-15 Lieutenant-Colonel G. de Gaury and geologist visited Muscat in course of an extensive mineral survey.
- 23-24 Her Majesty's Consul-General and Mr. N. M. P. Reilly, Economic Counsellor, visited Sultan at Salalah.
- Petroleum Development (Oman) begin work on supply route, Muscat-Fahud, from Fahud end. Surveys of beach-head, road and installation sites in progress.
- Refusal of Beni Ruwahah in Wadi Andam to pay Zakat to Sultan's Wali at Mudhaibi. Dispute settled but offending Shaikhs imprisoned in Jalali for firing upon Field Force.
- Sultan agrees in principle to establishment of an American Consulate subject to conclusion of a satisfactory revised Treaty.

July

- 1 British Bank of the Middle East moved into their new premises.
- 9 Her Majesty's Consul-General left for leave in the United Kingdom.
- 20 Party of Field Force fired on in Sharqiyah; two killed, Major Dennison and two others wounded.
- Field Force concentrated in area, following which local Shaikhs and tribal leaders were handed over and brought to Muscat.
- Heavy rainfall, almost unknown in summer months, caused considerable damage to new season's date crop, particularly in Interior.

August

- 18 Petroleum Development (Oman) lands first supplies at Sehl Malih beach near Muscat.
- Several reports of arms smuggling from Saudi Arabia through Sur. Detachment of Muscat Infantry sent to this port.
- Four new teachers engaged to bring staff of Saidiya School up to establishment.

SECRET

August

Release of Shaikhs from Wadi Andam who were imprisoned for firing on Field Force.

Arrival in Gwador of new Medical Officer and nurse from Bombay for employment under Muscat Government.

September

2 Sayid Shihab bin Faisal, Sultan's Representative, returned from Bombay after a prolonged absence in India.

11 Mr. N. Mc L. Innes, Minister for External Affairs, returned from the United Kingdom after leave and sick leave.

29 Dr. Tara Chand, Indian Ambassador to Iran and negotiator of Muscat-India Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, called at Muscat on his return to India on retirement.

Muscat Infantry detachment returned from Sur having found no evidence to substantiate reports of arms smuggling.

Release of all but one of the tribal leaders arrested following the firing on members of Field Force in Sharqiya.

October

3-7 H.M.S. *Loch Insh*—operational visit.

26 Her Majesty's Consul-General returned from United Kingdom leave.

31 Sultan returned from Salalah on tanker *British Skill*.

Government of India imposed restrictions on import of dates, Kasha fish, &c., from Sultanate.

October

Arrival of Pakistani doctor for service with the mobile clinic presented to the Sultanate by Her Majesty's Government.

November

10 Poppy Day Appeal for Earl Haig Fund—record total, Rs. 5165/7/-.

12 Mobile clinic visited Hajar for a week.

15 Sayid Faisal bin Ali, a cousin of the Sultan, absconded from Muscat.

16 Her Majesty's Consul-General and Mrs. Chauncy dined with the Sultan.

25 Mobile clinic went on extended tour of villages in the Wadi Samail up to Bidbid.

Nov. 30—Visit of Mr. N. M. P. Reilly, Economic

Dec. 3 Counsellor to Her Majesty's Residency, Bahrain.

December

13 The Sultan dined with Her Majesty's Consul-General.

15 Camp of ARAMCO geologists with vehicles and landing ground sited at latitude 55° 28' East, longitude 21° 57' North, in vicinity of Umm Samim beyond Sultanate frontier as notified to Saudi Arabian Government in 1955.

20 Post near west bank of Wadi Habarut occupied by detachment of Hadramaut Bedouin Legion for control of Mahra tribe in Aden Protectorate territory adjoining Sultanate Province of Dhofar.

EA 1081/22

No 5

PRESENT CONDITIONS IN BURAIMI

Sir Bernard Burrows to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received May 21)

(No. 65. Confidential)

Sir,

Bahrain,

May 16, 1957.

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a report from the Political Officer at Abu Dhabi about visits which he paid to Buraimi during March last. This interesting report indicates that the improvement noted in Residency letter to Eastern Department No. 10801/191/56 of the 29th of October last has continued as compared with the state of affairs described in Mr. Gault's despatch No. 80 of the 10th of July last.

2. I am not in favour of taking up with the Muscat authorities the question of the tax which they impose on vehicles crossing Muscat territory on the way to the Abu Dhabi section of the oasis. They have agreed that all Abu Dhabi State vehicles shall be exempt and that four commercial vehicles a month shall also be exempt. The fact that Shaikh Zaid has apparently not made use of this latter concession, or encouraged his people to use a route that does not pass through Muscat territory, suggests that he does not consider the grievance a particularly serious one or at any rate that he attaches more importance to the maintenance of friendly relations with Muscat than to its removal. The difficulty is a real one since it would not be practicable to have a customs barrier between the Muscat and Abu Dhabi villages, and if no taxes were imposed on commercial vehicles going to the latter all trade would be concentrated in the Abu Dhabi sector at the expense of the traders in the Muscat villages.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to Muscat, Dubai and Abu Dhabi.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

Enclosure

I reached Buraimi on the morning of March 8, remaining there until the 21st, when I returned to Abu Dhabi via Dubai. I paid a further brief visit to the oasis from March 28 to 30. There is now a well-worn motor track between Abu Dhabi and Buraimi, and the distance of 102 miles takes no more than four and a half hours running time in a Landrover.

2. The unusually heavy rainfall of the previous two months had produced a mass of vegetation, far more than is to be found in a normal year, and all the tribesmen who owned camels or flocks of sheep or goats, particularly the Sabais and the Kuwaitat, Najadat and Darmikah sections of the Dhawahir, were grazing them in the desert. The Abu Dhabi settlements were thus emptier than usual at this time of the year, and when I arrived the only person of importance present was Sultan bin Surur, head of the Dhawahir. The only representative of the Al bu Falah shaikhs was Zaid's small son, Khalifah. Zaid himself had spent almost the entire winter hunting in the desert or keeping Shakhbut company in Abu Dhabi. Although he had been asked to return during the course of my stay, he excused himself on the grounds of business elsewhere, which proved to be a visit to his newly-wedded Marri wife in the Bainuna and arranging the wedding of his nephew, Sultan, Shakhbut's younger son, in the same area. Shaikh Mohammed bin Khalifa was on a hunting tour south of Buraimi, accompanied by Huzza, but they both returned two days after my arrival.

3. One of the main objects of my visit was to examine the date-gardens and falajes and wind-up the payments from the Trucial States Development Fund for work on the falajes in the financial year 1956-57. A detailed report on the falajes is attached as an annex to this report⁽¹⁾. It appeared that the flow of water in most

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

of these falajes was about the same as on my last visit to the oasis in June. The only noticeable difference was in the Muscat sector. Thanks to cleaning work undertaken by the Wali, the Buraimi and Sa'ara falajes are now much stronger than they were last summer, and the increased flow is reflected in the healthier state of the Buraimi, Hamasa and Sa'ara gardens. Though the palms in the northern parts of these gardens, i.e., the areas furthest from the water supply, have almost all died, the remainder (perhaps three-quarters to two-thirds of the whole) should yield a good crop of dates this year, and I noticed that the banana, lime and mango trees were also in much better heart. I saw one or two patches of flourishing barley.

4. The gardens of the Abu Dhabi sector are also expected to produce a higher yield this year than last, but this will be a result of the better rains rather than of an increase in the flow of water in the falajes—despite the fact that Shaikh Zaid has undertaken two costly projects on the Aini falaj in the past four months. The first of these was designed to increase the supply of water at the source of the falaj by digging vertical shafts (known as "thaggab") from the surface to the area where the water that feeds the falaj is thought to collect. These vertical channels are then connected with each other by horizontal channels, which in turn lead into the main falaj. Of four such vertical channels sunk, two struck water; the other two were dry. The second, and more costly, project on the same falaj, work on which is still in hand, consists of the widening and deepening of the main channel by the excavation of rock over a distance of about 360 yards. According to Zaid, the limestone belt which the falaj traverses at this place greatly constricts the flow of water. The work of excavation is being carried out by a group of 10 specially-trained Awamir. It is a slow and painful business, which progresses at the rate of about 3 yards per day. The effect of this work and of the work on the falaj sources, both of which have been paid for from the 1956-57 development allocation, will not become apparent until the whole scheme is completed.

5. Towards the end of my stay in Buraimi I arranged for further work to be undertaken from development funds—the anti-malarial spraying of the gardens, as was done last summer. On this occasion, however, my task was made much harder by the elusiveness of the locally-trained sprayer, who disappeared into the desert to look after his camels just when I needed him.

6. Broadly speaking, the oasis seems in better heart economically than it was last summer. There appears to be more money circulating (at any rate in the Abu Dhabi sector), most of it coming from the pockets of the large number of Buraimi men now in the Trucial Oman Scouts. Several new shops have been opened since my last visit. Apart from the suq in Al Ain, the main shopping centre in the Abu Dhabi sector, there are now shops, most of them newly opened, in Jimi, Qattarah and Mu'taradah, and the range of goods on sale has increased appreciably over the past nine months. Shaikh Zaid has undertaken, entirely at his own expense, the construction of a fine new suq at Al Ain. This consists of some 15 shops, arranged in two rows facing each other. At the end of this "street", which will be unique in the oasis, is a coffee shop. Work on this project is expected to be completed towards the end of May.

7. Despite these encouraging developments there is, however, a serious barrier to the expansion of trade, which is giving rise to widespread criticism throughout the oasis—the imposition by the Muscat authorities of a 10 per cent. customs tax on all goods entering the oasis from Dubai via Mahadha, coupled with a tax of Rs.10 per vehicle. Wherever I went, I was tackled on this subject, the theme being generally: "What right have the Muscat authorities to impose such a tax on us Abu Dhabi subjects? We realise that this is a standard Sultanate tax, but we consider it highly unjust, in view of the fact that the goods taxed are all destined for Abu Dhabi, not Muscat, and the track from Dubai to Buraimi passes through only a few miles of Muscat territory." Zaid's absence prevented me from discussing this with him, but I gather he has told the merchants not to evade the Mahadha customs post by taking an alternative route, as all wish to do. The only course now open to merchants who refuse to pay the Sultanate dues is to import direct from Abu Dhabi, since the Abu Dhabi-Buraimi road lies wholly in Abu Dhabi territory. But so far only one merchant is doing this, mainly because Abu Dhabi prices are higher than those of Dubai, and the range of goods available in Abu Dhabi is more restricted. I was told that Zaid had refused to take advantage of the concession obtained from the Sultan last year, whereby four Abu Dhabi vehicles per month may enter Buraimi without being taxed.

8. In this and other matters, Zaid's attitude appears to be to seek a *modus vivendi* with the Muscat authorities wherever possible, and to refrain from any action which might provoke them. He appears to have revised his views about the Wali, whom he has praised warmly to me—a most satisfactory *volte-face* from his attitude of last year. The only thing he has against him is his meanness, which seems to be universally complained about, though it is probably true that the Sultan does not provide him with sufficient funds to entertain and distribute alms to the extent expected of him.

9. Unfortunately, despite Zaid's friendly approaches—he and the Wali went hunting together not long ago—the latter is still considered unco-operative. For example, he has failed to implement the Sultan's decision that the openings of the Jimi falaj in Hamasah should be closed. When I inspected these three openings, I found that sand was piling up all around the entrances and blowing in freely. I was told, too, that the Wali had opened seven shafts ("thaggab") on the Qattarah falaj that had been cemented-up last year by Henderson. Still harder to understand was the Wali's absence at a luncheon I gave for Shaikhs Huzza and Mohammed bin Khalifah and the leading figures in the oasis. When I had called on the Wali the previous day, he had been, as usual, most friendly and courteous, and had accepted my invitation with pleasure. But on the following morning he had told Pope, the present commander of the Muscat detachment in Hamasah, that he could not come to lunch with me, because he would meet there Macdonald (who is in command of the Trucial Oman Scouts Squadron stationed in the oasis) with whom he had fallen out over the matter of compensation for a goat which had been killed by a Trucial Oman Scout's vehicle. It seems that the Wali would not accept Macdonald's figure, though this was in line with current rates. Pope did his utmost to persuade the Wali to attend, and, indeed, got him to agree to come; but he did not turn up. Pope told me afterwards that an additional (and perhaps the principal) reason for his non-appearance was his reluctance to appear at a function at which he would not be the sole important guest.

10. The most spectacular development in the oasis since my visit last summer has been the establishment of a small school by Shaikh Zaid at Muwaiqih, presided over by a young and energetic Muscati schoolmaster, Mohammed bin Rashid, whom Zaid originally engaged, last November, as a tutor for his son, Khalifa. There are now 12 boys in this school (formerly there were 16, but four left recently to join their bedouin parents in the desert), ranging in age from about 9 to 15. The school is housed in a simple, two-storied building, which includes accommodation for the master and his family. Zaid intends, however, to build a new school, work on which is expected to start after Ramadhan. The curriculum is based on that of the Muscat schools, and consists almost entirely of study of the "three Rs" and of the Qor'an. Later Mohammed plans to teach English and simple geography. Every Thursday afternoon the boys put on khaki trousers, shirts and head-dresses and parade around carrying Abu Dhabi flags and performing simple drill movements. This is followed by elementary gymnastics and football. Mohammed, who appears to be staunchly pro-British, was clearly delighted at the interest I showed in the school. On my arrival, he bellowed an effusive address of welcome at me through a tin megaphone, and later organised a drill and gymnastics display for my benefit and that of the Shaikhs, complete with red flags and triumphal arches galore. The boys seem to be responding well to Mohammed's teaching, and it is unfortunate that, owing to the distance between Muwaiqih and the outlying Abu Dhabi settlements, attendance is not greater. Shaikh Shakhbut hopes to secure another Muscati, preferably a relation or friend of Mohammed, for his school in Abu Dhabi.

11. Not content with bringing in a Muscati schoolteacher, Zaid has also engaged a Persian doctor, who is now established at Jimi. This man has, unfortunately, to a large extent eclipsed the dispenser who was brought to Al Ain last November under the Trucial States development programme. The latter is doing useful work among the villagers of Al Ain, Muwaiqih and Mu'taradh, and sees about 10 patients a day, but he cannot compete with the injections offered by the Persian—and by most Arabs the needle is regarded as a panacea for all ills. For this reason, Shaikhs Huzza and Zaid have not supported the dispenser to the extent he deserves.

12. The general picture in Buraimi is thus undoubtedly healthier now than it was last summer. There are now very few unemployed able-bodied men in the

Abu Dhabi villages, thanks, mainly, to the increased recruiting for the Trucial Oman Scouts over the past six months, and to the employment created by Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Limited on Das. Throughout the Abu Dhabi villages I heard nothing but praise for the Scouts. Zaid's Wali in Qattarah, the Amiri Doodah bin Maktum, is particularly enthusiastic about the force. Apart from the much resented 10 per cent. customs tax, the merchants in the Abu Dhabi sector have little to grumble about, and almost all speak of increased business. The same is unfortunately not true of the Muscat sector, where poverty is still widespread, the shops are poorly stocked and business remains slack, but there seems to be slightly less despondency than I noticed last summer, and the people appear to have taken heart from the improved flow of water in the falajes which has been brought about by the Wali. Since my visit there have been further rains, exceptionally heavy for this time of year, and visitors to Abu Dhabi from the oasis say that these have greatly benefited the gardens and the falajes. It seems, therefore, that there will be a bumper fruit harvest this year, and this should attract even more summer visitors than usual. Though some of these visitors will be parasites, many will bring money into the oasis, and this should help to maintain, and perhaps augment, the satisfactory progress of the area.

EA 1016/71

No. 6

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BAHRAIN IN EARLY 1957

(Received with semi-official letter of June 5, 1957, from Mr. Gault to Mr. Riches, on June 7)

Mr. Gault to Sir Bernard Burrows (Bahrain)

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatches No. 2 (1011/6/57G) of January 17 and No. 4 (1011/10/57G) of January 27 on political and on constitutional developments respectively in Bahrain and to submit to your Excellency herewith a further record of what has happened in Bahrain since then.

2. As might have been expected, things have remained very quiet politically. A few pamphlets have been distributed in small numbers criticising the Ruler of Bahrain and his Government for their treatment of the leaders of the Committee of National Union and attacking "the imperialists" but these have had no effect. This indicates that political activity has not ceased entirely. Evidence is now beginning to appear, thanks in part to the increasing activity and efficiency of the Bahrain State Police, which now has a Special Branch and a Criminal Investigation Department which are growing in efficacy, of a slight but noticeable recrudescence of activity in this respect among a relatively small number of Bahrainis. There are some indications that this activity is subject to influences from outside Bahrain. It is in any case to be expected that some degree of admiration for Egypt and therefore of hostility to Britain and to the West remains among certain Bahrainis and that given an opportunity it might burst out again into the open. It is however safe to say that the general mass of the people here do not at this moment want more political troubles in the islands. They are tiring of Egyptian propaganda and beginning to realise the dangers in Egypt's policies. The added and visible strength of the police force and the presence of two companies of British troops reinforce this feeling considerably.

3. As regards administrative matters nothing outstanding has happened though there has been some progress. The Ruler, against even Sir Charles Belgrave's advice, in February appointed three men of his family to the Administration Council; his eldest son Shaikh Isa, a brother Shaikh Mubarak and a cousin Shaikh Ali bin Mohamed. This made the composition of the Council six Shaikhs and three officials (who were not Shaikhs) under the chairmanship of the Ruler's uncle, Shaikh Abdulla bin Isa, which gives far too high a proportion of Shaikhs. Shortly after this the year for which the original Council had been appointed ended and the Ruler, without consulting the Adviser at all, reappointed the enlarged Council for a further year. In the many discussions I have had with the Ruler about the Council I have formed the opinion that, while he realises its usefulness as a body which can discuss local affairs and put up recommendations on them, he does not wish it to have too much scope lest it arrogate to itself what he would consider too strong a position. He is determined to keep final control in his own hands, partly because he fears, not unjustifiably, that the Council may tend to be extravagant on expenditure and partly because he fears that it may be used, by the original Shaikhs on it, as a means of advertising themselves as more concerned for the "good" of Bahrain than he appears to be. The three original Shaikhs in the Council were Shaikh Daij bin Hamed, a younger brother of the Ruler and head of the Law Courts, Shaikh Khalifa bin Mohamed, a son of the Ruler's uncle Shaikh Mohamed bin Isa and Director of Police and Public Security; and Shaikh Khalid bin Mohamed bin Abdulla, a grandson of the Ruler's second uncle Shaikh Abdulla bin Isa. Thus the original Shaikhs on the Council represented the three main branches of the Al Khalifa family, the Ruler's own and those of his two uncles. In the second half of last year there was from time to time talk going round Bahrain about possible successors to Shaikh Salman, the present ruler, who would be replaced. The successors mentioned were Shaikh Khalifah bin Mohamed, Shaikh Daij bin Hamed and another brother Shaikh Abdulla bin Hamed who was the least likely of the three candidates. One must assume that the Ruler eventually heard of this and I feel it likely that one reason at least for his

putting his son, another brother and a brother of Shaikh Khalifah bin Mohamed on the Council was to watch the two pretenders, and also, through his son, to have first hand information of what the Council was doing and, perhaps more important, how it was doing it and who took the leading part. The Ruler has, on one occasion recently, mentioned to me his mistrust of the rest of his family when money is concerned. And Shaikh Khalifah bin Mohamed was very much put out at the appointment of the three extra Shaikhs. The increase in the size of the Council and its being over-weighted with Shaikhs is however a retrograde step, both administratively, since it slows up the Council's work and inhibits the taking of decisions without reference to the Ruler by his son, and politically since it gives the Bahrain public the impression that the Ruler, instead of aiming to advance and improve his government, is following a reactionary course. The comment has already been made to me by local Arabs, as I have already reported elsewhere, that since November's disturbances the Ruler and the Al Khalifa have felt secure enough with our backing to embark on a reactionary rather than a progressive course. When I learned of the reappointment of the enlarged Council for a further year I pointed out to the Ruler the unwisdom, in the long run, of what he had done and the general unsuitableness of the three Shaikhs he had appointed who could be expected to impede rather than speed up the machinery of administration. He hedged by saying that he could always, and at the right moment would, take them off again as easily as he had put them on. Direct intervention with the Ruler in what are really his own affairs is not always either easy or successful!

4. In February, too, it came to my notice that the Ruler appeared to be manoeuvring to keep Sir Charles Belgrave, the Adviser to the Government, on, although it had been agreed on all sides last summer that Sir Charles should retire in the course of this year. When I spoke to the Ruler about the matter he produced the somewhat disingenuous argument that as the Adviser was now Adviser to the Government there would be no objection to his becoming henceforward personal adviser to the Ruler! I explained that this was not what Her Majesty's Government judged desirable and not what he had agreed upon last summer. I said that there would be no harm in Sir Charles continuing to serve the Ruler in London and occasionally paying short visits to Bahrain but that it would be impossible and undesirable for him to spend long periods in Bahrain. The Ruler in the end accepted the point. I had in the meantime learned from Sir Charles himself that the Ruler was very unwilling to let him go. In the middle of April, after this matter had been settled, Sir Charles was suddenly advised to go to London for medical examination by the Bahrain Government's doctors here. He left at very short notice on April 18 accompanied by Lady Belgrave and underwent a serious operation on April 27. An extensive malignant condition was found and as a result it is now, although the final medical opinion has not yet been given, most unlikely that he would be able to do more than pay a brief visit to Bahrain sometime next winter. Mr. G. W. R. Smith, who was designated last year Secretary to the Government to replace Sir Charles Belgrave when the latter retired, was appointed Acting Adviser by the Ruler. When I asked the Ruler whether he would not appoint Mr. Smith Secretary he replied that he would, in due course, do so but that he did not think it suitable to do so at once since Sir Charles might return for a short time before he went on leave pending retirement in June. This reflected partly the Ruler's unwillingness to appear to be getting rid of the Adviser and partly his inability to realise how serious was Sir Charles' condition and how remote the possibility of his recovering from the operation so quickly as to be able to return to Bahrain, say, in early June even for a few weeks.

5. On March 8 the Bahrain Petroleum Company was notified by the Arabian American Oil Company in Eastern Saudi Arabia that they would be turning on the oil in the pipeline to Bahrain the following day. This would enable the Sitra refinery of the Bahrain Petroleum Company to begin working again at full production. The refinery had, during the stoppage, been using Bahrain crude and Persian crude which gave it about half its normal production. The reopening of the pipe would also benefit the State's finances which, it has since been calculated, lost about £300,000 in revenue—income tax on the oil processed in the Bahrain refinery during the time the flow of crude oil from Saudi Arabia was halted—from November 6, 1956, to March 9, 1957. During this lean time we had suggested to the Bahrain Government and to the Ruler that it would be worthwhile employing a first class oil consultant to see whether anything more could be done than was

already being done by the Bahrain Petroleum Company to increase the production of oil in Bahrain—at present and for a number of years past running at 30,000 barrels a day or 1½ million metric tons a year. The idea was accepted without demur by the oil company and the Government are now putting it into effect though final arrangements have not yet been made. A similar survey for other minerals has already been completed, using the geological information held by the oil company, but unfortunately has given a completely negative result. It had been hoped that the second survey might show that some manufacturing process or other might, with the latest techniques, be commercially feasible in Bahrain and thereby offer some alternative to oil production since the present estimate of the life of the Bahrain field, as it now is and producing at the present rate of 1½ million tons a year, is no more than 11 years. The refinery could of course continue to work on imported oil, which even now provides 6/7ths of its output.

6. The cutting off of the supply of Saudi Arabian crude oil to Bahrain in November 1956 with the consequent loss of oil revenue had one unfortunate result. It led a number of Bahrainis, and in particular the Ruler, one of whose pet themes is that the Bahrain Petroleum Company do not do enough to extract oil from his territories, to accuse the company of indulging in unnecessary expenditure in particular on its public relations department, on the erection of a large new office in Manama and on training apprentices (which includes paying them a wage as well as educating them to a standard which the company judged should enable them to use the best of these apprentices in supervisory posts, from which they could move into higher assignments). The argument was that to continue this apparently unproductive expenditure would reduce, by that amount, the taxable profit of the company and so reduce the tax on the half share of that profit payable to the Bahrain Government. I recommended to the Adviser that the Government should take adequate steps to counter these allegations which were damaging to the company. As a result the Government called in their auditors, Messrs. Whinney, Murray and Company of Baghdad, who have now calculated that of the expenditure which was criticised only 6 per cent. is met from profits arising in and so taxable in Bahrain, the other 94 per cent. being met from funds from outside Bahrain. Of this 6 per cent. one-half only—3 per cent.—is met out of the Bahrain Government's half share of the profits of the company in the form of income tax. The other half is met by the company out of its half share of the profits of working. The criticism actually died down as soon as the oil from Saudi Arabia flowed again, and I hope that this information will serve to close the matter.

7. In March the Ruler received a personal letter from King Saud enclosing a copy of a statement the latter proposed to issue objecting to a recent shipment of oil by American tanker from Persia to the Israeli port of Eilat on the Gulf of Akaba. King Saud called on all the Rulers of those Persian Gulf States which produced oil to see that none went to Israel. The Ruler told me he intended to reply by quoting an ordinance issued about a year ago forbidding any dealings in Bahrain with Israel. No approach was made to the Bahrain Petroleum Company about not allowing oil to go to Israel.

8. In connexion with the Ruler's criticism of the Bahrain Petroleum Company for not doing enough to find more oil in Bahrain it was decided once the Saudi oil was flowing again to encourage him to make an approach to King Saud on the matter of the sea-bed between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia where the boundary between the two countries has not yet been agreed, in spite of considerable negotiations up to the spring of 1955. Now, with no diplomatic relations between Britain and Saudi Arabia an approach by us was impossible and was anyhow bedevilled by the question of Buraimi. Both the Adviser, Sir Charles Belgrave, and the Ruler's uncle, Shaikh Abdulla bin Isa, had been trying to persuade the Ruler to move in this but he had hitherto refused to do so. Accordingly, I raised the point with him, on your Excellency's instructions, in April and found him ready, apparently, to take action provided we saw no objection. He said he would have to sound out the ground very cautiously first. So far it has not been possible to do anything because of Ramadan, the month of fasting, which ended at the beginning of May and because of King Saud's subsequent visit to Iraq.

9. The hardy question of Zubarah, the ruined village in Qatar to which the Al Khalifa of Bahrain have laid claim for over 100 years now and which is pursued with tiresome tenacity by the present Ruler of Bahrain, has come up yet again. While however Shaikh Salman has now moved some way from his previous

proposals the Shaikh of Qatar has become more intransigent being now no longer dependent on Bahrain for anything, as he and his father have been in the past, so any settlement must unfortunately be regarded as unlikely.

10. As regards administrative and constitutional development, it is likely that quite a lot of the proposals made by Mr. J. W. Cummins in his report (see my despatch No. 4 under reference) will be applied, if slowly and piecemeal. At present things are held up owing to uncertainty about the health of Sir Charles Belgrave. One difficulty will however be to find the trained and experienced Bahrainis to fill the various posts which Mr. Cummings recommends—in particular that of Secretary to the Government—see paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 4 under reference. On the legal side Dr. Sanhoury, the Egyptian jurist who was commissioned in 1955 to revise the penal code which the Ruler had wished to introduce that summer, at our suggestion, but had not done so in the face of opposition worked up by the Higher Executive Committee to certain parts of the code dealing mainly with personal status, has now at length, produced a new penal code altogether. It is a lengthy document and the Bahrain Government is studying it. The original penal code was in fact introduced last November, at the time of the Suez disturbances here, without the sections dealing with personal status which had aroused opposition the previous year. I understand that Dr. Sanhoury's draft may be used to provide those sections but that those parts of the Bahrain penal code already enacted would not be altered. Dr. Sanhoury has also produced criminal procedure rules. On April 6th, by a Queen's Regulation, you transferred to the Ruler, with his agreement, jurisdiction over Moroccans, Tunisians, Libyans, Sudanese, Egyptians, Lebanese, Jordanians, Syrians, Iraqis, stateless persons of Palestinian origin, persons from the Aden Protectorate and from the Italian Trust Territory of Somalia. The Ruler issued a parallel proclamation announcing his assumption of this jurisdiction. This transfer enables the Bahrain Government to deal with undesirables of these Middle East nationalities itself without the necessity for recourse to Her Majesty's Court for Bahrain as had been the case hitherto.

11. After much delay the Government has now appointed headmen to all the larger villages and to groups of the very small ones. These men, who live in their own villages, will serve as a useful link between the Government and the villages in question and should do much to disprove the criticism of the villages, that the Ruler and his Government do not take enough interest in them and in their problems. There will also be a department in Manama specifically to deal with these headmen and look after them.

12. Interest in the three Bahrain prisoners in St. Helena where they are undergoing prison sentences has waned here, except among their families and immediate circle. It is now mainly the Egyptian wireless that pays any attention to them. They sent a petition to the Ruler in March to be allowed to return to Bahrain to finish their sentences but he rejected it.

13. As I have already indicated the Bahrain police are now much better able to deal with, and know about, undesirables and this fact has not I think been lost on potential troublemakers both in and outside Bahrain. Vigilance must however be continuous. In general the police have benefited from the test of the November disturbances. They have acquired a new confidence in themselves and are treated with an entirely new respect by the public. By order of the Ruler and with our approval the force has now become unified as an entirely police body, the mobile, military wing which has hitherto existed having been abolished and its men re-incorporated as police. There are now 15 British officers, with one sanctioned post for a British officer as yet unfilled. It may fairly be said that now, within its limits, which are circumscribed owing to lack of numbers, the Bahrain State Police is a useful force ready for instant action and this is known to the public. I fear that stiffening from behind in the shape of British forces in Bahrain will be necessary for some years yet. The trouble is recruiting the actual policemen. The Bahraini is not interested in police work and the Bahrain public, while they no longer despise the police, do not like them. So young men from Bahrain do not seem to like going into the force although the pay is good. And finding men from outside is equally difficult. A strength of 1,000 has now been approved but the actual numbers have remained at about 600 for many months so recruitment only in fact makes good wastage.

14. The labour law is almost ready for enactment. It will be less favourable to the workers than the original draft prepared by the Labour Law Committee

in 1955 and 1956 but that is inevitable after the events of November 1956 and the demise of the Committee of National Union. The Ruler could hardly have been expected to accept all of its many—for Bahrain—somewhat radical provisions. I also think the development not undesirable, provided certain points, such as the right to strike, are not lost, since the original draft, though very good and up-to-date, was in my view too advanced for a Bahrain in normal circumstances. Yet while the Government was negotiating on it from a position essentially weak such a result was more or less unavoidable. A workmen's compensation ordinance is also now being drafted, to supplement the labour ordinance when it comes into force.

15. 1957 has, for Bahrain, been a quieter year, so far, than for a long time. The people on the whole welcome this interlude of relative normality for they are tired of politics. Only a small minority would like to continue agitating, and no doubt will continue with support of various kinds and degrees from outside. There is however a danger, though not a near one. While we must try to see that a renewal of political agitation is staved off for as long as possible we must also try to see that the Ruler, who is reactionary by nature, by upbringing and by association, does not use this calm solely to strengthen his own autocratic position and that of the Al Khalifa. There is I feel some hope that he will not do so but he needs to be watched constantly and, when possible, have any undesirable tendency checked. Bahrain was, in my view, lucky that it had quite a serious disturbance in November last. Much material damage and loss were caused and the mere fact of this made most Bahrainis realise very forcibly the undesirability and even danger of allowing such disturbances to occur, including allowing political agitators freedom and giving them encouragement to preach upheaval. Bahrain's interest which had up till the first days of November been focused on the Suez Canal was sharply brought back to things at home. With that came the general realisation of the dangerous consequences of political agitations. The fact that British forces intervened I think did British prestige good here, particularly since their intervention was, most fortunately, not attended by any casualties. The Ruler has, since then, complained about their activities from time to time but more I think from the point of view that thoughtless acts by the Army do Her Majesty's Government harm and thereby the Ruler for his association with the British and for having agreed to the forces being here than because the forces are in fact here. I think too the Ruler now realises how much he is dependent on us for the maintenance of his position. This situation of course has its own dangers, taking the longer view. I feel however that provided we can, in the next year or two, induce or if necessary bully the Ruler into going the right way under our protection the danger inherent in our maintaining ourselves here by what is in fact force could be greatly lessened. There is no question but that the Ruler himself is deeply attached to his connexion with us and recently he has several times sharply criticised the policy of Egypt to me.

I have, &c.

C. A. GAULT

(Her Majesty's Political Agent).

EA 1019/6

No 7

THE TENTH MEETING OF THE TRUCIAL COUNCIL

Sir Bernard Burrows to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received May 29)

(No. 69. Confidential)

Bahrain,

May 23, 1957.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Political Agent, Trucial States, which encloses the agenda⁽¹⁾ and minutes⁽¹⁾ of the tenth meeting of the Trucial Council and of the first meeting of the Education and Public Health Committees held in Dubai on the 13th of May.

2. These meetings marked a further stage in the slow process of bringing the Rulers of the Trucial States to a better realisation of their responsibilities in the modern world. Even the least co-operative of the Shaikhs are now beginning to take a more active part in the meetings, while the more advanced of them have, I think, some idea of what we are driving at.

3. I believe that the newly-formed Education Council is perhaps the most important of the enterprises on which we have so far embarked in the Trucial States. As I remarked in my despatch No. 43 of the 2nd of April, education, particularly as imparted by expatriate Arab teachers, is likely to destroy the political tranquillity which these little shaikhdoms have until recently enjoyed. I am convinced that the only way to control the pernicious influences which may creep in under the guise of education is by enlisting the support of the local Rulers and other notables whose position is just as much threatened by Egyptian ideas as our own. The establishment of an Education Council is the first step in this direction. I have outlined what I believe to be the next step in my letter 1745/1⁽¹⁾ of the 22nd of May to Mr. Riches, in which I have given the details of a scheme for training local teachers to replace the Egyptians and Palestinians on whom the Persian Gulf States have been compelled to rely.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch, without enclosure, to Her Majesty's Political Agent, Trucial States.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

Enclosure

Mr. Tripp to Sir Bernard Burrows (Bahrain)

Dubai,

May 18, 1957.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith two copies of the agenda⁽¹⁾ and minutes⁽¹⁾ of the tenth meeting of the Trucial Council, and of the first meetings of Education and Public Health Committees, which were held in Dubai on the 13th of May.

2. The meetings were attended by all the Trucial States' Rulers, except the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah, who was absent in Bahrain, and for whom his son, Shaikh Khalid bin Saqr, deputised. It was unfortunate that Shaikh Shakhbut was again unsupported by any of his brothers, who are all in the United States of America. However, Shaikh Shakhbut made one or two small contributions to the discussions, and did not maintain his customary stony silence.

3. I am glad to be able to report that the meeting was distinguished by the Rulers' ready participation in discussions of nearly all the items on the agenda, which is perhaps not sufficiently reflected in the minutes. As usual, Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan was the most prepared to debate projects under discussion. But it was gratifying to hear such habitually silent members as the Rulers of Ajman and

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

SECRET

Umm el Quwain speak up. The sense of their interventions was to show that they supported the various initiatives of Her Majesty's Government in trying to improve conditions in the Trucial States and that they valued the British connexion.

4. As had been agreed with your Excellency, I took the opportunity afforded by the Council meeting to launch the Education Committee. As will be seen from its terms of reference drawn up by Mr. Muir and myself, we intend to encourage Rulers to control education in the Trucial States through this committee, with our guidance. We may thus be able to prevent Jordanian and Syrian teachers from introducing those objectionable influences which threaten our own and the Rulers' interests, and our cordial relations with the Rulers. The only dissentient voice was that of the Ruler of Sharjah, who is, I think, anxious on two counts: first, that any sort of control via this Agency offends his pride, and, second, that any co-ordinated educational effort in the Trucial States is bound to affect the "most-favoured-nation" treatment which Shaikh Saqr has managed with some skill to secure for Sharjah. However, with the reasonable reservation that he would wish to be sure that Kuwait had no objection to the committee, he was prepared to vote for its creation. The other Rulers seemed to welcome the prospect of being able to control expatriate teachers.

5. I was very glad to be able to inform Rulers of the impressive help which Her Majesty's Government have agreed to give the Trucial States in 1957-58. There is no doubt that this help is very much appreciated and the scale and scope of the projects fires the imagination of even these rather apathetic bedouin. I believe we can look forward to increasing interest and support from Rulers and people for our various plans for improving the area, as we begin to put something on the ground. It is a slow and often disheartening process, and we are constantly fighting to demonstrate the positive, tangible benefits of the British connexion, against the empty promises and anti-British propaganda of Egypt. I am quite sure that but for our timely efforts to improve conditions here, we should be coming under very strong local criticism by now.

6. I hope the inauguration of the Public Health Committee, with fairly wide terms of reference, will lead to a closer association of Rulers with our medical effort here. You are already aware of the difficulties caused by local personalities in this sphere, and I see no prospect of any rapid restoration of confidence. The most I can hope for is to improve facilities and ensure that we and the Rulers get reasonable value for the money spent on medical projects.

7. The Council's approval of the frontier settlement should prove useful in convincing people that, despite the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah's refusal to acknowledge the fairness of his new frontier with Fujairah, we have arrived at a solution which is generally accepted as fair and in accordance with the facts of to-day's situation in the disputed area.

8. There is evidently not much enthusiasm among the Rulers to take effective steps to control the import of arms and ammunition into their States. They all seem to assume that there is no significant traffic in arms.

9. To sum up, I think we may count this tenth meeting of the Council as having been a success, as Rulers were brought to discuss and consider the substantial help which Her Majesty's Government is giving to the Trucial States. Although there is a long way to go before the Council becomes anything more than a deliberative assembly, I have the feeling that these periodic discussions of administrative improvements are gradually having the effect of stimulating Rulers to think about improvements which they wish to see brought about in their States.

I have, &c.

J. P. TRIPP,

Political Agent.

SECRET

56052

D* 2

EA 1086/5

No. 8

SETTLEMENT OF CERTAIN FRONTIERS IN THE TRUCIAL STATES OF THE PERSIAN GULF

Sir Bernard Burrows to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received May 29)

(No. 71. Confidential)

Bahrain,

Sir,

May 24, 1957.

With reference to Mr. Gault's despatch No. 78 of July 16 last, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies⁽¹⁾ of letters written by the Political Agent for the Trucial States to various of the Trucial States' Rulers giving his decisions about the frontiers between their States. These awards virtually complete the task of defining these frontiers except for one or two matters of detail and except in so far as it is impossible to make complete settlements in certain areas before the frontiers between the Trucial States and Muscat are also dealt with. As you know, it is hoped to make progress with this latter task at the end of the year. The decisions announced in these letters have been received without adverse comment by the Rulers except in two cases. One comparatively minor one was a complaint by the Ruler of Sharjah that too much territory had been allotted to the Ruler of Ajman in the neighbourhood of Manamah. This is understood to have been settled after the Ruler of Ajman had expressed readiness to swear to his evidence before Qadis.

2. The other case is the far more important one of the frontiers between Ras al Khaimah and Fujairah which I described at length in my telegram No. 487 of April 26. As authorised in your telegram No. 694 of April 29, I wrote Shaikh Saqr a letter, of which I also enclose a copy,⁽¹⁾ in which I told him that we were unable to change the decision but would help him in every possible way in working out the details of the practical arrangements for the sharing of rights in the area in question and for access to isolated pieces of territory. Shaikh Saqr replied in a letter in which he said he could not accept this settlement unless the whole question was referred to a Shar'a Court whose members he would have to approve. I gave him reasons in a lengthy conversation, in which Mr. Tripp also took part, why we did not feel that this would be appropriate and at his request sent him a further brief letter saying that I could add nothing to my letter of May 3. Shaikh Saqr sent yet another letter in reply in which he made the point that he had not previously given us authority to settle his boundaries except those with the Ruler of Sharjah and the Ruler of Umm al Qaiwain, and said that he would not be bound by any settlement other than these.

3. This refers back to a letter which he wrote to the Political Agent in January 1955 in response to a request that he should give us authority to settle his boundaries with these two States. Authority was not sought for settling the boundaries with Fujairah because it was at that time uncertain whether we would in fact wish to proceed with this difficult task. When the successful settlement of the other boundaries encouraged us to tackle the mountain area also no further written authority was obtained from Shaikh Saqr, mainly because it was felt that he would give a flat refusal to any such request since he has always purported not to "recognise" the Ruler of Fujairah as a ruler. It was decided instead to pursue general discussions of frontier matters with him, and to draw him gradually into a position where we would in fact be dealing, with his knowledge, with the Ras al Khaimah-Fujairah frontiers, but without actually putting this question to him in so many words. This was done over a period of months, and Mr. Walker succeeded in securing in addition to Shaikh Saqr's oral approval the provision by him of guides and witnesses to tour in Ras al Khaimah and in the disputed territory. Shaikh Saqr also collected evidence and submitted various written claims describing and naming the villages, wadis, trees, &c., on which he relied for his case over the frontiers with Fujairah. He also authorised Mr. Walker to collect information and evidence from his subjects and others. During the course of nearly two years' investigation in this manner of the Ras al Khaimah-Fujairah frontier Shaikh Saqr

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

SECRET

never once protested orally or in writing against the fact that we were obviously proceeding with the settlement of the claim. Moreover, some of the places mentioned in Mr. Tripp's letter to Shaikh Saqr of April 1, 1956 (copy enclosed in my despatch No. 37 of April 20, 1956) are in territory bordering on Fujairah and there is a specific reservation with regard to Fujairah's claims in Mr. Tripp's letter to him of July 2, 1956 (copy enclosed in Mr. Gault's despatch under reference). In addition we have the general authority given in the undertaking by Shaikh Saqr of May 30, 1948, at the time of his accession (reproduced on pages 44 and 45 of the "Collection of Treaties") in which he states, with specific reference to the question of frontiers, that he will accept the arbitration of Her Majesty's Government in case of dispute with other Rulers. It is also significant that when the question of frontier delimitation was raised in a general way at meetings of the Trucial Council in 1954 and 1956, Shaikh Saqr made no reservation to the effect that he would not agree to our defining his frontiers with Fujairah.

4. It would no doubt have been possible to send Shaikh Saqr a further lengthy reply on these lines but I concluded after securing the views of Mr. Tripp that his main object in writing this final letter was to have the last word and to be able to say that he had not willingly accepted the settlement but that it was being forced upon him, and it appeared that in the circumstances it would be futile for us to enter into further argument. I have therefore not replied to this letter. Shaikh Saqr finally came to see me on May 17 and told me that he intended to return to his State on the following day. He repeated that he could not recognise the frontier settlement with Fujairah and that he intended to continue to "defend his rights and his houses". I replied, after appropriate expressions of Her Majesty's Government's friendship and my sorrow at having to make a decision unpalatable to him, that I realised that he did not willingly accept the settlement and that it was of course open to him as to anyone else to pursue his claims by all legal and peaceful means, but that I relied on him personally not to cause any trouble or disturbance, and that we would hold him responsible if any such things occurred as a result of his actions.

5. Mr. Tripp has reported that at the Trucial Council meeting on May 13, at which the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah was not present but his son deputised for him, the Rulers appeared content with the frontier settlements and that after the meeting the Rulers of Umm al Qaiwain, Ajman and Sharjah individually assured him that they considered that the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah should have abided by the decision announced to him in Mr. Tripp's letter of March 18. It is particularly significant that the Ruler of Sharjah, as a fellow member of the Qawasim family, should have taken this line. Mr. Tripp is of the opinion that the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah would never have taken his present intransigent line if he had not been encouraged to do so by the bin Ghurair family of Dubai who are known to be among the leading representatives of Saudi influence in the Trucial Coast, and by the Jordanian schoolmaster at Ras al Khaimah, both of whom have influenced him to make as much trouble as possible. A recent report from the Commander of the squadron of the Trucial Oman Scouts who are in the disputed area confirms that the great majority of the inhabitants are not at all concerned with the results of the settlement, and that those on each side of the new frontier line are on very friendly terms with each other. Shaikh Saqr appears to be unpopular throughout the area.

6. I must once again express my warm admiration for the work undertaken by Mr. Walker in preparing these frontier settlements. It is a great pity that this one case should have caused so much trouble but the ease with which the other settlements have been accepted makes it all the more likely that in the Ras al Khaimah case also his assessment of the situation is correct.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Mr. Tripp at Dubai and to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Muscat.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

SECRET

EA 1642/15

No. 9

JURISDICTION IN THE PERSIAN GULF*Mr. Riches to Sir Bernard Burrows (Bahrain)*(Confidential)
Sir,Foreign Office,
May 30, 1956.

We have again been considering with the legal advisers our future legislative and judicial policy in the Persian Gulf in the light of developments since the discussions that were held on the subject when you were in London last. In recent years, our policy has been, broadly speaking, that recommended by Sir Eric Beckett after his visit to the Persian Gulf in April 1952. It was intended that the Rulers of Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar should enact laws and codes similar to ours and we believed that the difficulties arising from the existence of a dual jurisdiction would be much increased if the two systems of law administered were substantially different.

2. Events have now moved more swiftly than was expected in 1952: not only has the history of the Bahrain Penal Code warned us that it may be a difficult and lengthy business to persuade the Rulers to enact codes and laws similar to our own, but the pressure of Arab nationalism has begun to be seriously felt in the Gulf and we may not be able everywhere to retain our separate jurisdiction indefinitely. It is certainly no part of our policy to give it up, but we must take account of the fact that extra-territorial jurisdiction has disappeared elsewhere in the Middle East and is likely to come under increasing attack as an anachronism even in the Persian Gulf. In these circumstances we cannot afford perfectionism but should concentrate on persuading the Rulers to establish a legal system which will be tolerable to both Europeans and Muslims. This will probably mean accepting a lower standard than we originally had in mind. But if we continue to press for the high standard of justice embodied in laws drafted on a British model, we may risk achieving nothing. If we then had to relinquish our jurisdiction, those now subject to it would be left to unpredictable Arab courts. Paragraphs 3-8 below set out some of the steps that we might take to ensure that this does not happen. These paragraphs do not seek to lay down policy; they represent our thinking on the matter and I believe to some extent your own.

3. First, we should strongly encourage the Rulers to accept the idea that they need codified laws. If we can persuade them to take this view, we should offer our help in drafting any codes that may be necessary. If they want English models we shall be very glad to try to supply them. But if they prefer a code based on Turkish, Egyptian and Iraqi models, we should not stand in their way. However inferior such a code might be to the best English law, it would be greatly preferable to the type of law of that the Shaikhs would apply if they had failed to accept any external example and had followed their own inclinations.

4. Secondly, we should encourage the Rulers to appoint trained judges. A great part of the trouble in the Gulf legal systems springs from the persistent belief by the Rulers that judicial and administrative powers go hand in hand. There is probably as much need to reform the judges as to reform the law. Initially, the Rulers would need to import trained judges from outside; these would most probably be found from Egypt and we should have to face the problem of further increasing Egyptian influence throughout the Gulf. But a policy which would pay better in the long run, would be to send young men to study law at universities in Muslim countries.

5. Thirdly, we might present draft laws to the Rulers for parallel but not necessarily identical application. In doing this we should try to avoid the sort of reaction which the Bahrain Penal Code excited, and we should make it clear that the draft was merely a basis for discussion. As a means to this we might (if we could get financial authority!) add to your staff a Muslim Legal Adviser whose job it would be to smooth the path of this type of law by suppressing the more obvious objections in the draft before it reached the Ruler.

6. We should of course also continue our present policy of advising the Rulers to accept our legislation on subjects which are controlled by international

SECRET

agreements, which we must apply to the Shaikhdoms: e.g., on the control of drugs and air navigation. Here we must, of course, be careful not to offend their susceptibilities by hustling them. The legislation submitted must be as simple as is consistent with international requirements.

7. By these four means we might go some way towards ensuring that if our jurisdiction did cease in the Gulf, we should leave a concrete, reliable judicial system, which would at least be no worse than that of the more advanced Middle Eastern States.

8. Meanwhile there are, I think, improvements that might be made within our existing courts. For instance, a permanent Assistant Judge of the Chief Court might be stationed permanently in the Gulf so that Political Agents can refer the more complicated cases to him to hear at first instance. We might once more, and this time more radically, revise the Orders in Council, which at present are so detailed and restrictive as to make it impossible to have a flexible policy. They could be recast in a shorter and more general form. In doing this we should remember that our laws are often administered by officers with no legal background, and that the simplicity of the law is often more important than its perfection.

9. We might gain invaluable help in deciding our future judicial and legislative policy by obtaining the opinion of a group of lawyers who had visited the Gulf. The composition of such a group would not be easy: Professor Norman Anderson has been suggested since he probably knows more of the problems arising from the interaction of Muslim and European laws than anybody else available. But he would need to be supported by somebody with extensive judicial experience and possibly someone with experience of the actual process of producing legislation.

10. Connected with this whole problem is the extent of the jurisdiction which we now possess in the Gulf. It seems to me that the retention of our jurisdiction over Muslims is open to legitimate criticism and is not essential to the maintenance of our influence. As an obtrusive element in our special position it is a likely target not only for the resentment of the Rulers and their more progressive subjects, but also for Egyptian and Saudi propaganda. It covers Muslims who are neither British subjects nor British protected persons. In order to preserve the essentials of our position in the Gulf we must be prepared to sacrifice the non-essentials. I therefore wonder whether we should not make a spontaneous gesture in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar by offering to transfer Muslims whose retention is not necessary to us, rather than wait until the Rulers press us to.

11. Muslims fall into four categories:—

- (a) Those who are subjects of foreign non-Muslim Governments.
- (b) Those who are the subjects of foreign Muslim Governments.
- (c) Those who are British subjects.
- (d) Those who are British protected persons.

12. Muslims who are the subjects of foreign non-Muslim Governments should not, I think, be transferred from our jurisdiction. Such a transfer would offend against the principle (to which we attach importance) that the classes of people transferred should be defined by nationality rather than religion.

13. I think that the subjects of foreign Muslim Governments should be transferred in both Bahrain and Qatar as they have recently been in Kuwait because their retention seems to be an anomaly which it would be difficult to defend against local pressure. In most cases the transfer could be effected by an exchange of letters between individual Shaikhs, and the foreign Government would not have to be consulted. Some categories might cause difficulty: for instance, we should probably retain the Turks, who consider themselves Europeans.

14. Muslim British subjects should probably not be transferred, since this would make an undesirable distinction between Her Majesty's Muslim and Christian subjects. Therefore we should retain jurisdiction over British subjects from Aden Colony and persons from such parts of British Somaliland as qualify as British subjects. Pakistan, as the only Commonwealth Muslim State, would also be in a special position. Before giving up jurisdiction over Pakistanis we should have to consult the Pakistan Government.

SECRET

15. The position of British-protected persons—e.g., persons from the Aden Protectorate, Zanzibar and the Federated Malay States—is complicated by their right of appeal to the Privy Council from Her Majesty's Courts in the Gulf Shaikhdoms. If we transfer them to the Rulers' jurisdiction, they are deprived of this right, and this might give cause for complaint. But I should question how much they value this privilege which they appear never to have exercised, and believe that, subject to consideration by the Colonial Office and the legal authorities, they too should be transferred to the Rulers' jurisdiction. In particular, as we have already agreed to transfer natives of the Aden Protectorate to the jurisdiction of the Ruler of Kuwait, we should do the same in Qatar and Bahrain.

16. None of my above suggestions is intended to apply to the Trucial States. Their courts could not cope with sweeping extensions of their competence, and their Rulers would probably not welcome the added responsibility.

17. The transfers suggested above would result in the Rulers' having jurisdiction over virtually all Muslims, while we should retain jurisdiction over Christians. Such a general rule would be infringed in some cases by the decision to define the categories of persons transferred by their nationality rather than their religion. But delimitation of the groups of religion would lead to undesirable distinctions and legal difficulties. There would in addition be exceptions discussed above such as the natives of Aden Colony and the Turks.

18. I should be glad to have your comments on all these suggestions.

Yours ever,

D. M. H. RICHES.

EA 1051/16

No. 10

THE FUTURE OF THE PERSIAN GULF STATES

Sir Bernard Burrows to Mr. Beeley. (Received June 3)

(No. 1041 G. Secret)
Sir,

Bahrain,

May 27, 1957.

I imagine that one of the topics for discussion at the Baghdad meeting next month will be future policy with regard to the Persian Gulf States as discussed in recent despatches from Tehran, Baghdad and myself. In the hope of concentrating such discussion in view of the very short time available I have put down in the enclosed paper some of the main points which seem to me to emerge from the correspondence, and some further thoughts on them.

2. I am sending copies of this letter to Baghdad, Tehran, Ankara, Beirut, Karachi, POMEF and Kuwait.

Yours ever,

B. A. B. BURROWS.

Enclosure

The object of this paper is to put together in summary form some of the comments which have been made on this subject in recent correspondence in the hope of seeing where the points of difference really lie and whether anything positive can be done about them.

2. The three chief lines of criticism on the present situation appears to be as follows:—

(1) It is out-of-date. It is not forward looking. It is therefore impossible that informed public opinion or the United States Government will continue to support the present arrangement.

(2) The British position in the Persian Gulf makes difficulties for us in our relationship with neighbouring States, particularly Iraq and Persia. Conversely the better present prospects of agreement between these States may tend to be at the expense of our position in the Gulf.

(3) Owing to the United Nations, Suez, &c., we can no longer effectively exercise our protecting role.

3. As regards (1) the impetus for change comes from several directions. The idea is spread by even responsible publicists (Nutting, Sulzberger, Monroe are recent examples). Even without their efforts it is fairly deeply rooted in a good deal of American opinion. A different source is the Arab Nationalist anti-Imperialist trend inside and outside the Gulf which holds up as an alternative to British protection a guarantee from some or all of the Arab States.

4. Federation might possibly be advocated by the younger elements in the Gulf States. It would never appeal to the Rulers and older and more responsible people. It is not clear how it would add to the strength of the States or improve their economic prospects. The economies of the oil-rich States are too much alike. There is too big a gap between them and the poor ones. Kuwait and Qatar already contribute to Trucial Coast development. It appears that we should not advocate Federation, but should not appear to oppose the idea if it came up from below. We can continue to push the Trucial States very gradually towards Confederation through the Trucial Council.

5. A multilateral guarantee of individual States is likely to be a good deal more attractive locally. It could have two forms, one in which we participated and the other a purely Arab or Middle Eastern affair. Recent events in Jordan would not give confidence in a purely Arab League guarantee. But the latent force of pan-Arabism should not be under-estimated. It is irrational and cannot be answered by arguments of prudence or even self-interest. Changing a British for

an Arab guarantee could be made into a powerful slogan. This would be accompanied by the "Arabisation" of the oil and the use of oil revenues for immediate expenditure in the non-producing Middle Eastern countries. A guarantee by neighbours, *i.e.*, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Persia, added to our existing protection is less unattractive. It would be for consideration whether the United States should also take part. There would of course be many practical disadvantages. The guarantors would no doubt all expect to be separately represented in the Persian Gulf States. There would thus be an end of our special position. It is not clear who would conduct the foreign relations of the Gulf States. Perhaps they could be allowed to choose. It is also far from clear what would happen if the guarantors disagreed among themselves about action to be taken (cp. the tripartite declaration on Palestine). Once we had given up our special position it might be argued that there was no reason for us to be among the guarantors. Any such proposals would be abhorrent to the Rulers of Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. They would only see advantage in becoming more independent within our protection, not in becoming dependent on more people. Many Arabs in the Gulf would want Egypt included as well. Kuwait would not like to be guaranteed by Iraq, whom she cordially distrusts. Persia would find it difficult to guarantee the independence of Bahrain. Abu Dhabi would not like being guaranteed by Saudi Arabia. It would be necessary for all outstanding frontier questions to be settled first, including sea bed frontiers, since otherwise the guarantors would not know what they were guaranteeing. Apart from these particular objections there is the general argument that if we initiate *any* change it may very likely go in a direction we do not like. This is particularly true while Egyptian influence remains ideologically strong. This would be the case even if we tried to change the nature of our representation in Kuwait as is advocated from time to time.

6. Another frequent source of criticism is the autocratic and backward nature of internal government in these States. An obvious first answer is that no other Middle Eastern country has made a success of democracy. Another less obvious point, when we are asked why we encourage democratic institutions in colonies but not in the Gulf States, is that in the former the autocracy is foreign, therefore movements for independence or self-government are inevitably pro-democratic. The rulers are the imperialists, the people are the natives striving to be free. In the Gulf States the autocrats are just as local as the people. It is true that we are often criticised for supporting them and keeping them in power, but in Kuwait and Qatar at least this is only very remotely true. The régimes are fully capable of absorbing the early stages of democratic attack by themselves. There is thus no obligation on us, even if it were assumed that we wished gradually to shed our imperialistic burden, to take active measures to install democracies. The Americans have not made much progress in installing democracy in Saudi Arabia. If they do not think it right to try to do this, there is no greater reason why we should try in the Gulf. In fact Bahrain may well be working out gradually a constitutional system, based on functional representation, which is far better suited to local conditions than Western democratic forms. Kuwait too has developed the traditional freedom of discussion in the Shaikh's tent into a system of departmental consultation between the Shaikhly President of the Department and a majlis of other citizens.

7. As regards (2), as against the criticism that our position in the Gulf makes difficulties with Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Persia, it should perhaps be considered that our position in the Gulf is one of our few remaining acts of presence in the Middle East. Our command of the approaches to the Baghdad Pact under-belly may be held to be a part of our *locus standi* in the Pact and to add weight to our participation.

8. Iraq, Persia and Saudi Arabia do not at present seem able to make much headway for themselves in the Gulf States. In so far as there is any outside influence other than ours, that of Egypt predominates, except that in Qatar importance is attached to relations with Saudi Arabia. In a sense the existence of these three large States, each with designs on various parts of the Gulf States, strengthens the belief widely held in the Gulf States that if it were not for us they would quickly be swallowed up. Nevertheless it would undoubtedly be helpful, even for our own relations with the Gulf States, if the three larger neighbours accepted their independent existence.

9. There is an element of truth in (3), the question of our ability to exercise our protection effectively in present circumstances. We can no doubt still give help more effectively than anyone else in the event of a major military attack on any of the States under our protection, but it is very unlikely that the threat will be of this nature. The most likely threats are:—

(a) the detachment of isolated or disputed bits of territory, *e.g.*, the Persian seizure of Farsi;

(b) subversion.

As regards (a), it is true that after Suez it would be more difficult for us than before to do another Buraimi-type operation, though it is to be hoped that we would be ready to do so at least in the event of Persian seizure of one of the inhabited Trucial Coast islands. In addition to restraints on forcible action on our part, we have come across the difficulty typified by the fact that we have been hampered in securing a settlement of the Bahrain-Saudi sea bed frontier by our bad relations with the Saudis over the entirely separate question of the Abu Dhabi frontier and Buraimi. In certain circumstances like this it seems best to encourage the local Rulers to negotiate informally on their own. But this has not so far worked well between Kuwait and Iraq. The existence of this difficulty should spur us on to reach settlements of outstanding territorial issues. If we cannot represent the interests of these States effectively it may soon come to be believed for instance that Kuwait is more valuable to us than we to Kuwait.

10. As regards (b), subversion, we can offer extremely valuable help through the Security Services, &c., in relating individual security problems to our wider knowledge of the pattern throughout the area. Unfortunately overt liaison between local security authorities and ourselves is difficult in Kuwait because this is thought likely to attract further hostile propaganda and subversive attempts. Strenuous efforts are being made to overcome this difficulty.

11. The sequence of events in Jordan is relevant to all this, though it is perhaps too early to draw the final morals from it. It could be argued that Jordan was better able to take severe action against subversives because she had previously terminated her relations with us. It could also be said that in this case American aid was more effective than ours. On the other hand the moral can also be drawn that Jordan would not have got into such serious trouble to begin with if she had not broken her connexion with us.

12. The two Persian Gulf States which are most nearly able to look after themselves are Kuwait and Muscat. These are also the States in which our position is least obvious. This suggests that we can and should make our position less obtrusive. We are in the process of doing this by, *e.g.*, transfers of jurisdiction, handing over the Postal Services, the departure of the Adviser from Bahrain, reduction of the British forces there. We have still some way to go in these directions before there is any danger to the fundamentals of our position.

13. The inter-relation of Aden and the Gulf requires closer study on the political side than it has received. Two tendencies are apparent. Gulf Rulers have expressed satisfaction, or understanding, of our defence of the Protectorates against the Yemen, but at the same time the more colonial flavour of the Administration in Aden gives openings for more intensive hostile propaganda which spills over into the Gulf. Is there a case for making our relationship with some or all of the Aden States more like that with the Gulf States? In the Eastern Protectorate at least this is no doubt in practice more or less the case already. If so could we make more advantage of the facts by giving our relationship a new look? If some of the Aden Rulers could be encouraged to take a more active part themselves could they aspire to the more independent situation of Muscat?

14. The following are among the conclusions which suggest themselves for future policy:—

(a) The maintenance of our position in the Gulf will continue to be very much influenced by outside events and by the policies which we are seen to adopt as regards other Middle Eastern questions. Evidence of diplomatic skill and success will be the greatest influence in our favour and vice versa. Our position in the Gulf should no longer be taken for granted politically. Policies likely to affect it should be considered in the light of their effects in the Gulf.

- (b) We can continue to make our presence less obtrusive in non-essential matters.
- (c) We should not at present launch any scheme for major change in our relationship with the Persian Gulf States.
- (d) We should encourage contacts of all kinds, short of political and military, between the Gulf States and neighbouring friendly powers.
- (e) We should let it be known politely to the neighbouring States that they are at present disliked and feared at least by those Gulf States with whom territorial questions are outstanding, and that this is a much greater obstacle than our position to their having closer relations with the Gulf States. If they want to increase that influence they must first be ready to settle outstanding questions in a generous spirit as from a large power to a small one.
- (f) In suitable cases we can encourage direct contact on individual questions, e.g., Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, Muscat and Pakistan (though the chances of Muscat agreeing to this are very slim), Kuwait and Iraq.
- (g) We could try to proceed to actual negotiation about certain outstanding questions. We are already handling the Iraq-Kuwait frontiers. If we made progress with this we could go on to the Northern sea bed frontiers. As soon as we have relations with Saudi Arabia again we could try the Northern Islands.
- (h) We could try to indicate to the other Baghdad Pact Powers that our position in the Gulf is a source of strength to the Pact and that it is most unlikely that any alternative arrangements would result in as close ties between the Gulf States and any Pact member or the Pact generally.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

SECRET

EA 1015/18

No. 11

OPERATIONS AGAINST DISSIDENT OMANIS

Mr. Gault to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received June 25)

(No. 83. Confidential)
Sir,

Bahrain,
June 20, 1957.

Ever since their failure at Buraimi in 1955 the Saudi Arabian Government have been maintaining a number of Omani malcontents in a camp near Damman in Eastern Saudi Arabia. When they have been in special favour with their masters, these Omanis have been given the title of "Omani Liberation Army" but their numbers seem never to have exceeded 500. Our information about the activities of these people has always been meagre and since the rupture of diplomatic relations, virtually non-existent. I now have the honour to report on what appears to have been their first operation against the authority of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman; day-to-day developments have been reported to you in a series of telegrams, ending with Her Majesty's Consul-General at Muscat's telegram No. 183 to me of the 12th of June.

2. The origin of the recent disturbances appears to have been the deposition of Salih bin Isa from the position of Shaikh of the Harth tribe in the Sharqiyah, which is the extreme eastern part of Muscat. Salih was associated with the Imam Ghalib and fled to Saudi Arabia and thence to Cairo, where he remained with Talib, the Imam's brother. In his place, the tribe nominated Shaikh Ahmed bin Mohamed, a son of a former Shaikh of the tribe, but it appears that his nomination was a perfunctory affair and lacked real tribal support. Although he was accepted by the Sultan, who styled him his Representative in the Sharqiyah, he became increasingly unpopular.

3. It is impossible to say whether the idea of a revolt originated with its eventual leader, Ibrahim bin Isa, a younger brother of Salih, or whether Salih and Talib worked it out in Cairo. Perhaps the most likely answer is that, as suggested in paragraph 16 below, the Saudis were sending the Omani dissidents home; some of them are said to have had instructions to lie low in Oman and await Egyptian or Saudi invading forces. Ibrahim, who had never left the Sharqiyah, may have taken advantage of these arrivals to further his own ambition of supplanting Shaikh Ahmed. It appears certain, however, that a number of men, somewhere between 100 and 200, were sent from Damman by road to Doha, in Qatar, and thence by country craft to Dubai, where they passed themselves off as workmen returning from employment in Saudi Arabia; they continued to Oman by lorry. This movement was discovered through intelligence contacts of the Trucial Oman Scouts, who reported the presence of a party of seven armed Omanis, including a relation of Talib. These were quickly arrested by the Dubai police and interrogated. As all except this small party were unarmed, it was impossible to distinguish between them and genuine returning workers, but the seven were duly handed over to the Muscat authorities.

4. Meanwhile, there seems to have been an increase in the gun-running which takes place endemically along the Trucial and Batinah coasts; energetic but so far unsuccessful attempts have been made by the Political Agent, Trucial States, and Her Majesty's forces to put a stop to this. At the same time Mohammed bin Abdullah al Salmi, a former Sultanate Qadhi and supporter of the Imam, who had fled with Salih, appeared quite openly on the Batinah coast and wrote to the Sultan saying that he had come to collect his family before going to stay in Kuwait. As soon as he reached the Sharqiyah, however, it became apparent that he had brought funds and a few men to help Ibrahim, who was already with his tribe. Shaikh Ahmed appealed to the Sultan for the return of the regular troops which had recently been withdrawn, but received the chilling reply that he had ample means for dealing with the situation himself and if he was fit to be Shaikh he now had the opportunity to prove it.

5. During this period, Cairo Radio increased the wildness of its stories about British repression in Oman, and broadcast fantastic stories of airborne Egyptian and Saudi invasions and of armoured columns crossing the Rub'al Khali. These

SECRET

stories fortunately rebounded on the Egyptians' own heads, because they were either obviously ridiculous, or were rapidly exposed as false. Consequently, when they reported further incidents in Oman which had a foundation of truth, they were not believed.

6. When eventually the Sultan was satisfied that Ibrahim had gathered a force at the village of Dahir in the eastern Sharqiyah and that there was no trouble elsewhere, he ordered a strong company of his regular forces, with artillery and mortar support, to move into the area, and instructed Shaikh Ahmed to assemble a tribal force. In the course of discovering Ibrahim's intentions and location, Shaikh Ahmed's car was fired on by the dissidents. This was the first overt defiance of the Sultan's authority.

7. The Sultan asked for the assistance of the Royal Air Force; Sir Bernard Burrows informed you of this in his telegram No. 525 of the 7th of May. Two Pembroke aircraft from Bahrain went down to Muscat on the 7th and 8th of May and remained there until the 16th of May. They were employed on reconnaissance duties and dropped messages on neighbouring villages warning people to have nothing to do with Ibrahim. This air reconnaissance discovered Ibrahim's force, estimated to number between 150 and 200, on the 9th of May in positions on the hill-tops around Dahir. A Shackleton aircraft from Aden also took photographs of this almost unmapped area.

8. The Sultan's brother, Tarik, who had been placed in political charge of the operation, gave an ultimatum to Ibrahim to disperse his force by the next day and to surrender himself. When the Muscat Force moved up to attack Ibrahim on the next day, Shaikh Ahmed appealed to Said Tarik to stop the attack on the ground that the loyal people of Dahir were so mixed up with the dissidents that they could not be separated. Said Tarik returned to Muscat for further instructions, but reconnaissance on the 10th of May showed that Ibrahim's force had disappeared in the night. Tribal rumours stated that they were marching on Nizwa and would cut the new road in the Wadi Beni Ruwaha. On the following day part of the force was discovered outside the village of Ibra, in the western Sharqiyah.

9. Once again it was not possible to attack the dissidents without harming the loyal subjects, and the Sultan therefore entered into further negotiations. After some days Ibrahim agreed to disperse all his men except an escort of 25 Al Wahibah, who had joined him because they were personally opposed to Shaikh Ahmed. Ibrahim swore on the Koran to leave for Muscat by the end of the month. The regular troops accordingly returned to Firq, near Nizwa.

10. Ibrahim did not keep his oath, but was rejoined by some of his former followers and more Al Wahibah. Loyal tribes round about informed the Sultan and made ready to defend their territory against Ibrahim. Ibrahim wrote to the Sultan, again professing his loyalty, and claiming that the trouble was due to the appointment of Shaikh Ahmed, who must be deposed in favour of himself. There were a number of other conditions in the letter, which the Sultan rejected, as he considered it to be impertinent.

11. The Sultan called upon leading Shaikhs of the neighbourhood to assemble a force to discover Ibrahim, after which the regular forces would attack him without further parleying. He was to be brought in dead or alive. In preparation for this move the Royal Air Force stood by to evacuate casualties, and on the 9th of June provided a communications flight to enable the Muscat Chief of Staff to brief his Field Commander.

12. This operation was postponed on several occasions, but Ibrahim, probably realising that he had lost tribal support, arrived at Sib on the Batinah coast on the 11th of June and surrendered to the Sultan's forces. The Sultan sent for him to come to Muscat on the 14th of June, where he arrived with an escort of 20 of his own men. The Sultan would allow only five of Ibrahim's followers into the palace, and they were quickly separated from him. Ibrahim was then seized and disarmed and taken at once to the Jelali fort, where he was placed in irons. The popular reaction seems to have been slight, and we can, I think, now take it that this particular revolt is over.

13. We know so little of what goes on in the interior of Oman that it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions, but I think we can say straight away that

the timely and welcome help given by the Royal Air Force has paid great dividends. The Sultan has formally requested that an expression of his gratitude should be conveyed to the Royal Air Force authorities; I enclose a copy of his letter.⁽¹⁾ He now appears convinced that Her Majesty's Government mean what they say when they offer friendship and support and he now appears ready to do his part in ensuring that his forces can co-operate effectively with others under our control in this part of the world, and particularly with the Royal Air Force. He has authorised training in co-operation with aircraft and has given permission for the Royal Air Force to conduct training flights over his territory, so that air crews may become familiar with this remote territory and also that his own forces may learn something of the capabilities of aircraft. The Sultan is also more prepared to divulge information about the location and state of training of his own forces. At the same time the amount of help given by the Royal Air Force and the advice offered by Her Majesty's Consul-General at Muscat were not sufficient to constitute pressure on the Sultan to take more forceful military action than he himself wished to take, with the consequent responsibility for any unforeseen results.

14. The temptation to exert special pressure on the Sultan was very strong in the early part of the operation. To Western minds it appears desirable, when a crafty enemy operating in a difficult country has been definitely located by an overwhelming force, to attack at once and subdue all opposition by a timely display of force. The Sultan has always proved himself a shrewd judge of these matters and on this occasion he asserted his authority by typical foxy means. He now has Ibrahim safely locked up, and while his methods may not have been very honest he has attained his end without killing anyone.

15. Major Chauncy thinks that the Sultan is probably awaiting future developments with an open mind. If the leading shaikhs in the interior disapprove of the arrest of Ibrahim they will no doubt protest to the Sultan, who can then demand a guarantee from them for his future good behaviour. If this is forthcoming he can let Ibrahim out with reasonable certainty that he will behave. If there is no such approach the Sultan will probably take silence as implying consent and leave Ibrahim to rot in gaol.

16. The fact that Ibrahim gave himself up to the Sultan instead of escaping back to Saudi Arabia lends colour to a theory held here, that the Saudis had been getting rid of their expensive Omani guests by sending them home to make trouble, and had made it clear that they did not want to see them back again. We have, of course, no means of verifying this hypothesis, but if it is true we may expect more of these people to return to Oman under cover of the seasonal influx for the date harvest in July. I think the best way of preventing this from leading to trouble is to try to prevent further supplies of arms being sent to Oman. The Political Agent, Trucial States, and such of Her Majesty's Forces as are available are therefore making considerable efforts to break up the arms smuggling organisation which has been discovered by patient intelligence work. It remains to be seen how successful this will be.

17. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Political Office, Middle East Forces, at Cyprus, the Commander, British Forces, Arabian Peninsula at Aden, the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, in Ceylon, the Political Agents at Kuwait, Dubai and in Qatar and the Consul-General at Muscat.

I have, &c.

C. A. GAULT
(Officiating Resident).

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

V 1075/41

No. 12

ANGLO-AMERICAN TALKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Mr. Gault (Bahrain)(No. 93. Secret)
Sir,Foreign Office,
July 11, 1957.

At the Bermuda Conference in March it was agreed that there should be talks between British and American officials on Middle East problems "dealing first with those aspects of the problems bearing upon the supply of oil to the free world, with a view to making recommendations for furthering the common interests of the two Governments in this area". It was agreed that officials of the two Governments should first make separate studies of the factors involved, that exchanges of views based on these studies should take place, and that there should then be a visit of American officials to London or British officials to Washington in order that the views of the two sides could be concerted and an agreed submission made to Governments.

2. After the separate studies had been made, views were exchanged between the British Embassy in Washington and the State Department in April. These discussions were informal and cordial, and revealed a very substantial similarity of views. The Americans wanted to concentrate the study mainly on problems connected with oil, according to the letter of the Bermuda brief. On these subjects a paper was produced, with contributions by both sides, which it was agreed to regard as an identical submission to our two Governments for use in the third stage of the discussions. But the paper was not formally approved by Ministers and is not a binding document. I enclose a copy of it (Enclosure 1). As you will see it emerged clearly that the main subject on which there was a difference of opinion was the relationship between our position in the Persian Gulf and the policy of winning Saudi Arabia to the Western side. There were also discussions on the position in Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Egypt; on all of which general agreement was reached. This was in itself an appreciable result (although it subsequently appeared that the Americans had begun to develop some doubts about whether our immediate policy towards Egypt was as firm as theirs). Short notes on the discussions about Iraq and Egypt are attached (Enclosure 2).

3. It was decided that certain other Middle Eastern problems of considerable importance, including aspects of the Arab-Israel conflict like the Gaza Strip and the Strait of Tiran, the Sudan, Nile Waters and Libya should not be covered in that stage of the talks, as being less directly concerned with oil problems. The last three were discussed separately with the State Department by the Head of the African Department who was then in Washington.

4. For the third stage Mr. Loy Henderson, Deputy Under-Secretary for Administration at the State Department, who had acted as American Observer at the Bagdad Pact Council's meeting at Karachi in June, visited London on his way home and held talks with Sir Humphrey Trevelyan between the 12th and 14th of June. He was accompanied by two members of the State Department. Heads of the Middle East Departments took part on the British side.

5. Copies of the Agreed Paper which resulted from the talks—"Measures to Ensure Continued Access to Middle East Petroleum Resources" and a Memorandum setting out the subsidiary points raised by both sides are enclosed (Enclosures 3 and 4). The Paper is based on an American draft which was submitted before the talks began and amended as a result of discussion. For tactical reasons the British Delegation preferred to retain the American wording except where amendment was necessary on a substantive point. The Paper itself does not indicate the whole value of the talks, although it is a useful rehearsal of the common position of the two Governments on Middle East questions and the main divergence between them (Buraimi). Ministers have approved the conclusions and recommendations of the Agreed Paper. Mr. Dulles has also signified approval on behalf of the American Government. Consideration is now being given to how the recommendations in the Agreed Paper can best be followed up and what arrangements should be made for a British party to visit Washington for further talks in accordance with the provisions of Section II, paragraph 9, of the Paper.

SECRET

6. To the Americans Buraimi was the centre-point of the talks. They were disappointed that they could not get us to move towards the Saudi point of view on it, but Mr. Henderson was prepared to understand our position and by the end of the talks seemed to have accepted the fact that we were unable rather than unwilling to do so. He told me that he realised that the obstacle was not our refusal but the situation itself. The exposition of the situation on the ground by Her Majesty's Political Resident, Persian Gulf, who took part in one of the meetings, was largely responsible for Mr. Henderson's change of view. The fact that Mr. Dulles accepted the Agreed Paper in its entirety including recommendation 3 about United States and United Kingdom co-operation "to preserve beneficial United Kingdom relationships with the Persian Gulf and Arabian principalities" and the admission by the American side that the reference in the previous working paper to "elements of weakness" in the United Kingdom's position in the Persian Gulf as a result of insufficient responsiveness to "the legitimate democratic pressures" was unrealistic, show that the Americans have come a considerable way towards our point of view on Persian Gulf matters. They no doubt realised that such arguments could be applied with equal or greater force to Saudi Arabia, though the British side did not seek to rub in this point.

7. Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, with the concurrence of Her Majesty's Political Resident, Persian Gulf, was able to suggest one move which might indirectly help to improve the situation between Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf Rulers: a meeting between King Saud and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman (Agreed Paper, Recommendation 1), not to settle the Buraimi question but in the hope that it might create a better atmosphere and enable us to move towards a settlement of the South-Eastern boundaries of Saudi Arabia. The means of achieving this meeting and the kind of mutual concessions which might be made will have to be very carefully worked out.

8. The other topics discussed on which comment is necessary are:

(a) *Egypt*

I think that we were able to satisfy the Americans (who feared that we were weakening in our opposition to Nasser) that there was no divergence between the policies of the two Governments on Egypt and that we were anxious to keep closely in line with them in a policy of what they call "cutting Nasser down to size". We intend to keep in close touch with the Americans on our Egyptian policy and we have agreed that they should be told in advance before we make any move towards agreement with the Egyptians about British property and Egyptian balances.

(b) *Arab-Israel Dispute*

No progress was made on this subject as the Americans had not cleared their own ideas.

(c) *Jordan*

The joint assessment of the future of Jordan recommended in the Agreed Paper has been submitted (Amman telegram No. 1121 of the 25th of June) to me. Consideration is now being given to the question of financial aid for development in Jordan.

(d) *Persian Gulf Seabed and Islands*

Although the Americans had raised the question of the Persian Gulf seabed and islands during the exchange of views with the Embassy in Washington, they produced no further ideas on the subject. They agreed to our proposal that there should be discussion between British and American officials including legal advisers, in order to see whether we could move towards a settlement of certain specific disputes and to decide on the principles which we should seek to have recognised by the States concerned in order to assist the settlement and prevent the inflammation of disputes and to minimise difficulties likely to arise in the grant of oil concessions. One purpose will be to try and prevent any further seizure of unoccupied islands in the Persian Gulf.

(e) *Aden and the Yemen*

Paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of subsidiary points records the discussion on Aden and the Yemen. The Agreed Paper does not mention Aden directly but its importance is indicated by the stress laid on the sea route

SECRET

56052

E*

through the Persian Gulf (the Americans admit Aden is an important link in this route), on Soviet activity in the Yemen and on the desirability of a settlement, with public American support, of the boundary between Saudi Arabia and the Aden Protectorate. For a number of reasons, the main one being that the Americans are loath to appear to be involving themselves in a "colonial" situation, it seemed better not to press for any further statement on Aden.

(f) *Iranian Claim to Bahrain*

Arising from discussion about the islands in the Persian Gulf, Mr. Henderson said personally and unofficially that he thought there might be a joint Anglo-American approach to the Iranian Government urging them to allow the Iranian claim to Bahrain to die. Her Majesty's Ambassador at Tehran has been asked for his comments.

9. Although reference was made in the Agreed Paper to the Baghdad Pact, the American (Eisenhower) Doctrine and oil, none of these topics was in fact discussed. Technical Anglo-American talks on oil and oil transport are now taking place in Paris and will probably be continued in Washington at the end of July.

10. The foregoing information about the Anglo-American talks is for your own personal information and that of those members of your staff whom you consider it necessary to inform. The Americans are most anxious that no details about the talks should leak to foreign Governments. It is not certain that they will even inform their own Representatives in the Middle East. For this reason you should not discuss the talks with the United States Consul-General at Dhahran (or the American Representative in the case of other posts), unless he raises the matter first and shows that he has been informed of their upshot by the State Department.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Baghdad, Amman, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Tehran, Ankara, Washington, Khartoum and Tripoli, the United Kingdom High Commissioner at Karachi, Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Taiz and the Political Officer with the Middle East Forces at Episkopi.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

Enclosure 1

STAGE II

Foreword

In accordance with the "Agreed Position on Study of Middle East Problems" reached at Bermuda, officials of the United States and United Kingdom Governments have separately studied Middle East problems bearing upon the supply of oil to the free world, and have exchanged views based on those studies. The present paper summarises this exchange of views.

While in no sense a formally agreed document, this paper is intended to provide a common United States-United Kingdom point of departure for the next phase, agreed at Bermuda, of deciding "what further procedural steps should be taken to concert the views of the two Governments to bring them into accord as far as possible".

Paragraphs 9, 10 and 14 of this paper report divergences of United States and United Kingdom views concerning the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms and Saudi Arabia. Paragraph 16 (i) and (ii) lists several procedures and possible elements of a settlement with respect to the Buraimi issue that might be considered in the next phase.

Review of Middle East Problems Bearing upon the Supply of Oil to the Free World

May 10, 1957.

I.—BASIC PREMISES

1. In the next 10 years or so it is unlikely that increased supplies of other forms of energy will be sufficient to make much impact on the demand for oil in the free world. Acceptance of this premise does not, of course, obviate the recognised need for the free world, and particularly Western Europe, to pursue

SECRET

vigorously present and projected plans for the development of alternative sources of energy.

2. Free world demand for oil will increase substantially during the next decade and the bulk of this additional oil will have to come from the Middle East where most of the world's proved reserves lie. This premise would be dislodged only if very substantial new crude oil deposits were to be found outside the Middle East.

3. A supply of oil from the Middle East in a steadily increasing volume is essential to the economic progress and the strategic strength of the NATO countries.

4. Certain Middle East Governments have shown a willingness and capability to deny Western access to oil reserves (Iran 1951-53) and to disrupt Middle East oil transport facilities (Egypt and Syria 1956-57). It is essential that more effective measures be devised to protect the free world's, and particularly the NATO countries' long-term access to Middle East oil and to insure against temporary interruptions of its flow. This requirement confronts the West with the difficult problems of maintaining satisfactory political relations with the Middle East countries concerned with the production and transport of oil, and of securing oil supplies against external attack or internal disturbance.

5. The difficulties and dangers inherent in the free world's dependence on Middle East oil would be intensified if this dependence came to rest upon one or two countries. Two countries, moreover, would not provide what Western Europe currently needs. The United States and United Kingdom should accordingly seek to retain access to the oil resources of all four of the major Middle East producing States: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This effort is favoured by the heavy dependence of these four countries on revenues derived from the sale of their oil in free world markets.

II.—POLITICAL FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE PROTECTION OF FREE WORLD ACCESS TO MIDDLE EAST OIL

6. Continued access to Iranian oil seems least likely to be disturbed. Iran has already had a national convulsion over oil; its Government has adopted a pronounced pro-Western stance; it is relatively immune to the fevers of the Arab world.

7. The countries affected by Arab nationalism which directly concern this study are the producing areas—Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, and the transit countries, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.

8. In Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia strong internal and external pressures exist on behalf of policies in common with other Arab States. Extreme Arab nationalism that looks to Nasser for leadership seeks to present itself, with some effect, as the exponent of true Arabism. Strong feelings existing in Iraq and Saudi Arabia over the Arab-Israel dispute, and in Saudi Arabia over continuing differences with the United Kingdom, provide bases for pressure and agitation by extremist groups. While these factors do not appear immediately to threaten continued access to the oil resources of the three countries, the ability of their present leadership to withstand the extremists would be improved if the bases for pressure and agitation were minimised or removed.

9. Kuwait merits special attention because of the importance of the resources of this sheikhdom to the Middle East oil supply picture. Pressures from indigenous nationalist sentiment, stimulated by Egyptian propaganda, teachers and technicians and by other educated non-Kuwaiti Arabs have been building up. Preservation of the present Sabah family position in the face of these pressures depends in large measure on the relationship between the ruling family and the United Kingdom. In the view of the United Kingdom, this relationship is an inseparable part of the wider system of relationship between the United Kingdom and other Gulf rulers. They regard the preservation of this Western position as the only means at present in sight of assuring the continued exploitation of the oil of Kuwait and the oil or potential oil of other protected Gulf territories. They see it also as part of the protective system covering the sea lanes used in transporting oil from the three other major producers, since Kuwait and the other Gulf territories, Muscat, Aden and the Aden Protectorate, are links in a chain, the effectiveness of which would be destroyed if any of the links were broken. The United Kingdom side believes that

SECRET

56052

E* 2

no similar state of relationships with any other Western country could be substituted and that a British withdrawal from them would be an absolute loss to the common Western interest. British influence over the internal affairs of the Gulf States is limited but it is consistently exerted in the direction of a reasonable reform, bearing in mind the need of extreme caution if the Ruler's confidence is to be retained. In the view of the United States, a substantial British position in the Gulf is important to continued access to the petroleum resources. But they believe that the British position will be increasingly endangered if the rulers are not in some way persuaded to be more responsive to constructive pressures for reforms which are bound to increase as education and information media expand in this region. If the present trend is allowed to continue, it may be increasingly difficult to control extremist movements through normal security measures.

10. The Gulf principalities are at different levels of development, and adaptations of the traditional systems may be desirable in some before others. The conclusion of friendly agreements between these States and Saudi Arabia over current issues would be desirable. In the United States view, the possibility of direct discussions in some cases should be considered and would not necessarily affect adversely the present United Kingdom position. The United States is inclined to believe the United Kingdom position has elements of weakness and believes greater responsiveness to the legitimate democratic pressures in the Gulf and a recognition of the desirability of adjusting the present relationship in the interests of stabilising the area will contribute to rather than destroy over the long run the substantial British influence in the area.

11. Apart from the Persian Gulf, free world dependence upon Middle East oil transport facilities rests principally on two countries (and to a lesser extent on Jordan and Lebanon). Egypt can block the Suez Canal, and Syria alone can breach the existing and operating Iraq Petroleum Company pipelines and Trans-Arabian pipeline. These, moreover, are countries in which the Soviet influence is most extensive, Arab nationalism most extreme and involvement in the Arab-Israel dispute currently most immediate. The economic self-interest of both countries in revenues from these facilities, or pressures from petroleum producers and consumers, will serve to inhibit interference with the facilities in normal circumstances, but developments such as a renewed outbreak of Arab-Israel hostilities could well lead to the denial of both Canal and pipelines.

12. Political realities and common prudence dictate that the United States and the United Kingdom should seek to reduce free world dependence on Egypt and Syria. As there is now no practicable alternative to the Suez Canal, the United States and the United Kingdom must also, however, seek to restore normal conditions in the Middle East, so that the Canal, the existing pipelines, will be available. Security of transit through the countries concerned depends ultimately on their internal political conditions and on United States and United Kingdom political relations with them. Egypt, has, of course, an importance which transcends her position as a transit State. Egypt is, and is likely to remain, a centre of anti-Western influence and revolutionary tendencies affecting the whole of the Arab world. It is therefore advisable to consider what can best be done to neutralise this influence.

13. In protecting the continued access to Middle East oil resources and transit facilities, the United States and the United Kingdom are assisted substantially by elements of strength resulting from the Baghdad Pact, the application of the American Doctrine to the area, the British position in the Persian Gulf and the United States position in Saudi Arabia. In this context, relations between the West and Saudi Arabia are of particular importance. Saudi Arabia has in the past opposed the Baghdad Pact and differences between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom in the Persian Gulf area remain unresolved. Saudi Arabia, has, however, endorsed the American Doctrine, extended its co-operation with the United States at Dhahran, and has continued its policy of firm opposition to Soviet influence in the area. If Saudi Arabia could be brought further to identify its interests with those of the United States and the United Kingdom, there could follow a reduction of the extremist threat in Iraq, a curtailment of financial support for Arab extremist movements, a constructive Saudi influence on behalf of secure transit right for oil, Arab acquiescence in a substantial British position in the Persian Gulf, and wider Arab co-operation in opposing the expansion of Soviet influence.

14. In attempting to steer Saudi Arabia in the right direction, the main differences of opinion between the United States and the United Kingdom remain (a) the extent to which the Buraimi issue hampers the co-operation of the Saudi Government with the West, and (b) the extent to which a solution satisfactory to Saudi Arabia could endanger the position in the Persian Gulf. Basically, the difference is that the United States Government believes that a formula can be found which resolves the dispute without undermining the Western position in the Gulf, and that Saudi Arabia's co-operation with the United Kingdom and the long-term Western position in the area would be furthered by a settlement. The United Kingdom Government, while willing to consider any suggestions, is not so far aware of any solution which would satisfy these conditions. At the same time, it believes that, while the existence of the dispute is an inhibiting factor, it need not seriously hamper the evolution of Saudi policy in the desired direction.

Policies at Present being Pursued

15. The United States and United Kingdom are already pursuing, either independently or in conjunction, the following lines of action to preserve and strengthen their relationships with the oil-producing States and to protect access to Middle East oil transport facilities:

- (i) Giving full support to the Baghdad Pact.
- (ii) Carrying out the Joint Resolution on the Middle East passed by the United States Congress on March 9, 1957. (Known informally as the American Doctrine and the Eisenhower Doctrine.)
- (iii) Fostering the influence and prestige of Iraq and Saudi Arabia in the transit States.
- (iv) Reducing the threat of Arab-Israel hostilities by:
 - (a) Supporting more effective United Nations action to police the Armistice Lines and to prevent the raids across them;
 - (b) Maintaining pressure on Israel to adopt a less belligerent attitude;
- (v) Strengthening the internal security forces of the producing States.
- (vi) Curbing the Egyptian subversive apparatus in the Middle East and diminishing extremist influence by the replacement of Egyptian and Syrian teachers and technicians in the area;
- (vii) Encouraging an increased awareness of the community of interests between oil-producing States and the West, by the use of various information media, and stimulating the Governments of the oil-producing States to do the same;
- (viii) Maintaining the 50/50 principle in Middle East concessions;
- (ix) Assisting the transit companies to secure satisfactory agreements with the transit countries;
- (x) Fostering treaty guarantees of the security of new pipelines that may be built in the Middle East and seeking opportunities to obtain similar guarantees for existing pipelines.

Recommendations

16.—(i) There should be further United States-United Kingdom discussions of the divergence referred to in paragraph 14 above. Among other things, the practicability of the following procedures might be considered:

- (a) Mediation by the United States.
- (b) A resumption of direct United Kingdom-Saudi Arabian talks.
- (c) A direct approach by the Sultan of Muscat to Saudi Arabia on border issues, with suitable recognition of the rights of Abu Dhabi as represented by the United Kingdom.
- (d) Some system to guarantee the permanency of a border settlement.
- (ii) The following might also be considered as possible elements of a settlement:
 - (a) Saudi recognition of Muscat's sovereignty over inner Oman.
 - (b) A treaty establishing a neutral zone under the administration of the indigenous tribes.
 - (c) The return of some of the Buraimi refugees.

(iii) The two Governments should also consider whether steps should now be taken to promote settlements of the various claims to the islands and the sea bed of the Persian Gulf. The following might be considered:

- (a) An international conference of interested States.
- (b) Reference to the International Court of Justice.
- (c) Reference to the United Nations International Law Commission for an advisory opinion.
- (d) A joint United States-United Kingdom approach to the interested Powers proposing agreement on the median line of the Gulf.

(iv) The United States and United Kingdom should seek to promote the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between Iraq and France, and between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom and France. The two Governments should initiate enquiries in Baghdad designed to promote the former, and the United States Government should take any available opportunity to persuade the Saudi Arabian Government of the desirability of the latter.

(v) The two Governments should consider measures to restore tolerable relations with Egypt, or at least to mitigate the violence and efficiency of its hostile anti-Western policies.

(vi) There should be further consultation about the problems presented by the activities of Egyptian and Syrian teachers and technicians in the area, especially in Kuwait.

III.—INSURANCE AGAINST INTERRUPTION OF MIDDLE EAST OIL SUPPLIES

17. The Middle East producing and transit States will be less disposed to interfere with free world access to the area's oil if they are aware that Western Europe is able to cope with temporary interruptions of the flow of Middle East oil.

18. As was shown in the Iranian oil crisis, the existence of excess-developed capacity in the four major Middle East oil-producing States enabled the free world to defeat attempts by one of these States to impose unacceptable conditions for access to its oil or to injure Western Europe by stopping oil exports. More recently, the Suez crisis also emphasised the importance of having alternative sources of oil supplies not only within the Middle East but also from non-Middle East sources.

19. This excess oil-producing capacity, which made it possible in 1951 to offset the loss of Iranian oil and which during the last six months minimised the effect of the closure of the Suez Canal and the Iraq Petroleum Company pipelines by means of an oil lift to Western Europe from the Western Hemisphere, is rapidly being overtaken by rising consumption. The United States will soon be unable to provide substantial quantities of petroleum from its own production to meet a similar future crisis without imposing drastic domestic rationing, a step that would only be taken in a major emergency clearly threatening the security of the United States.

20. It is therefore all the more urgent that other alternative sources of supply be sought. In the Western Hemisphere, Venezuela could be a significant source if its productive potential were rapidly developed. Colombia also offers opportunities for development. In the Eastern Hemisphere, North Africa is the most promising non-Middle East source and has the special advantages of close proximity to Western Europe, and of being a source of non-dollar oil. Burma and Indonesia too offer some possibilities. These and other promising sources, e.g., Canada, would together provide the means of giving the free world a useful margin of flexibility in future emergencies. It should be stressed however that significant development of these potential alternative sources of supply will require several years of concentrated effort. Flexibility would be yet further enlarged if, wherever possible, e.g., in each of the four major Middle East producing States, the oil companies were to maintain stand-by producing capacity in excess of current market demand. It is recognised that the maintenance of significant surplus producing capacity might cause difficulties with the Governments of the States concerned.

21. The Suez oil crisis also emphasised the disadvantage of not having a surplus of tankers to cope with the increased movements made necessary by the

disruption of Middle East transport facilities. The shortage of tankers provided a stimulus to tanker construction but, with a return to more normal conditions—resumption of the use of the Suez Canal and restoration of existing Middle East pipelines to maximum operation—tanker fleet owners may be disposed to begin restricting new construction and expediting scrapping.

22. To forestall such action with a view to maintaining surplus tanker tonnage in being, two methods suggest themselves:

(i) Instituting a programme to increase petroleum stockpiles in Western Europe thus affording cargoes for surplus tankers. The resulting supplementary oil stocks would greatly ease the immediate impact of a future oil crisis in Europe.

(ii) Providing inducements to tanker owners to withdraw tankers from active service and place them in tanker reserve fleets for emergency use.

23. Substantial expansion of existing pipeline facilities in the Middle East will almost certainly be required to meet the rapid growth in world petroleum consumption, and would provide additional insurance against interruptions in the flow of the area's oil. A number of United States and United Kingdom major oil companies are at present considering the merits of an Iraq-Turkey line. Other alternatives might include an Iran-Turkey line, giving an outlet to the new Qum discovery.

Recommendations

24.—(i) The United States and the United Kingdom should consider immediate steps which they may take, either jointly or individually, to ensure alternative oil availabilities. These might include:

(a) Encouraging the oil companies to build up and maintain in each of the four major Middle East producing States developed stand-by capacity substantially in excess of current market demands upon those countries.

(b) Encouraging the oil companies vigorously to pursue oil exploration and development in areas other than the Middle East and, where possible, to maintain in those areas developed stand-by capacity in excess of current market demands upon those areas.

(c) Persuading the Governments of free world countries outside the Middle East to permit further exploration for and development of oil resources.

(ii) The United States and the United Kingdom should also reach agreement as soon as possible on a programme, involving the most practicable combination of oil stockpiling, maintenance of the tanker fleet at a high level and new pipelines, designed to ensure Western Europe, and to the maximum extent possible other free world areas, against temporary interruptions of the flow of Middle East oil. It will be necessary urgently to examine:

(a) The desirability and practicability of encouraging the completion of tanker construction programmes and of discouraging expedited tanker scrapping, both on account of the intrinsic merit of these steps and with a view to providing tonnage for the movement of petroleum to Western European stockpiles or for possible reserve fleets.

(b) The relative merits of tankers over 60,000 d.w.t. as compared with tankers of 45,000–60,000 d.w.t.

(c) The availability in Western Europe of below-ground storage (mines, quarries, pits, &c.) for between three and six months' crude oil requirements, and the cost and steel requirement of unavoidable above-ground tank storage.

(d) The utility of crude oil stockpiling in the Western Hemisphere.

(e) The overall problems of finance and steel availabilities, including an examination of the alternative cost in terms of tonnage of steel of pipeline construction on the one hand and of tanker building on the other for a like movement of oil.

(f) The vulnerability to sabotage of pipelines in politically unstable areas.

25. Much preliminary work will have to be done before any firm decisions can be taken on the problems discussed above. Moreover, the consideration of many of them cannot be far advanced without seeking the views and collaboration

of the industries concerned. The United States and United Kingdom Governments should each consider how such consultation and collaboration with industry may best be secured in their respective countries.

Enclosure 2

EGYPT (Stage II)

The difference on Egypt showed itself to be manageably small. The Americans agreed with our view that Egypt will probably remain for a long time the centre of discontent and revolutionary tendencies throughout the Arab world, and that its Governments must be expected to pursue more or less zealously a policy of hostility to Western interests; but that there was a growing concern in Egypt about Nasser's political estrangement from other Arab Powers and the economic difficulties caused by his policy. The Americans agreed that the long-term problem was how to secure some mitigation of the violence and efficiency with which anti-Western policies are pursued. We were agreed that "Nasser must be cut down to size"; and that he himself, committed as he is to his present policies, is hardly likely to change to sincere co-operation with the West on any terms which the West can offer him. The Americans emphasised that they attached great importance to reducing the efficiency of Egypt's influence in the rest of the Arab world. They thought that at present there was far more possibility of doing this than of pursuing policies which would lead to an early governmental change inside Egypt. But internal economic pressures were working slowly against Nasser, and we should both keep them up. Some of this is reflected in the "identical submission" to the two Governments.

IRAQ (Stage II)

The Americans were in general agreement with our points about Iraq. They regarded it as the most reliable Arab Power so far as the West was concerned. Mr. Rountree said that Nuri's disappearance would be unfortunate at any time, but was inevitable some time; we should therefore do what we could to mitigate its consequences. There was one factor on the other side. Egyptian propaganda had had some success in pinning on to Nuri personal responsibility for the Baghdad Pact policy. From this point of view it would be a good thing to have the same policy maintained by a different Prime Minister. They saw no differences in our estimate of the basic situation. The chances of an extremist *coup d'état* must be reckoned with; but were less at present than in any other country in the Middle East. They accepted our point about expanding consultation with the Iraqi Government on NATO lines; they thought that there had in fact been a satisfactorily high degree of consultation during the current Jordan situation and hoped it would continue. They thought that the United States Government's new status as a member of the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact might be the foundation for further collaboration. United States aid to Iraq was generous. For their part, they suggested that we should encourage the Iraqis to be more forthcoming and more skilful in their handling of Jordan. This applied particularly to the royal families, since the feud between Queen Zein and Abdulillah was a weakness.

Enclosure 3

STAGE III

ANGLO-AMERICAN TALKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, JUNE 12-14, 1957

AGREED PAPER

Measures to Ensure Continued Access to Middle East Petroleum Resources

I.—CONCLUSIONS

1. Access to Middle East petroleum supplies will, for at least the next 10 years, be vital to the security of Western Europe.

SECRET

2. The most vital section of the area is that comprising the four principal producing States: Iraq, Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

3. Continued access to the resources of these States depends on the maintenance of friendly and influential relations with those countries. In this connexion, the following assets are important:

- (a) The Baghdad Pact.
- (b) The American Doctrine.
- (c) The British position in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf in general.
- (d) United States relations with Saudi Arabia.

4. It is desirable that close relations be established between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia and between Saudi Arabia and Muscat.

5. Continued access to the resources of the oil-producing States requires the establishment and maintenance of secure means of transit. The principal present transit routes of importance are:

- (a) The sea route through the Persian Gulf.
- (b) The Suez Canal.
- (c) The Trans-Arabian pipeline.
- (d) The Iraq Petroleum Company pipelines.

6. These means of transit are currently threatened by:

- (a) Soviet activity and influence in Syria, Egypt and Yemen.
- (b) Egyptian and Syrian subversive political activity in Lebanon, Jordan and the Persian Gulf States.
- (c) Tensions arising from the continuance of the Arab-Israel dispute.

II.—RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Efforts should continually be made to achieve a settlement of outstanding frontier disputes between Saudi Arabia and the peripheral States beginning with Qatar and extending through the Aden Protectorate and to define the frontiers. Hitherto it has been found impossible to obtain a settlement of these disputes which would be acceptable to all the States concerned.

United Kingdom Comments.—The United Kingdom does not know of any change in the views of these States which would materially alter this situation. The United Kingdom is always ready to discuss frontier problems (which include the Buraimi problem) with Saudi Arabia. United States help in working towards a settlement of these problems will be most useful. A public declaration by the United States Government supporting a frontier settlement would materially contribute to the stability of the area. The United Kingdom considers that the most hopeful way of improving the situation in the areas of dispute between Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States in the near future is likely to be the arrangement of an early meeting between King Saud and the Sultan of Muscat, with a view to the mutual grant of concessions which will reduce tensions between Saudi Arabia and Muscat and lay the basis of a friendly relationship which is a prerequisite for the settlement of the border problems. The United States and United Kingdom Governments should consult on the method to be adopted to arrange such a meeting. Concessions to be offered by the Sultan of Muscat might include the return of some or all of the refugees and the restoration of their property. King Saud in return might acknowledge the sovereignty of Muscat in Inner Oman. The meeting would require careful preparation.

United States Comments.—The United States welcomes the continued willingness of the United Kingdom to discuss frontier problems (which include the Buraimi problem) with Saudi Arabia. It considers a solution of these problems important to furthering the common interests of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Middle East. The United States is of the opinion that the present moment is particularly propitious for attempting to bring about a frontier settlement and is inclined to believe that it may become progressively more difficult with the passage of time to obtain the kind of settlement which would preserve the Western position in the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, it stands ready to consult on the method of arranging a meeting between King Saud and the Sultan of Muscat as proposed by the United Kingdom and to discuss with the United Kingdom

SECRET

suggestions for bringing about an eventual settlement of border disputes. The United States is prepared to give sympathetic consideration to making a public declaration at the appropriate time supporting a frontier settlement accepted by the parties concerned.

2. There should be an early re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom. American assistance to this end will be welcomed by the United Kingdom.

3. The United States and the United Kingdom should co-operate to preserve beneficial United Kingdom relationships with the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea principalities of special importance to the supply of oil to the free world, including especially Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Sharja and Muscat.

4. The United States and the United Kingdom should consider steps to be taken to promote settlements of the various claims to islands and the sea bed of the Persian Gulf. Officials, including legal experts, of the two Governments should discuss as soon as possible how progress can be made to this end and what principles the two Governments should seek to have recognised by the States concerned in order to assist the settlement and prevent the inflammation of disputes and to minimise difficulties likely to arise in the grant of oil concessions.

5. United States and United Kingdom efforts should continue to strengthen Jordan and Lebanon to resist threats to their independence and territorial integrity from Soviet and Egyptian activities. Iraq and Saudi Arabia should be encouraged to assist these efforts. There should be further United States-United Kingdom discussions at an early date on the future of Jordan, in the light of the joint assessment of the situation by the United Kingdom and United States Ambassadors in Jordan, which is expected.

6. The United States and the United Kingdom should be prepared to restore tolerable relations with Egypt and Syria, once the acts of these States firmly indicate a will to re-establish and maintain such relations with the West and to moderate anti-Western policies. In the meantime, neither Government should, without consultation, take any action which would strengthen Nasser or the present Syrian leadership internally or their influence externally. Both Governments should inform each other before considering unblocking blocked Egyptian balances. The United Kingdom will inform the United States before taking any action towards the resumption of diplomatic relations with Egypt.

7. The United States and the United Kingdom should pursue urgently through established machinery discussions of measures to ensure against interruptions of the flow of Middle East oil.

8. The United States and the United Kingdom should continue efforts to maintain peace and tranquillity in the area, particularly in those parts affected by the Arab-Israel dispute, working directly as well as through other countries and through the United Nations.

9. In order to assure close co-operation in the Middle East, senior representatives of the United States and United Kingdom Governments should periodically exchange visits of the kind now concluded.

Enclosure 4

STAGE III

ANGLO-AMERICAN TALKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, JUNE 12-14, 1957

Subsidiary Points

1. I gave a brief general outline of the proposals on Palestine in Foreign Office telegram No. 2382 Saving to Washington. I was also authorised by the Treasury to say that in case a partial settlement of this nature came about, we should "play our part".

2. I asked that the American representatives, in discussing the provision of aid to the Yemen with the Imam, should urge him to concentrate on his internal

SECRET

economy rather than expend his energies on his claims to the Aden Protectorate. Mr. Henderson said that the Imam was quite crazy and in any case did not seem to want the kind of aid which the United States was prepared to offer him. We spoke about the Russian penetration of the Yemen. Mr. Henderson said that Mr. Wadsworth had seen a Communist ship discharging arms there. I asked that the American Government should use their influence with King Saud to stop gun-running into the Aden Protectorate whenever specific cases were reported by the Aden authorities.

3. I spoke briefly on the United States supply of arms to Saudi Arabia. I said that the only immediate danger was that the arms already in Saudi Arabia could now be released to dissidents in the surrounding territories. The Americans said that they were not supplying the kind of arms which would enable the Saudis to release anything that they already had. I said that we recognised the United States' overriding obligations to supply arising from the reimbursable aid agreement of 1951 and the Dhahran base agreement. We hoped that the United States Government would bear our interests in mind when phasing their arms supply programme. The Americans said that they were certainly doing this.

4. I spoke in general terms about the attitude of Aramco. We had found them not so helpful as the other American general managers in the Persian Gulf, although we recognised the difficult position which they were often in as a result of Saudi Arabian pressure. What was particularly important was that they should not carry out any oil surveys in territories beyond our declared frontier.

5. I said that we should want to have talks with the Americans very soon about North Africa, though we were not ready yet.

6. I referred to paragraph 16 (iv) of the Stage II paper regarding the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between France and the Arab States. The Americans agreed that this did not necessarily imply any immediate action. The timing of any approaches should be decided in due course in consultation between the two Governments. Both sides were in fact of the opinion that it was better not to complicate our affairs at present by trying to push the Arabs back into the arms of France.

7. I mentioned the Islamic Conference. This had been started by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt to promote cultural activities among Moslems. It was nobbled by the Egyptian Government who, without consulting Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, established the office of the Conference in Egypt and appointed Anwar Sadat as secretary and organiser of the Conference's activities. These activities were henceforth devoted to furthering Egyptian political aims. Various attempts had been made to induce other Moslem States, particularly Pakistan, to take action to reverse the Egyptian initiative, restore the conference to its original scope and establish its headquarters outside Egypt, probably in Mecca. The Pakistanis had always professed themselves ready to do this, but had been ineffective. I suggested that the question should be discussed informally by the United States and United Kingdom Governments with the Saudi Arabian and Pakistan Governments, with a view to depriving Egypt of this means of propaganda. Mr. Loy Henderson said that there had been some discussion about this at the Baghdad Pact meeting. He entirely agreed that we should do everything possible on these lines.

8. I suggested that it would be an advantage to have periodical discussions in NATO on Middle Eastern oil policy and the political policy which followed from it, in order to supplement the efforts made by our European posts to keep European Governments from pursuing their own ends in the Middle East to the detriment of common interests. We must of course be careful to avoid any appearance that the European Powers were ganging up to put pressure on Middle Eastern countries. That would produce immediate resistance. But NATO could be used with some effect to help keep the policies of European Governments in line on such questions as economic pressure on Nasser, maintenance of 50-50 concessions, &c., and it would seem a legitimate concern of NATO countries to discuss the political basis of European oil. The Americans thought that NATO was already having periodical discussions of this nature on questions of Middle Eastern politics.

SECRET

EA 1944/23

No. 13

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND SHAIKH SABAH AS-SALIM ON JULY 22, 1957

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Sir Bernard Burrows (Bahrain)

(No. 104. Confidential)
Sir,

*Foreign Office,
July 26, 1957.*

The following is a record of my conversation with Shaikh Sabah as-Salim when I received him at the Foreign Office on 22nd of July. After the usual exchange of compliments, the conversation turned to the present unrest in Oman and from there to the need for a solution of outstanding problems between Her Majesty's Government and King Sa'ud's. Shaikh Sabah's line was that there has never been so favourable a moment as the present for settling outstanding differences with King Sa'ud and that it was part of Her Majesty's Government's responsibility not only to the Sultan of Muscat and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, but also to the Persian Gulf Shaikhdoms that they should not let this opportunity slip. Briefly, Shaikh Sabah's point was that the events of the last few months in Jordan and the Lebanon and the growing friendship between Iraq and Saudi Arabia had brought at least a half of the Arab world into line with the general policy of Her Majesty's Government of resisting Communist encroachments in the area, but that to strengthen this new combination it was essential that Her Majesty's Government should do everything possible to remove the several outstanding sources of friction with King Sa'ud, of which the Buraimi question was much the most important.

2. I said that we too had been much encouraged by these new developments and that it was, in fact, Her Majesty's Government who had arranged the original visit of the Amir Zaid to Riyadh, which had been the beginning of the rapprochement between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, but I pointed out that we could not abandon the interests of the Sultan of Muscat and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, to whom we had made promises, and that to do so would probably destroy the confidence of the other Rulers in our good intentions. Shaikh Sabah agreed with this but said that it should be possible, with the good offices of Her Majesty's Government, to arrange for a compromise solution in the way that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had been able to settle their frontier differences by setting up a neutral zone. I said that we too would like to work towards a compromise and that it was just because of this that we regretted the present developments in Oman. The danger was that if we accepted any compromise which allowed an opening to Saudi activity in Oman, they would take the opportunity to subvert the loyalty of the subjects of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and of the Sultan of Muscat. I added that the present troubles were caused by the Saudis and the Egyptians sending arms into the interior of Oman.

3. Shaikh Sabah replied that if there was a compromise which pleased both sides and it was under the supervision of Her Majesty's Government, he did not believe that these consequences would follow. He again stressed that there was now an opportunity which might not recur. He said that the Gulf States were entirely opposed to Communism and that King Sa'ud was also well aware of the Communist danger; he cited as an example of this, the recent letter from King Sa'ud to the Ruler of Kuwait asking for his help in intercepting the Communists from Iran and Iraq who might try to make their way into Arabia by landing on the coast of Kuwait. He went on to say again that he was not suggesting at all that we should abandon our responsibilities to the Sultan of Muscat but that he was sure that through our good offices it would be possible to arrange a compromise solution (hall wasat).

4. The conversation then turned to Palestine. Shaikh Sabah said that more important still was the finding of a solution to the Palestine question, which affected the whole of the Arab world and not only the Arabian peninsula. He said that he thought that a number of the Arab rulers would now be ready to accept the 1947 frontiers although they had rejected them at the time. I replied that the difficulty now was that the Israelis no longer would agree to less than the 1948 frontiers, but that Her Majesty's Government were trying to work for a compromise

SECRET

between the two frontiers. Shaikh Sabah then said that the real difficulty was the attitude of the Americans. If they were to withdraw their financial help from Israel, the Israelis would very soon have to accept any solution which had been previously agreed upon by the British and American Governments. I described the five points which Her Majesty's Government thought necessary for a solution of the Palestine problem:

- (a) the recognition of the right to return of a number of refugees to Israel;
- (b) financial compensation of other refugees;
- (c) acceptance of agreed frontiers by both Israel and the Arab States;
- (d) a guarantee by the Great Powers to the Arab States that Israel would not be allowed to expand beyond the frontiers agreed;
- (e) agreement between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States about the exploitation of the water of the Jordan and its tributaries.

Shaikh Sabah did not dissent from this outline of the settlement but again reiterated his belief that it all depended on the attitude of the Americans which, as far as he could see at the moment, seemed to be working to remove British influence from the Middle East.

5. Shaikh Sabah concluded by thanking me for the assistance given him on his journey home by Her Majesty's Representatives in Beirut, in Venice and in Paris, who he said had gone out of their way to make his journey easy for him. He then went on to say how helpful the Political Agent in Kuwait and his staff had always been and said that he particularly hoped that I would make known to them his commendation of their help.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to all the Gulf Posts, and to Beirut, Washington, Rome, Amman, Tel Aviv and Paris.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

SECRET

EA 10325/11

No. 14

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND Mr. DULLES AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON JULY 31, 1957

After Dinner at No. 10 Mr. Dulles read out a communication which had been received from a representative of King Saud. King Saud denied that he had supplied any arms for the rebels in Oman. He said that they had got these arms from India through the machinations of Mr. Khrishna Menon.

EA 1051/22

No. 15

FUTURE BRITISH POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Sir Bernard Burrows to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received September 3)

(No. 116. Confidential) *Bahrain,*
Sir, *August 28, 1957.*

Despatch No. 89 (10319/57) of August 8 from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran regarding Iranian interest in the Persian Gulf States prompts me to put down certain further reflections on the subject of our future policy in this area and in particular to call attention to an evolution of our practice which has been taking place since the correspondence at the beginning of this year (e.g., my despatch No. 12 of January 24) and which may be of some significance.

2. We have always known that direct relations existed between some of the Persian Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. Our general attitude in the past on this subject was that such relations were not a very good thing from our point of view but that we could not do very much about them except to insist that all formal agreements or exchanges of views ought to be done through us. Latterly, however, we have come in the particular cases mentioned below, and perhaps without realising that we were making any modification of policy, to adopt a more encouraging attitude towards these direct contacts and to advocate in addition the establishment of direct contact between Kuwait and Iraq.

3. As regards Kuwait we have long known that oil questions were from time to time discussed with Saudi Arabia, usually on the initiative of the latter. We encouraged the Ruler to inform King Saud of the affray which took place in Kuwait in May last and in which some alleged Saudi subjects were involved. It was found that an account of the matter had already been given to King Saud by the unofficial Saudi Trade Agent and that the Ruler had received a reassuring message from King Saud. We have since encouraged the Ruler to approach King Saud direct on the subject of the neutral zone seabed proclamation and over the question of a concession to be issued by Saudi Arabia to Japanese interests for their share of this area. We have for some time been trying to arrange for direct discussion between Kuwait and Iraq of the water and oil pipelines and frontier demarcation between

the two countries, since we have found it difficult to make either see the other's point of view. After much hesitation on the Kuwait side this process is about to be begun by a meeting due to take place in the Lebanon between the Ruler and the Acting Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs. In Bahrain we have for some time been urging the Ruler to discuss with the Saudis, or at least to try to discover their attitude with regard to the fixing of the seabed frontier between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. He has not yet acted on this advice. We have also recently informed him that we have no objection to his taking up a Saudi offer of mediation between him and the Ruler of Qatar over the question of his claims in Zubarah. Here again it is unlikely that he will take advantage of the Saudi offer. In Qatar relations with Saudi Arabia have always been particularly close, without much apparent detriment to our position. We have long thought that when it becomes possible to discuss the Qatar-Saudi border this should best be done in the first instance between Qatar and Saudi representatives without our intervention, but with reference back to us in case of serious difficulty, or to confirm an agreement. The visit of the Ruler to India earlier this year and the more recent plan for the Ruler's son Ahmed to visit Iran, were rather more significant evidence of interest in the outside world. In the Trucial States we have frowned on Sharjah's attempts at direct dealings with Egypt over the supply of teachers and doctors, and this does not seem in practice to have ever come to very much. Other than this the independent relations of the Trucial States Rulers with the outside world consist mainly in occasional visits to Saudi Arabia on the pilgrimage (from which the Rulers are apt to return somewhat disgruntled with the lack of Saudi consideration for them) and the habitual visits of the Rulers of Dubai to South Iran for hunting. The recent visits of the Regent of Dubai and the Ruler of Sharjah to Tehran represented an attempt by Iran, at least in the case of Dubai, to give this traditional contact greater formality and political purpose. The case of Muscat is in theory

somewhat different as being a fully independent State, legally capable of having relations of any kind with any country in the world, but in practice independent relations have in recent times been carried on only with the United States and India. Here too, in consonance with the instances mentioned above, we have lately been doing what we can to encourage the Sultan to establish direct relations with Iraq over the supply of officials and technicians, with Pakistan over Gwadar, and with Saudi Arabia in an attempt to make a first tentative step towards the establishment of conditions in which frontier questions between the two States could be dealt with. None of these attempts has yet met with success.

4. To complete the picture of the relationships of the Persian Gulf States with the outside world two further facets should be noticed. Kuwait is pressing ahead towards independent membership of the International Telecommunications Union and will no doubt later also want to join the Universal Postal Union. The Ruler has also rather spasmodically sent representatives or observers to Arab League technical and cultural meetings, of which the last example was the preparatory Petroleum Committee meeting in Cairo earlier this year. Bahrain is moving towards its own International Postal Service but the question of membership of international bodies has not yet so far as I know arisen in practical form elsewhere than in Kuwait. Secondly, as regards foreign representation in the Gulf, there has been for some time an American Consul in Kuwait and there may shortly be one in Muscat. There is an Indian Consul in Muscat whose responsibilities also extend to Qatar and the Trucial States. There is a Pakistani Trade Agent in Kuwait whose responsibilities have just been extended to Qatar and the Trucial States. There are unofficial Saudi representatives in Bahrain and Kuwait who have no formal status but are the normal medium for such communications as King Saud and the Rulers wish to make to each other. We give no recognition to their existence but equally have not sought to object. There is a representative of somewhat uncertain status of the Iraq Government's publicity service in Bahrain. Several other States conduct consular business for their nationals in the Gulf States by means of officials sent in temporarily from neighbouring countries, e.g., from the United States Consulate-General at Dhahran to Bahrain, from the Indian Embassy at Bagdad to Kuwait and

Bahrain, and from the Iranian Consulate-General at Basra to Kuwait. Arrangements of this kind would appear fully to meet the practical needs of the foreign communities in the Gulf States but have not prevented a series of applications being made by Middle Eastern countries for the establishment of regular consulates. Most vehement recently has been the Iranian Government's desire to open a consulate in Kuwait. Such requests have all been refused except that an Iraqi application of some time ago to open a Consulate in Kuwait was agreed to in principle and has apparently never been cancelled though no move has been made towards implementing the proposal.

5. It is clear that in recent years the unfriendly state of relations between Her Majesty's Government and Saudi Arabia, or latterly the absence of such relations, has acted as a special cause in leading us to view with favour direct dealings between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Bahrain on matters which in the interests of these States should be settled without delay. In the case of Muscat we are influenced by the thought that even with United Kingdom-Saudi relations restored we could not usefully discuss Buraimi or the Saudi-Muscat frontiers with King Saud because we could not carry the Sultan of Muscat with us in any compromise which might seem necessary to make these negotiations succeed. Somewhat similarly in the case of Kuwait and Iraq we have found ourselves getting into an unrewarding situation by trying to explain to each Government the intransigent though somewhat devious suspicions of the other and have concluded that the best way to move towards a settlement would be to confront them directly with each other. It remains to be seen whether in either of these cases practical results are any better obtainable by these means than by our mediation. But the most striking innovation is perhaps our decision not to stand in the way of mediation by Saudi Arabia between Bahrain and Qatar. We have hitherto felt it to be a rather essential part of our position that we should be the only arbitrators between the Gulf States. In this case we had the special circumstances that we had decided to tell the Ruler of Bahrain that we could not support his claims at the same moment as the Saudi offer of mediation was made known, and it would certainly have imposed a severe strain on our relations with Bahrain if we had felt obliged to inform the Ruler that we could not help him and at the same time that he must not avail himself of the

Saudi offer. I would hope that our attitude in this matter would not constitute a precedent and that we should normally continue to keep in our own hands the settlement of disputes between the Gulf States.

6. It is one of the main purposes of this despatch to suggest that subject to the comment in the preceding sentence, we may by these decisions be building up a new doctrine and perhaps tentatively finding the way by characteristically empirical means to an evolution of our traditional position in the Gulf which may avoid some of the dangers of the more rapid and radical transformations advocated by such critics as Mr. Nutting, the *Economist*, the Middle East correspondent of *The Times* and Her Majesty's Embassy at Tehran. We are in fact moving towards a system in which we would allow and even encourage the Persian Gulf States to conduct their own relations with neighbouring States and in which they would be able to have separate membership of technical international organisations. Relations with neighbouring Powers would be conducted, as they are at present by some of the States with Saudi Arabia, by personal contacts between the Rulers and the neighbouring Sovereigns, or by sending special representatives from either side to visit the other to conduct special pieces of business. This would not except perhaps in Muscat involve the appointment of diplomatic or consular representatives in the Gulf States. This is not at present desired by the Gulf States and would lead immediately to the difficulty that if any Middle Eastern consulates are set up it would be impossible to keep out the Egyptians and Syrians. If relations are conducted personally or by means of temporary emissaries this problem does not arise. Our function in this system would be to give the Gulf States such support and advice as was required in their dealings with their neighbours, and to continue to conduct for them the very small amount of diplomatic business done with other States, and to continue to be regarded as in the last resort responsible for giving protection to these States against external attack. We would also continue to represent them in international bodies to the extent that this was necessary, and to the extent that they did not wish to do so themselves. We would hope that the question of membership of the Political Committee of the Arab League would not arise. Membership of the United Nations would be impossible (except in the case of Muscat) and is most unlikely to be desired. As this system developed our

relationship with the more advanced States would become more like that of an Ally and less like that of a Protecting Power. To some extent we are getting towards this position with Kuwait already. To reach this stage Bahrain would have for a time to be pushed away from our apron strings as regards dealings with Saudi Arabia. Qatar, so far as Saudi Arabia was concerned, would fall fairly readily into the Kuwait pattern. It would have to be recognised that in this respect as in most others the Trucial States would lag a long way behind.

7. Among the many difficulties which will no doubt spring to the mind in considering this line of thought, particularly to the legal mind, the three following perhaps deserve the greatest attention. If we are no longer responsible for conducting the relations of the Gulf States with their neighbours how can we be satisfied that requests for our help if they get into difficulties will be justified? In other words, if we do not control their foreign policy how can we be sure that they will not by design or bad judgment get themselves into unnecessary trouble with their neighbours from which we should have to rescue them by offering or actually giving military support, no doubt to the great embarrassment of our general position in the Middle East? The answer to this is three-fold. We do not in fact have absolute control of Kuwait's foreign policy now, at least so far as Saudi Arabia and some other Arab countries are concerned. Secondly, our contacts with the Ruler are very close and we can rely on him to keep us informed of any important developments. We should have to continue to rely on this close personal contact for the future. It is in any case the most important buttress of our whole position here, whatever the framework of that position may be. We can be more sure of its continuing if we gradually allow greater latitude than if we try to hold the reins too tight. Thirdly, we seemed able to get along reasonably well for a number of years with other Middle Eastern countries with whom we had defensive alliances and over whose foreign policy we had no control other than the clause, more frequently honoured by both sides in the breach than in the observance, that neither party would adopt in regard to foreign countries an attitude inconsistent with the alliance, or words to that effect.

8. The second main question which may be asked is where this system would lead us as regards our other implicit function in the Gulf States, namely, that of in the last resort

preserving internal security and protecting the lives and property of foreigners, including not only British subjects and those under our jurisdiction but, theoretically at least, all foreigners because we do not allow their Governments to have consular representatives here who would in a normal foreign country have this responsibility. On this I would foresee no immediate change of principle but a gradual limitation of the circumstances in which our intervention would be required. It has already become clear that it is most unlikely that we should have to intervene with military force in Kuwait to safeguard internal security owing to the large size and relative efficiency of the local security forces, and the vigorous manner in which they are likely to be used. It has also been felt that for us to intervene in Kuwait, except in the most extreme emergency, would pose such awkward political problems, both in the local and in the wider spheres, that such intervention cannot be contemplated as a normal exercise of our special position. We are still a long way from having reached a similar stage in Bahrain, but we have been trying for a long time to enable the Bahrain Government to stand more on their own feet in these matters, and they are certainly moving, although slowly, in this direction. Qatar and the Trucial States are, of course, still further behind but the distant goal of policy should, even in these cases, be the same.

9. The third question is whether the evolution which I have described, or our recognition of it, should lead to any change in the formal nature of our relationship with the Gulf States. Must we, in other words, make new treaties as each State becomes able to take a greater part in conducting its own foreign relations and maintaining its own internal security? My answer to this would be a decided negative. The treaties are vague and general in their terms and in many cases our present position is a good deal more than would flow from a strict interpretation of them. Any future relationship of the kind I have forecast would fall with equal ease within the existing texts. From the political point of view there is no serious local demand for change in the treaties and I believe that an attempt to conclude new treaties would call down on the heads of the Rulers more hostile propaganda and criticism from Cairo radio than does the maintenance of the existing treaties. The negotiation of new treaties would present all kinds of problems, particularly in cases where, as in Bahrain and

Sharjah, we would want to maintain military facilities, and once the question of revision had been thrown open the Rulers would no doubt be put under serious pressure, both from outside and from revolutionary elements within, to reconsider their international alignment in a much more radical way and perhaps abandon their special connexion with us altogether, which would suit neither the Rulers nor ourselves. As I have said in previous correspondence one of the greatest present obstacles to joining some of the neighbouring Powers with us in guaranteeing the integrity of the Gulf States is the existence of territorial and other quarrels between the Gulf States and their neighbours. The establishment of direct relations *de facto* seems at present to provide the best hope that some of these questions will get settled. If this happens it may then be more profitable to review the formal nature of our position and to see whether the negotiation of a multilateral guarantee looks more practicable.

10. There will be the further objection made that the kind of gradual and unpublicised evolution which I have described does not go far or fast enough, and that in particular it does not give us very much that we can say to the Press, or to the Iranian Government to meet their desire to ensure for themselves a share of the reversion of our interests here if, as they seem to believe, we are unable or unwilling to maintain them. It is true that looking to a future of this kind would not give us anything very dramatic to announce to the world. The absence of any such spectacular development would be entirely in line with all but a small minority of local feeling, but it has to be recognised that the continuance of Press comment to the effect that we ought to change our relationship with the Gulf States may of itself bring such a change nearer. It is not new for imperial positions to be eroded from outside rather than from within. Lord Macaulay's dreams of Indian independence played a part in bringing that independence about, and the withdrawal from the Sudan in the 1880s was due as much to the anti-imperialist feelings of the Liberal Party as to the efforts of the Sudanese. It is beyond my terms of reference to assess whether such external criticism of our present arrangements here can be successfully resisted. I have little doubt that from the point of view of the feelings of most of the inhabitants of the Gulf States, and in the interests of the continuance of our position here for the longest

possible time, it would be desirable that this should be done. As regards the Iranians, the fact is that if they want to improve their position in the Gulf they are going about it in the wrong way. Their most noticeable contributions so far have been to seize by force two islands claimed by both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to continue to allow public agitation on their ridiculous claim to Bahrain, to badger us about opening an Iranian Consulate in Kuwait which they know that neither we nor the Ruler approve, and to drive trade underground by imposing export and import restrictions which they cannot effectively maintain. Their more recent attempts to establish personal relations with some of the Gulf Rulers are an improvement on their previous tactics. I would hope that they could be told that we have no objection to, and indeed welcome, personal contacts of this nature and that we would be glad to see them try to improve their relations with any of the Gulf States they wish and that we believe the first

necessities for doing so are that they should adopt a generous attitude over territorial claims and commercial relations, that they should take full account of the Arab nature of these States, and that they should proceed without formality and without trying to insist on a formal status for their representatives. It would also no doubt be desirable to make it clear that when we talk of their establishing relations with these States we are referring to the Rulers and ruling circles only and that we should view with extreme disfavour any attempt to establish relations with other sections of the population, e.g., the Shias in Bahrain.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Bagdad, Beirut, Amman, Tehran and Karachi, and to the Political Office with the Middle East Forces, and Gulf Posts.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

EA 1015/394

No. 16

THE REBELLION IN CENTRAL OMAN

Sir Bernard Burrows to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received September 17)

(No. 127. Confidential) Bahrain,
Sir, September 11, 1957.

With reference to Mr. Gault's despatch No. 83 of the 20th of June, I have the honour to submit the following report on the recent operations in Central Oman.

2. The prediction in paragraph 16 of Mr. Gault's despatch under reference, that more of the so-called Omani Liberation Army might be expected to return to Oman under cover of the seasonal influx of the date harvest in July, was fulfilled only too accurately. On the 14th of June Ibrahim bin Isa, the leader of the earlier revolt in the Sharqiyah, surrendered to the Sultan and either on that day or on one of the days immediately following Talib bin Ali, brother of the ex-Imam Ghalib, and the leader of the Omani Liberation Army, landed on the Batinah coast. Conflicting reports were received as to the place where he had landed and as to the number of men and arms which he brought with him, but subsequent developments made it all too clear that he was well provided with both and that his equipment included a small number of light automatics and some land mines. The quantities of equipment will never be known, particularly as part of the consignment exploded shortly after it had been landed as a result of unskilful handling.

3. Talib moved rapidly inland and established himself among Beni Hina supporters west of Nizwa, where he was joined by his brother Ghalib, who had broken his parole and left the village where the Sultan had ordered him to live. Reports of these developments came in at various times between the 20th and 24th of June.

4. A detailed chronology of events⁽¹⁾ from that time onwards is annexed to this despatch. For the purpose of this review it is perhaps sufficient to summarise the incident into five parts:—

(a) The period of inaction from the first reports of Talib's landing until the 30th of June. During this time the Sultan instructed his Walis to raise

the tribes as necessary to contain or attack Talib if he were found.

(b) The Sultan's attempt to overcome the rising with his own forces from the 30th of June to the 16th of July. The original plan, which was to attack Talib in the position where he had been discovered at the villages of Sait and Ghumr with a force of loyal tribesmen, mostly from the Abriyin, was first delayed by the unreadiness of the Sultan's personal representatives to go forward, and then changed by a decision that if the villages did not capitulate they must be shelled by the regular army. In the event the rebels opened fire on the tribesmen with their light machine guns and although the latter suffered no casualties they refused to attack unless the forts had first been completely demolished. Lieutenant-Colonel Cheeseman committed his artillery and mortars to this task, but the weapons were so badly handled that they made no impression on the forts. While this was in progress, the rebels ambushed or mined four vehicles on the lines of communication and finally blocked the main road south of Muscat near Izki. This skilful use of guerilla tactics threw the Muscat command off balance and revealed their extreme logistic weakness, as the forward troops had no reserves of rations or ammunition and had to be withdrawn to their base at Firq. In the course of the withdrawal they were fired upon near Tanuf and Nizwa and lost a good number of men and vehicles. As a result the Oman Regiment became demoralised and the decision was taken to abandon the base at Firq and withdraw further to Fahud. At an early stage of these operations the Sultan asked for R.A.F. assistance in demolishing the forts. It was explained to the Sultan that the provision of such assistance would be

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

SECRET

contrary to Her Majesty's Government's existing policy, in addition to having had local effect, and he withdrew his request. However, the R.A.F. continued as before to provide communication and reconnaissance services.

(c) Political and R.A.F. action. On the 16th of July the Sultan wrote a letter to Her Majesty's Consul-General asking for all possible help from Her Majesty's Government by land and air. Her Majesty's Government decided on the 18th of July to accede to this request and instructions were given for political, air and land action to be taken accordingly. The political action consisted of a statement to the Sultan that Her Majesty's Government would help him and a public announcement to the same effect. That in itself had a profound influence in halting the spread of dissidence in Oman. Air action was restricted within carefully defined limits in order to minimise the danger to the civilian population. (It is believed that in the whole operations there were no more than three civilians slightly wounded.) The air attacks were concentrated during this period on the major forts of the rebel-held towns and were carried out after leaflet warnings. Land action consisted during the period up to the 1st of August of the concentration of the Muscat Northern Frontier Regiment, which had remained uncontaminated by the demoralisation of the Oman Regiment, and of two squadrons of the Trucial Oman Scouts (T.O.S.) at Ibri. The results of the action during this phase were to contain the sphere of rebel predominance to the towns and villages of Nizwa, Tanuf, Izki, Birkat al Mauz, Bahlah and Jabrin with some, but by no means all, of the area between these places. The Abriyin village of Hamra remained loyal throughout although close to Tanuf and Bahlah and being virtually dependent on those places for access to the rest of the country.

(d) The land campaign. Plans were being made during the preceding period for a land advance to tighten the ring further round the rebel-held localities. It became apparent after

the arrival of Brigadier Robertson on the 28th of July to take command of the forces in the field that, in order to make sure that the advance should not be held up once it had begun, and in order to speed up the later phases of the operations generally, it would be essential that British troops should take part in a support role in addition to the T.O.S. and Muscat forces. This was approved by Her Majesty's Government on the 30th of July and the final shape of the plan thereafter emerged very quickly. The main attack was to go in from the west on the route Ibri, Fahud, Awaifi, Iz, Firq, Nizwa. The forces moving along this route were to be the Muscat Northern Frontier Regiment, two squadrons of T.O.S., a Rifle Company and support group of the Cameronians and a troop of armoured cars of the 15/19 Hussars. A subsidiary move was to be made from Muscat up the Wadi Samail by the Muscat Infantry, followed by a large force of friendly tribesmen whom the Sultan had managed to assemble and who were to take over garrison duties in the rebel towns as soon as these were captured. A massive air-lift brought the diverse elements of the western force together at Fahud on the 5th and 6th of August, including Cameronians from Kenya and Bahrain, armoured cars from the Hadhramaut, signals and other specialist detachments from Cyprus and T.O.S. from Sharjah and Ibri. The force reached within a few hundred yards of Firq without any great resistance, but there they ran into heavy small-arms fire from prepared positions. After a short pause for pin-pointing the enemy positions and concerting the details of R.A.F. support, air attacks with rockets and fragmentation bombs were made on these positions on the 10th of August and Firq was captured on the 11th of August after a bold flank movement by the Cameronians during the preceding night, and Nizwa was entered on the same day. Meanwhile the Muscat force had run into opposition some miles short of Izki, but was able to advance with air support on the 11th of August and the junction between

SECRET

the two forces was effected at Birkat al Mauz on the 12th of August.

(e) The final phase has seen the occupation without further fighting of the remaining major rebel villages of Tanuf, Bahlah and Jabrin, the consolidation of the Muscat civil authority under the Minister of the Interior at Nizwa, the demolition of certain of the forts and fortifications previously held by the rebels and the search for the rebel leaders by land, air and sea which has unfortunately not yet been completed.

5. From the military point of view these events revealed weaknesses in the training organisation and leadership of the Muscat forces, and very serious deficiencies of military and political intelligence in Muscat. They also revealed on our side the absence of a ready-made plan of intervention in an intermediate size emergency of this kind. These deficiencies are now receiving urgent study. We were also handicapped at the start by the fortuitous absence of any senior officer experienced in working with native troops in this type of operation. This was not remedied until the arrival of Brigadier Robertson on the 28th of July. It was hoped at first that it might be possible to avoid using British troops in Oman both because of the political complications and because it was thought that they would find the climate excessively severe. It had never been thought that air action by itself would do what was required. It soon became clear that while a good deal could be done with the remains of the Muscat forces and the T.O.S. with air support, there would be some risk in relying only on these forces, particularly the risk that if they ran into any serious and organised opposition there might be quite a long delay during which outside political pressure might have built up. The decision to commit British troops may have slightly lengthened the preparatory stage, owing to the amount of ancillary units and equipment required, but it ensured that once the battle had been joined it was brought to a very speedy conclusion. The British troops suffered severely from the climate in the first few days, with numerous cases of temporary heat exhaustion, but after that they appeared to become acclimatised and were able to operate most effectively. While the last thing one would wish is to see British troops having to be committed again in such circumstances, it is a significant part of the

record of these events that they have proved that if necessary they can move and fight in Oman in the middle of the summer.

6. On his first arrival Talib obtained very little active support from the tribes resident in Oman except from the Beni Riyam and from certain members of his own tribe, the Beni Hina. His main strength depended throughout on the 200 or 300 Omanis who had come back with him from Saudi Arabia after being trained in the "Omani Liberation Army" at Dammam. It was the reverses suffered by the Sultan's forces in the early stages that shook the confidence of a large proportion of the Omani tribes, and there is little doubt that without the news of British intervention many more of them would have gone over to Talib's side. Support for the Sultan in Oman does not unfortunately as yet take the form of loyalty to the Crown or to a person, but rather of a desire to be on the stronger side and to have a share in any benefits that might be doled out from the State treasury. During the days in which it appeared that the Sultan might not be the stronger side, support therefore fell away widely. Moreover, particularly in the Dhahira, the predominant feeling of the Shaikhs is that they do not like authority at all. They have in recent years been just beginning to feel the authority of the Sultan and they were not slow on this occasion to welcome the prospect of its removal. It is more difficult to see why the Beni Riyam and their leader, Suleiman bin Himyar, should have thrown in their lot so unequivocally with the rebels. Suleiman's relations with the Sultan had for a long time been uneasy, and his stay in Muscat for some weeks prior to his escape on the 14th of July was not altogether of his own free will. Nevertheless, there was little apparent reason for him to feel that his privileged position in the Jebel Akhdar was seriously endangered unless indeed he was unusually far-sighted and had begun to understand that with the prospect of oil revenue, and a more powerful and centralised administration, the days of the individual robber baron were, in the long term, numbered.

7. A contributory cause of the temporary success of the rising and of the danger in the early stages that it might spread was the failure of the Sultan's Government to make any marked impact on the majority of the population of the interior during the last two years, and especially the failure to convince people that it was to their advantage

to be on good terms with the Government. Many people felt that the only result of the establishment of the Muscat administration was that they had to pay taxes and local dues more regularly than in the days of the Imam. Trade was improved by the opening of the Samail Road and medical attention became more generally available, but these things were evidently not enough in themselves to outweigh the dislike of authority and particularly of an authority whose most obvious representative was the tax gatherer. It is important in this connection to recall how much our thinking and that of the Muscat Government and of the Iraq Petroleum Company in planning the penetration of Oman in 1955 and the preceding years was influenced by the idea that oil would be found at Fahud. Perhaps partly unconsciously, one tended to work to the timetable that if Oman could be opened up and held for a year or two this would enable the company to prove the existence of oil and thereby to give visible evidence to the inhabitants that an era of greater prosperity was dawning and that the Muscat Government would shortly have great benefits to hand out to them. The discovery that in spite of its promising appearance the Fahud structure contained no oil meant that the situation would have to be held with the existing meagre resources of the Muscat Government for a much longer period than had been expected, and the implications of this delay were perhaps not considered as fully as they should have been. For this reason it seems likely that one of the most significant events of the period of the Oman rising, though entirely unconnected with it, may prove to have been the announcement by the Cities Service Company that two of their oil wells in Dhofar have been proved capable of producing at least 2,000 barrels a day each. Since then a further and better supply of oil has been found in one of the same wells. Once again there will be a delay before the benefits of this reach the ordinary inhabitant of Oman, but the delay is now finite and one can confidently expect that in not more than about two years' time the Muscat Government will be beginning to obtain additional revenues with which to strengthen both the civil and military administration and to make the exercise of its authority more welcome. The interim period may well be awkward. There is no guarantee that Talib and his friends outside Oman will not try to stage another rising, and it is only too probable that for the next couple of years or so the Muscat Govern-

ment will not have the resources to deal by itself with a rising on the same scale as the recent one or to bring about conditions in which such a thing would be less likely to occur. With the extreme conservatism of the Sultan, and the extreme paucity of experienced administrators at his disposal, it is not easy to persuade him to take even those measures in this direction which could be achieved within his present financial resources.

8. External reactions to the Oman rising and its suppression gave almost as much trouble as the rising itself. From the publicity point of view there was the most unfortunate initial accident that a high-powered British Press correspondent happened to be in the Gulf at the time when things went wrong and his exclusive and sensational stories brought the rest of the Press, sorely in need of silly-season material, hot on his heels. There were at one time no less than twenty-five correspondents in the area. Our subsequent difficulties with the Press were largely due to the fact that we and they had basically different aims. It was in truth a very small war. We wanted to emphasise this and to treat the early developments as optimistically as possible in order that opinion in America and the other Arab countries should not become unduly excited. The correspondents' object was to magnify the importance of the affair so as to keep their individual names on the front pages and to give their editors satisfactory amounts of sensational material. When they could not obtain news because there was not enough to go round, they either invented it or blamed us for not releasing it. Moreover, while we were being purposely optimistic they were looking for resemblances to Suez, on the theory presumably that bad news sells better than good. Added to this was the rooted objection of the Sultan of Muscat to have anything to do with the Press if this could be avoided. In view of the standard of reporting in most of the British newspapers he can hardly be blamed for this, but it was a factor which added considerably to our embarrassment as the correspondents believed, or professed to believe, that we were responsible for his unwillingness to receive them. Curiously enough the American Press on the whole gave much better and more objective coverage of the rising than their British colleagues, whose antics and complaints they often deplored. While, as I have said, the fundamental

difference in aim and outlook between ourselves and the British Press made some difficulty inevitable, it must be admitted with regret that public relations were the least successful aspect of the affair.

9. The extent of external responsibility for the rising is hard to determine. There is no doubt that many of the men who came into Oman with, or at about the same time as Talib had been given military training in Saudi Arabia, but there is virtually no evidence that the Saudi Arabian authorities had planned that these men should start a rising at this time. The reaction in Saudi Arabia and among the Arab States generally was extremely slow. The most coherent theory in the present state of our knowledge is that the higher authorities in Saudi Arabia wished to liquidate the Omani Liberation Army, partly to save themselves expense, partly because with their changing political orientation they were no longer so eager to upset the *status quo* in South-Eastern Arabia, or more generally because they had come to realise that revolutions might be infectious, and that they merely gave instructions for the men to be sent home. It is possible that Talib took charge of the movement from there on. It is perhaps more probable that it was organised either by junior Saudi officials or more likely by Egyptian or Syrian agents. In any case a certain quantity of arms, including some new-looking American anti-tank mines and grenades, were supplied to Talib, and transport by local craft to the Trucial States or the Batinah Coast arranged. There is no evidence that any foreigners entered Oman with Talib or that any supplies and personnel were sent to him from outside after the operations had started. Attempts were naturally made, principally by Syria, to get the Arab Governments to take some concerted political action with regard to the Oman operations.

This was held up for some time owing to the deliberate procrastination of the Iraq Government, and it was not until the active phase of the operations had come to an end that Arab League discussions finally reached the point where action was initiated in the Security Council. The Sultan of Muscat was with the utmost difficulty prevailed on by us to send a telegram to the President of the Security Council objecting to the reference of the matter to that body since it was a purely internal affair. He could not be persuaded to send similar messages to even the relatively friendly Arab Governments. But the attempt to inscribe the item on the Council's agenda was defeated.

10. Reactions in the other Gulf States were mixed. The Rulers tended to be glad in private that Her Majesty's Government were showing themselves willing and able to stand by their friend, but many other people were critical of the Sultan's administration, the backwardness of which they thought had largely contributed to the rising, and were inclined to shake their heads at the news of British forces being once more engaged in fighting Arabs. In Kuwait the Ruling Family were inclined to be somewhat more conscious of this state of feeling than of the solidarity which they owed to a brother Ruler. In Bahrain one or two pamphlets were circulated, but a strike call met with no response whatever.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations, Bagdad, Tehran, Amman, Beirut, P.O.M.E.F., to the Governor of Aden, the Commander-in-Chief East Indies, the Commander British Forces Arabian Peninsula and to Gulf Posts.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

SECRET

EA 1123/2

No. 17

BAHRAIN TRADE STATISTICS, JUNE AND JULY 1957

Commercial Secretariat to Eastern Department. (Received September 30)

(No. 1100/1/34/57)

Bahrain,

Dear Department,

September 20, 1957.

We enclose herewith Bahrain trade statistics for the months of June and July 1957.

2. These statistics were not issued by the Customs Department in time for inclusion in the respective bi-monthly reports.

3. The export and re-export figures for June included in our Economic Report No. 3 were obtained in advance from the Customs Department and we find that when compared with the final figures issued for the month, there are slight differences in the totals. We would regard the final figures as the more accurate.

4. This letter has been copied with enclosures to the recipients of our bi-monthly Economic Report.

Yours ever,

COMMERCIAL SECRETARIAT.

Enclosure 1

Trade Statistics

The total imports into Bahrain (excluding the Bahrain Government and the Bahrain Petroleum Company figures) were £1,563,395 for June and £1,419,245 for July. These figures compare favourably with £1,657,160 for June 1956 and £1,345,225 for July 1956. The United Kingdom figures for June and July this year were £502,615 and £435,185 respectively.

2. The total exports and re-exports from Bahrain (excluding oil) were £477,405 for June and £441,380 for July. Although these figures show an increase of approximately 20 per cent. over the March and April export and re-export figures of this year, they still reflect the lethargic condition of the market when compared with totals of £790,615 in June 1956 and £644,510 in July 1956.

3. The prevailing recession in the export and re-export trade is largely caused by Saudi Arabia's shortage of foreign currency (see paragraphs 1 and 10 of Economic Report No. 4 for July-August 1957). The total value of re-exports to Saudi Arabia shows a decrease of 47 per cent. compared with the corresponding period in 1956.

Enclosure 2

Bahrain Import Statistics

From major countries, but excluding Dubai, Muscat and contiguous territories and all articles imported by the Government of Bahrain and the Bahrain Petroleum Company Limited or admitted duty free:—

Country of Origin	(Value in £ sterling)	
	June	July
Aden	1,655	685
Africa B.E.	6,305	9,315
Australia	33,365	46,440
Austria	—	59,460
Belgium	20,775	14,180
Burma	5,740	—
Canada	6,485	—
Czechoslovakia	6,320	5,105
Denmark	16,010	3,215

SECRET

Country of Origin	June	July
Egypt ...	1,210	2,115
France ...	12,515	14,250
Formosa ...	—	2,025
Germany ...	72,920	43,025
Holland ...	98,110	37,075
Hong Kong ...	55,490	20,345
Hungary ...	2,510	545
India ...	160,005	139,425
Italy ...	19,900	19,725
Iraq ...	22,905	10,925
Japan ...	66,215	112,740
Lebanon ...	11,090	8,360
Malaya States ...	10,220	28,550
Persia ...	70,525	49,525
Pakistan ...	4,200	4,575
Siam ...	47,915	57,270
Sudan ...	8,160	2,460
Switzerland ...	15,800	19,135
Syria ...	1,040	730
Sweden ...	18,525	18,770
United Kingdom ...	502,615	435,185
United States ...	197,315	201,710
Norway ...	2,950	—
Roumania ...	35,170	33,730
Yugoslavia ...	1,185	—
Zanzibar ...	11,235	4,150
Others ...	17,045	14,500
Total ...	1,563,395	1,419,245

Bahrain Exports and Re-exports

(Commodities only—excludes oil)

(Value in £ sterling)

Exported to	June	July
Saudi Arabia ...	255,460	220,485
Qatar ...	45,495	50,690
Dubai ...	81,330	88,140
Muscat ...	3,310	1,330
Kuwait ...	40,450	33,570
India ...	1,385	265
Pakistan ...	215	185
Persia ...	41,050	39,860
Aden ...	—	1,245
Afghanistan ...	1,745	2,905
Iraq ...	920	2,705
United Kingdom ...	6,030	—
Lebanon ...	15	—
Total ...	477,405	441,380

Bahrain Re-export Trade with Saudi Arabia

(Value in £ sterling)

	Re-exported to Saudi Arabia		Total of Re-export Trade	
	1956	1957	1956	1957
April ...	389,195	169,455	580,905	377,035
May ...	325,080	289,030	543,400	534,560
June ...	561,005	255,460	790,615	477,405
July ...	478,105	220,485	644,510	441,380
Total for 4 months	1,753,385	934,430	2,559,430	1,830,380

EA 1051/22

No. 18

DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PERSIAN GULF SHAIKHDOMS AND NEIGHBOURING FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Sir Bernard Burrows (Bahrain)

(No. 141. Confidential)
Sir,

Foreign Office,

October 17, 1957.

In your despatch No. 116 (1086) of the 28th of August, your Excellency draws attention to a significant evolution in the course of the last year in the attitude of Her Majesty's Government towards direct contacts between the Persian Gulf States under their protection and neighbouring foreign countries.

2. I share your view that we need not be perturbed at these developments and, indeed, should in principle encourage direct contacts whenever there is either clear advantage in our doing so or there is no other course compatible with our obligation to promote the interests of the Shaikhdoms. But it appears from the recent behaviour of the Rulers of Kuwait and Bahrain that they are anything but anxious to be introduced into the front line in this way, self-interest and tradition inclining them to prefer to shelter behind us; while the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, although constitutionally in a more appropriate position to do so, is to the inconvenience and disadvantage of Her Majesty's Government most reluctant to establish direct contacts with the outside world. A further difficulty is that even when the Shaikhdoms are willing or anxious to become members of international technical bodies there may be constitutional objections to acceptance of their candidature by the sovereign States members of the organisation. A case in point is the Kuwaiti desire to join the International Telecommunications Union.

3. I agree that the specific instance of the dispute between Bahrain and Qatar over Zubarah should be regarded as in no way constituting a precedent and that we should normally try to keep in our own hands the settlement of disputes between the Gulf States.

4. As regards the three major difficulties involved in promoting more direct contacts to the Gulf States, to which your Excellency draws attention, I agree generally with the analysis in paragraphs 7 to 9 of your despatch under reference. In particular there seems no reason for any formal change in our treaty relationship with the Gulf States; nor should our present policy of refusing to accept the appointment of any further foreign consuls in the Shaikhdoms be modified. As regards the attitude of the Iranian Government you will have seen from my despatch No. 129 to Tehran that I have instructed Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to speak to the Iranian Government in a sense similar to that advocated by you.

5. To sum up, your Excellency may be assured that I am not in principle opposed to direct contacts between the Gulf Shaikhdoms under our protection and neighbouring foreign countries, and any recommendations in this connection made by you will be considered sympathetically.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Baghdad, Beirut, Amman, Tehran and Karachi, and to the Political Office with the Middle East Forces, and Gulf Posts.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

EA 1019/10

No. 19

THE ELEVENTH MEETING OF THE TRUCIAL COUNCIL

Sir Bernard Burrows to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received November 20)

(No. 150. Confidential)

*Bahrain,
November 15, 1957.*

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Political Agency, Trucial States, which encloses the Agenda⁽¹⁾ and Minutes⁽¹⁾ of the eleventh meeting of the Trucial Council and of the second meetings of the Education and Public Health Committees, which were held in Dubai on the 6th of November.

2. In paragraph 7 of his despatch and item 5 of the minutes of the Education Committee, Mr. Tripp refers to the Rulers' freedom to correspond direct with Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar on educational matters. It was necessary for Mr. Tripp to make this point since the Ruler of Kuwait had insisted that he would only send teachers to the Trucial States in response to requests from individual rulers. Although this might be regarded as a retrograde step from our intention to co-ordinate all educational matters, including the allocation of teachers, through the Education Committee, we have no alternative but to respect the wishes of the Ruler of Kuwait and to try to encourage the Rulers to discuss their problems and requirements in Committee before making individual approaches to Kuwait. Arising from the Ruler of Kuwait's wish to keep the provision of teachers a personal matter between the Rulers of the Trucial States and himself, the Kuwait Government has so far failed to accept our invitation to nominate a Kuwaiti representative on the Committee. I intend to take up this matter with the Kuwait authorities during my next visit to Kuwait.

3. Apart from this small amendment to our plans for persuading the Rulers to work together in furthering the interests of their territories the meeting of the Trucial Council shows, I think, that the Rulers are becoming aware of the purpose of the Council. The issue of a broadsheet after each meeting will help to show that the Rulers are working together in tackling the common problems of the Shaikhdoms and will also publicise more widely in the Trucial States the benefits accruing to these States and their people from co-operation between the Rulers and Her Majesty's Government.

4. Our attempts to increase the effectiveness of the Trucial Council will, however, be in danger of frustration if the funds allotted under the Trucial States Development Scheme for the year 1958-59 are reduced by the amount referred to in Mr. Walmsley's letter⁽¹⁾ (EA 1102/48) of the 4th of November, to which I shall reply separately. At its present stage the progress of the Trucial Council cannot be divorced from the progress of the Development Scheme, which is the mainspring of its activities, and any serious slowing-down of the latter must inevitably result in the Rulers' losing interest in the work of the Council and, consequently, in a weakening of our ability to influence them in the face of hostile propaganda and their own separatist tendencies.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch, without enclosure, to Her Majesty's Political Agent, Trucial States.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

SECRET

Enclosure

*Mr. Tripp to Sir Bernard Burrows (Bahrain)**Political Agency,
Trucial States,
Dubai,*

(No. 10110/57)

November 8, 1957.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith for your Excellency's information two copies of the agenda⁽¹⁾ and minutes⁽¹⁾ of the eleventh meeting of the Trucial Council, and of the second meetings of the Education and Public Health Committees, which were held in Dubai on the 5th and 6th of November.

2. All the Trucial States' Rulers attended the opening of the eleventh session, but the Ruler of Sharjah had to withdraw almost at once, having succumbed to Asian 'flu. I feared that his absence from the Council would make discussion less lively, but in the event I was pleased that the other Rulers kept the ball rolling. It was unfortunate that the Ruler of Abu Dhabi had to return to his sick brother's bedside immediately on the conclusion of the first day's business and that the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah felt compelled to withdraw after lunch, in a huff over the frontier settlement, the memory of which still renders his speech periodically quite incoherent. Despite these disappointments, the eleventh meeting and the subsequent committee meetings and various functions arranged for the Rulers were more than usually animated and I gained the impression that Rulers are beginning at last to appreciate the efforts of Her Majesty's Government to help them improve the condition of their States.

3. As had been agreed between us, Sir, I sought to make this Agency appear less intrusive in the various spheres of improvement in the Trucial States, and to give the impression that it was the Rulers who were deciding how to spend the funds which Her Majesty's Government were so generously providing. This fiction was fairly successfully maintained in conversation and reflected in the publicity with which the meetings have been invested. While I do not think this in any way fools the Rulers—most of whom think it quite proper that we should spoon-feed them—I hope that the more independent minded Rulers and aspiring Arab nationalists in the Trucial States will begin to believe that although Her Majesty's Government provide the means, it is the Rulers who conceive and execute the improvements which are now appearing on the Trucial Coast, as a result of expenditure under the Development fund. This is the goal at which I am, with your approval, aiming and in time I hope we shall be able to put much more responsibility on the Rulers for the execution of the development programme.

4. There is, however, the continuing disappointment of the lack of response on the part of most of the Rulers, to our suggestion that they should shoulder part of the financial burden. True, Dubai and Abu Dhabi have made considerable progress and the Rulers of these two States are already financing schemes of administrative improvements and some development projects. But the other Rulers seem rooted in their obstinate refusal to contribute to development schemes.

5. At the Council meeting Rulers again expressed their gratitude for the considerable help which Her Majesty's Government are giving them, and which is becoming more apparent with the increasing expenditure on dispensaries, the hospital, education and water survey. From the remarks of some of the Rulers it is clear that they approve the general lines of the development programme, which as Shaikh Mohammed es Sharqi told me, proved beyond a shadow of doubt the falseness of allegations that Her Majesty's Government were exploiting the Trucial States. The new projects which the Rulers particularly welcomed were the Trade School in Sharjah and the improvements in medical coverage in the Trucial States.

6. As you will see from the minutes, Rulers agreed to some improvements in their general administration, including a more careful control of the issue of passports and in principle to the licensing of vehicles and drivers, with the help of the Superintendent of Police, Dubai. They also agreed to the introduction of legislation on workmen's compensation. My reference to the Rulers' promise of contributions to the Trucial Council from any future oil revenues unfortunately

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

SECRET

56052**

G

lost some of its effect in the absence of Shaikh Saqr of Sharjah, although the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah (1 per cent.) appeared embarrassed. Shaikh Rashid of Dubai took the opportunity to ask Shaikh Saqr why he did not come into line with the other Rulers on a 4 per cent. contribution, but received no coherent reply.

7. On the second day of their visit, Rulers met in the Education and Public Health Committees. They expressed their disappointment at Mr. Muir's inability to attend the discussions on education, which were however worth while. I was able to make the point about Rulers' freedom to correspond direct with Kuwait, Bahrain or Qatar on education, without prior consultation in the Education Committee, without letting it seem that this was a change of policy on our part. It was encouraging to hear the Rulers say they would of course continue to benefit from discussion of their education problems in the Committee, even though they addressed separate letters to the Rulers of those States which helped them with education. Shaikh Rashid of Dubai raised the question of screening teachers sent from outside, to ensure the exclusion of Communists. Other Rulers expressed similar apprehension and were advised to make the point in their correspondence with those States who were prepared to help them.

8. The Public Health Committee met this year in the Hospital and were able to see for themselves the great improvements which have been made in the past year. Rulers appeared impressed by the facilities now available and the tremendous improvement in medical coverage of the Trucial States. They did not, however, immediately respond to my plea for increased contributions to enable the hospital to increase its facilities still further. Figures for hospital attendance so far this year showed increasing confidence in the hospital and Shaikh Rashid told me privately that he had heard no more complaints against Dr. McCaully, who appeared to have "changed his attitude".

9. On the conclusion of the Public Health Committee's meeting, I took Rulers over to the Trucial Oman Scouts, where they were, as I have reported elsewhere, entertained and shown something of the work and life of their men in the Scouts.

10. While one is perhaps naturally impatient for some more spectacular advance in the effectiveness of the Trucial Council, as a consultative body, I feel we should remember that it is no more than the sum of its members, who still have a long way to go before they advance from their traditional positions as bedu Rulers. At the same time we are combating the idea, fostered to some extent by hostile propaganda, that the Council being a creation of Her Majesty's Government has some sinister purpose—perhaps to make it easier for us in time to deliver the seven Trucial States to the Sultan of Muscat? If this propaganda were not enough of a counter to our efforts to bind the Rulers together in their own interests, we have to contend as well with the separatist tendencies of such Rulers as Shaikh Saqr of Sharjah, with the resentment of the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah, while Abu Dhabi remains characteristically aloof from the activities of the other Trucial States. However, I am sure that we are right to persevere with our efforts to make the Trucial Council effective, since it has proved its value over the past five years, as a cohesive force in this area, and has provided a meeting place for Rulers, traditionally suspicious of each other, where they can at least discuss matters of common interest and see that none of their old enemies in fact sports a cloven hoof or sprouts a tail.

I have, &c.

J. P. TRIPP

(Political Agent).

EA 1085/18

No. 20

THE IRANIAN CLAIM TO BAHRAIN

Sir Bernard Burrows to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received November 19)

(No. 151. Confidential)
Sir,

Bahrain,
November 15, 1957.

With reference to your telegram No. 1887 of November 13 I have the honour to report that on that date a message was passed to the Ruler through the Secretary to the Bahrain Government to the effect that Her Majesty's Government, having heard reports of the Iranian Government's action to reassert their claims to Bahrain, wished the Ruler to know that Her Majesty's Government would continue to fulfil their obligation to safeguard the independence of Bahrain. On the 14th of November I called on the Ruler and confirmed this to him personally, explaining also the circumstances in which the Iranian Government's action had been taken. The Ruler expressed great pleasure at the action taken by Her Majesty's Government and asked me to convey his warm thanks. He also asked that I should confirm in writing what I had said to him. I enclose a copy of a letter which I am writing to him accordingly. The Ruler particularly asked that the letter should include some reference to my own initiative in enquiring as to the action which might be taken here as he thought this would be valuable in helping to bring home to people here the value of the local association between the Bahrain Government and Her Majesty's Representatives.

2. The Ruler recalled his earlier remarks about the Persian occupation of Farsi and Arabi (as reported for instance in my telegram No. 484 of the 24th of April last) and suggested that the present Persian action was probably in part a consequence of our not having reacted more firmly against the Persian seizure of these islands.

3. Suitable publicity has been given on Bahrain Radio to the attitude adopted in this matter by Her Majesty's Government.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Tehran and Washington, to POMEF and to the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, H.Q., B.F.A.P. and Gulf Posts.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

Enclosure

No. 1081/2

British Residency, Bahrain,
November 15, 1957.

After compliments,

As I informed your Highness on November 14 reports were recently received that the Iranian Government were taking certain steps to reassert their claim to Bahrain. On learning this I enquired of Her Majesty's Government whether a statement could be made on the subject and whether I could give the necessary assurances to your Highness. I have now been instructed to inform your Highness that Her Majesty's Government will continue to fulfil their obligation to safeguard the independence of Bahrain and a statement to the same effect has been issued by the Foreign Office in London.

Signed. B. A. B. BURROWS.

His Highness Shaikh Sir Sulman bin Hamad al Khalifa, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E.,
Bahrain.

SECRET

(Enclosure to Bahrain P/L despatch No. 158 of November 29
Received December 10)

Bahrain,
November 25, 1957.

From:

Sulman bin Hamad AlKhalifah,
Ruler of Bahrain,
Bahrain.

To:

His Excellency the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
British Residency,
Bahrain.

After compliments,

We were very pleased to receive your esteemed letter of the 15th November, 1957, giving us the assurances of Her Majesty's Government of safeguarding the independence of Our beloved country.

Please accept and extend to Her Majesty's Government Our heartfelt thanks for your assistance in this matter.

Usual ending,

SULMAN BIN HAMAD ALKHALIFAH.

SECRET

SECRET

EA 1016/84

No. 21

ELECTIONS TO THE MUNICIPAL COUNCILS OF MANAMA, MUHARRAQ, HEDD AND RIFA'A

Sir Bernard Burrows to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received December 17)

(No. 162. Confidential)
Sir,

Bahrain,
December 13, 1957.

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Political Agent, Bahrain, regarding the Bahrain Government's announcement that municipal elections are shortly to be held. I agree with Mr. Gault's views in paragraph 3 of his despatch.

2. In order to complete the picture it may be useful to record here that the Health and Education Councils at present consist of eight members each. Three of these are nominated by the Ruler; the other five are selected by the Municipal Councils from among their own members, two from Manama and one each from Muharrak, Rifa'a and Hedd. It is to be presumed that this arrangement will continue after the new Municipal Councils have been formed but nothing has yet been announced on the subject.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Baghdad, Tehran and Beirut, POMEF, the Governor of Aden and Gulf Posts.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

ANNEX

(No. 12. Confidential)
Sir,

Her Majesty's Political Agency, Bahrain,
December 11, 1957.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that in an announcement dated the 3rd of December, of which I enclose a translation, the Ruler of Bahrain ordered the holding of elections as soon as they could be arranged to the Municipal Councils of Manama, Muharrak, Hedd and Rifa'a.

2. As a result of the disturbances which took place in Bahrain at the beginning of November 1956 in connexion with the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt at the end of October Shaikh Salman dissolved the existing municipal councils for these places, which had not in any case been working satisfactorily for some years. For the Manama council elections held early in 1955 had proved a failure because the Committee of National Union had prevented many people from voting in them. Instead Shaikh Salman appointed new municipal councils, composed of persons carefully chosen by him in consultation with Sir Charles Belgrave, the Adviser, to give as wide a cross section of sensible public opinion as possible, and so arranged that no person sat on more than one council. These councils were appointed for a year with the expressed intentions that after that they would be replaced by ones elected and appointed in the normal way, for two years at a time. The Ruler thought, and we at the time agreed with him, that the time was not suitable for elections to be held owing to the risk of disturbances. The only officially published notification of the appointment of the existing councils appears to be the speech made by Shaikh Salman to the members of those councils when he received them on the 10th of December, 1956. A copy of this speech is enclosed. Likewise there was no officially published announcement of the dissolution of the previous councils. I should explain here that the custom, with regard to these municipal councils in Bahrain has been that half the members are elected, the electors having to have a property and tax-paying qualification, and the other half are appointed by the Government, on the instructions of the Ruler.

3. It happened that on the 2nd of December I went to see Shaikh Salman for one of my regular talks with him and suggested to him that he should consider

SECRET

having elections to the municipal councils since the year for which they were appointed was almost up and the moment seemed to me particularly favourable as the Committee of National Union had ceased to exist and without its trouble-makers the islands had been quiet for the past year. I added that his police force was now stronger than it ever had been both in men and in organisation. Shaikh Salman, somewhat to my surprise, accepted my suggestion with alacrity and the next day issued his announcement. I had decided to speak to him on the subject, among others, because since my return from leave in November I had found the belief among reasonable Bahrainis that Shaikh Salman might conveniently forget his undertaking of the previous year that the municipalities were being appointed for a year only and let these wholly appointed councils run on indefinitely. I felt it would have been very undesirable for it to appear that Shaikh Salman was profiting from his strengthened position in Bahrain since the suppression of the Committee of National Union to pursue a reactionary policy—which, be it said, he is only too liable to do given the chance. In this particular case it would, of course, have been hard for Shaikh Salman to justify refusing to allow municipal elections since these municipal councils, half elected and half appointed, have existed in Bahrain for very many years and have, on the whole, worked fairly well. The Manama council was set up as an entirely appointed body in 1919. In 1926 elections for half the members were introduced and in 1927 the Muharraq municipal council was formed. The two newly created municipal councils at Sitra and Jidhafs will not be re-elected since they have only been in existence since the end of September.

4. The qualification for an elector is the payment of municipal tax, either house or shop. The qualifications for candidates for elections are residence in or holding a position of responsibility in a firm in the particular municipal area, paying municipal taxes, literacy and of an age not less than 25 years. The Government is to make uniform the rules of the different municipalities regarding qualifications before the elections which are expected to take place in about six weeks' time. There may therefore be changes in the qualifications. It will in any case take a certain time to revise the voting lists. There are thought to be about 10,000 persons qualified to vote in the four particular areas.

I have, &c.

C. A. GAULT.

Enclosure No. 1

ANNOUNCEMENT BY HIS HIGHNESS

With reference to our declaration issued on December 10, 1956, in which we announced the formation of municipal councils for a period of one year only, we have issued our command to the municipalities to undertake directly the drawing-up of electoral lists in preparation for the holding of elections for the members of the municipal councils in accordance with the rules and regulations in force in the country.

The existing municipal councils will continue until it is possible to form the next councils in those praiseworthy efforts which they have carried out during this year in the discharging of their mission to the common good.

SALMAN BIN HAMED AL KHALIFA,

Ruler of Bahrain.

10 Jamadi al Awal 1377.

3 December 1957.

Enclosure No. 2

On the 10th of December, 1956, the nominated members of the new Majliss presented themselves before His Highness the Ruler of Bahrain at Rufa' Palace. These Majliss are for the municipalities, the regulation of diving, trade, minors, waqfs, agriculture and water. The total of the members is 50.

SECRET

His Highness delivered the following speech on this occasion:—

Gentlemen,

Bahrain has been exposed to a series of incidents and disturbances during the last three years, during which time the state of trade, the Government machinery and the public welfare in Bahrain have been affected and hindered. We are here not to go through particulars of the damages caused by those acts, though most of them are known to you. The action which we saw necessary to be taken in order to maintain security in Bahrain did not mean that we would hesitate to accomplish the reforms about which we had already made announcements.

It is much to be regretted that in spite of all efforts the Committee of National Union did not co-operate in achieving all those aims and in carrying out the reforms which they alleged they were working for. What happened was that they concentrated on paralysing the working of the Majliss and organisations which were founded 30 or 40 years ago for the public service and for looking after the public interest. These Majliss were obliged to cease functioning and therefore the Government was obliged to dissolve the Committee.

We would like, on this occasion, to express our appreciation of those minorities who valued their duty and responsibility toward the public interest and continued to work in the Majliss and bore that burden.

We would like to point out that the formation of the municipal councils are usually made by election. But in the present circumstances we found, in order that the work of the municipalities should be no longer delayed, it seemed wise to appoint the Majliss for a period of one year. It was also decided that the majority of the members would be appointed from those who had previously exercised such duties. We hereby assure you that we will see that elections will be allowed for these municipal councils after the appointed span of the present nominated Councils.

As regards the Councils of Health and Education we will soon form them as they are essential.

We wish to mention that we have started and will continue to carry out the vital schemes which will help in the progress of the country such as the marine jetty and the water scheme for Muharraq including extension of electricity to all parts of the country.

All this will be performed in spite of the fact that two-thirds of the State royalties depend on oil the production of which is very limited which makes it difficult for us to keep in line with the other States which produce more oil.

All these schemes which have been executed or are in the way of execution, are means to raise the standard of the country and to develop it. All these Majliss which have been established or will be established when the necessity arises are means to enable the sons of this country to co-operate with the Government in the progress and advancement of Bahrain.

We request you all, as well as all the persons who are interested in the progress of this country, to co-operate with us in introducing the reforms and development. You should overlook personal and private advantages and look seriously to the public benefit.

SECRET

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

EA 1012/6

No. 22

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Mr. Gault to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received July 15)

(No. 97. Confidential)
Sir,

Bahrain,
July 11, 1957.

With reference to my despatch No. 89 of the 1st of August, 1956, I have the honour to submit my Report on Leading Personalities in the Persian Gulf for 1957.

I have, &c.

C. A. GAULT.

Enclosure

Leading Personalities in the Persian Gulf, 1957

INDEX

Bahrain

1. Abdul Aziz bin Sa'ad Shemlan.
2. Abdul Rahman al Bakir.
3. Abdul Rahman al Qusaibi.
4. Abdullah bin Hamad al Khalifah, Shaikh.
5. Abdullah bin Isa al Khalifah, Shaikh, C.I.E.
6. Ahmad Fakhroo, M.B.E.
7. Daij bin Hamad al Khalifah, Shaikh, O.B.E.
8. Hassan al Madaifi.
9. Hussain bin Ali Yatim, M.B.E.
10. Isa bin Salman al Khalifah, Shaikh.
11. Kanoo family.
12. Khalifah bin Muhammad al Khalifah, Shaikh.
13. Khalifah bin Salman al Khalifah, Shaikh.
14. Mansur al Oraiyidh, M.B.E.
15. Muhammad bin Isa al Khalifah, Shaikh, C.B.E.
16. Muhsin al Tajir.
17. Rashid Zayani.
18. Salman bin Hamad bin Isa al Khalifah, His Highness Shaikh, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., Ruler of Bahrain.
19. Salman bin Muhammad al Khalifah, Shaikh.

Kuwait

1. Abdul Aziz Husain.
2. Abdul Latif Ibrahim al Nuf.
3. Abdullah al Jabir, Shaikh, C.I.E.
4. Abdullah bin Khaza'al.
5. Abdullah al Mubarak, Shaikh, C.I.E.
6. Abdullah al Salim al Sabah, His Highness Shaikh, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., Ruler of Kuwait.
7. Ahmad Abdul Latif.
8. Ali Dawud.
9. Ashraf Tawfiq Lutfi.
10. Badr al Abdullah al Mulla Salih.
11. Fahad al Salim, Shaikh.
12. Fu'ad Abdul Baqi.
13. 'Izzat Ja'far.
14. Jabir al Abdullah, Shaikh.
15. Jabir al Ahmad, Shaikh.

16. Jabir al Ali, Shaikh.
17. Jasim Qatami.
18. Khalid al Abdullah, Shaikh.
19. Mubarak al Abdullah al Ahmad, Shaikh.
20. Mubarak al Abdullah al Jabir, Shaikh.
21. Muhammad al Ahmad, Shaikh.
22. Muhammad Qabazard.
23. Muhammad Yusuf al Nuf.
24. Nuf Yusuf al Nuf.
25. Sabah al Abdullah, Shaikh.
26. Sabah al Ahmad, Shaikh.
27. Sabah al Salim, Shaikh.
28. Sa'd al Abdullah, Shaikh.
29. Salim al Ali, Shaikh.
30. Sa'ud al Fawzan.
31. Tala't Ghosain.
32. Yusuf al Ahmad al Ghanim.
33. Yusuf bin Isa, Shaikh.

Obituary: Abdullah al Ahmad, Shaikh.
Salah al Nasir, Shaikh.

Muscat

1. Ahmad bin Ibrahim, Saiyid.
2. Ghalib bin Ali bin Hilal.
3. Gokaldass, Rai Bahadur.
4. Ismail Khalil al Rassassi.
5. Muhammad bin Ahmad.
6. Said bin Taimur, Sultan of Muscat.
7. Salih bin Isa al Harthi, Shaikh.
8. Shihab bin Faisal, Saiyid.
9. Sulaiman bin Hamyar al Nabhani, Shaikh.
10. Taimur bin Faisal, Saiyid.
11. Talib bin Ali bin Hilal.
12. Tariq bin Taimur, Saiyid.

Qatar

1. Abdul Rahman bin Darwish.
2. Abdullah bin Darwish.
3. Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani, Shaikh.
4. Ali bin Abdullah Al Thani, His Highness Shaikh, K.B.E., Ruler of Qatar.
5. Jasim bin Darwish.
6. Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani.
7. Muhammad bin Uthman.
8. Nasir bin Khalid, Shaikh.
9. Salih al Mani'.

Obituary: Abdullah bin Qasim Al Thani,
His Excellency Shaikh.

Trucial States

ABU DHABI

1. Shakhbut bin Sultan bin Said, Shaikh, Ruler of Abu Dhabi.
2. Hazza' bin Sultan, Shaikh.
3. Khalid bin Sultan, Shaikh.
4. Zaid bin Sultan, Shaikh.

AJMAN

5. Rashid bin Humaid Al Na'imi, Shaikh, Ruler of Ajman.

DUBAI

6. Said bin Maktum, C.B.E., Shaikh, Ruler of Dubai.
7. Rashid bin Said bin Maktum, Shaikh.
8. Jum'a bin Maktum, Shaikh.
9. Khalifah bin Said bin Maktum.
10. Hamad bin Majid bin Fateim.
11. Hamad bin Majid bin Ghurair.
12. Ubaid bin Thani.
13. Thani bin Abdullah.
14. Murshid al Rashid al Usaimi.

FUJAIRAH

15. Muhammad bin Hamad al Sharqi, Shaikh, Ruler of Fujairah.

RAS AL KHAIMAH

16. Saqr bin Muhammad bin Salim, Shaikh, Ruler of Ras al Khaimah.
17. Sultan bin Salim al Qasimi.

SHARJAH

18. Saqr bin Sultan bin Saqr, Shaikh, Ruler of Sharjah.
19. Muhammad bin Saqr al Qasimi, Shaikh.

UMM AL QAIWAIN

20. Ahmad bin Rashid al Mu'alla, M.B.E., Shaikh, Ruler of Umm al Qaiwain.

BAHRAIN

1. Abdul Aziz bin Sa'ad Shemlan

Born about 1912. Sunni Arab. His father Saad Shemlan is a negro former slave, and his mother an Indian, probably from Malabar. His father is said to have been foster brother to the present Ruler. The father was deported about 1930 by Shaikh Hamad for seditious activities. Abdul Aziz went to the American University at Beirut in 1930 at the expense of the Bahrain Government. In 1939 he was employed as an informer by the then R.A.F. Liaison Officer here. In 1945 joined the British Bank of the Middle East (then Imperial Bank of Persia). In 1955 the Bank dispensed with his services, giving him a generous gratuity. Visited Egypt in the summer of 1955. Closely concerned with the now defunct paper *Saut al Bahrain* and a member of the High Executive Committee, later called the Committee of National Union, which was dissolved by the Ruler after the disturbances of November 1956. As a result of these disturbances, caused by the Committee of National Union over the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt, was arrested and sentenced by a Bahrain court to fourteen years' imprisonment which he is serving in St. Helena, having been deported from Bahrain.

Speaks good English. Was a drinker until his imprisonment.

2. Abdul Rahman al Bakir

Born about 1912. Of a Qatari family. His uncle who was a small merchant was reported for bringing cultured pearls into Bahrain—he had been agitating against the then Ruler—Abdul Rahman came to school in Bahrain (Muharraq) where he organised a strike of the students. Obtained Bahrain nationality on the insistence of Shaikh Salman who was opposed by the Adviser. The Ruler withdrew

his nationality in 1954. Since 1952 has been involved in local politics, attacking the Government in the newspapers. In 1954 helped to form the self-styled "High Executive Committee," later called "Committee of National Union," to press reforms and improvements in the administration on the Government. In December 1954 organised a general strike of one week. With Abdul Aziz Shemlan (No. 1), he became one of the leading figures of the reformist movement.

At the end of the second Bahrain general strike in March 1956 he was, at the Ruler's insistence, unofficially exiled for five months. He spent this period mainly in Egypt where he made several anti-British pronouncements. Returned to Bahrain in September 1956. As a result of the disturbances caused by the Committee of National Union in November 1956 over the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt was arrested and sentenced by a Bahrain court to fourteen years' imprisonment which he is serving in St. Helena having been deported thither. Speaks good English.

3. Abdul Rahman al Qusaibi

Born in 1892. Nejd, of plebeian origin. Formerly Victor Rosenthal's pearl-broker. An intelligent and sophisticated man. Has travelled much in the East and in Europe and was appointed an honorary Wazir of Saudi Arabia by Ibn Saud in 1951 and a Minister of State by King Saud in 1955. The Qusaibis have been for very many years unofficial Saudi purchasing agents in Bahrain, being mainly concerned with buying supplies from Saudi Arabia. The family owns land in Hasa and Qatif, but is not now in sound financial circumstances. When in Europe he dresses in European style. He often has big schemes which do not come off. In intelligence and outlook he is far in advance of the ordinary Bahrain merchant and is able to take an objective view of his own people and the "Arab cause," at least when talking to a non-Arab. He is a good and amusing talker. Is a busybody.

4. Abdullah bin Hamad al Khalifah, Shaikh

Brother of the Ruler (No. 18). Born in 1911. Very short-sighted and wears thick glasses. Abdullah is very ambitious and undoubtedly had hopes of succeeding his father. He has always been keen on learning and is the only one of the brothers who speaks any English. He is sensible, though rather slow-witted, careful over money and fairly progressive. For several years he was a magistrate on the Bahrain Court, but he retired from it twice in a huff because his father refused him something he wanted. He walked out a third time and then to his disgust his father appointed Shaikh Daij (No. 7) in his place. When Abdullah wished to return he was not reappointed.

Abdullah and Daij accompanied Shaikh Hamad to England in 1936 and the next year Abdullah spent six months living with a tutor in Oxford learning English. When he came back he was full of Western ideas, but little of this has survived except the furniture and European sanitation in his house. Shaikh Salman appointed him president of the Muharraq municipality, a post which Shaikh Salman had himself held before he succeeded. He is also President of the Majlis al Tijara (the official commercial tribunal) and Honorary President of the Bahrain Club. Besides his one trip to Europe, Abdullah has travelled several times in India. He is more conversant with European ways than any of his brothers. Physically he is not very strong.

5. Abdullah bin Isa al Khalifah, Shaikh, C.I.E.

Second brother of the late Shaikh Hamad and uncle of the present Shaikh of Bahrain (No. 18).

Born about 1883. Shaikh Abdullah is the cleverest, wickedest, most entertaining and most powerful member of the Khalifah family. His education is very slight. He can read but can scarcely write, and often laments the meagre educational facilities available to him in his younger days. He is very intelligent, with a sharp sense of humour; he has tact, political ability and an even temper, though he can be fierce when really roused. He is a skilful negotiator and arbitrator.

Shaikh Abdullah has travelled in India and the Near East and has visited England twice, once in 1919 and again in 1923 with Shaikh Hamad, who took him because he was afraid to leave him on his own in Bahrain.

Shaikh Abdullah was his father's favourite and although his elder brother, Shaikh Hamad, had been appointed heir apparent, Shaikh Abdullah was for many years the most powerful man in Bahrain. Shaikh Abdullah is always in debt, but cheerfully so, and is not mean. Most of his money is spent on sexual pleasures, for which he is notorious throughout the Gulf. His tastes are catholic and he does not trouble to hide his affairs. He has had countless wives and male and female attachments. He is feared and disliked by the Shia Baharinah on account of the wild doings of his earlier life. His servants used to carry off Baharinah women for their master. Respectable Arabs dislike and mistrust him. He is very popular with a section of the younger Shaikhs, who prefer him to Shaikh Salman. He strictly abstains from alcohol, but one of his sons is a notorious drunkard who visited England in 1953 for treatment for alcoholism.

Outwardly Shaikh Abdullah had always supported the Government of his brother, the late Shaikh Hamad, and has professed to be pro-British because Bahrain must be dependent, though he would himself prefer the country to be entirely independent. In the past, when there has been political trouble, there have been rumours that Shaikh Abdullah was behind it, but this has never been proved.

Shaikh Abdullah is more energetic than most of the younger members of the family. He used to be a good horseman and is fond of hawking and shooting. He is careful about his health, and in spite of his unrestrained lasciviousness he is rarely ill.

Shaikh Abdullah is Minister of Education (the only person in Bahrain to bear the title of "Minister"), the administration of this department being, however, in the hands of a Bahraini Director, Ahmad Al Umran. He is also the chairman of the Administrative Council and is a judge of the Bahrain Appeal Court.

6. Ahmad Fakhroo, M.B.E.

Born about 1905. Since the death of his father, Yusuf Fakhroo, in 1952, he has become the head of the family, which conducts one of the most important businesses in Bahrain. The firm deal in all kinds of trade, particularly building materials, and hold the Nuffield agency. They have connections with Iraq and India and have recently opened a branch in Bagdad. A proposal was once made informally that Ahmad should be made honorary Iraqi Consul in Bahrain, but it was not pursued. Though he confines himself largely to business, in 1954 with Mansur al Oraiyyidh played a useful part in restoring relations between the Shias in Bahrain and the Sunnis at a time of communal tension. For this was awarded the M.B.E. The family are Holis, i.e., Sunni Arabs who were previously domiciled in Persia and are considered to have lost the purity of their stock. Speaks good English. Has travelled much and is of progressive outlook.

7. Daij bin Hamad al Khalifah, Shaikh, O.B.E.

Brother of the Ruler. Born in 1915. An amiable and good-natured man, who was his father's favourite son. He is practically illiterate, but quite intelligent. He accompanied his father on both his visits to England in 1925 and 1936. He acquired a good deal of money and property from his father, for which reason most of his brothers dislike him. He is mentally energetic though physically slothful, and is much addicted to women. He is sometimes generous. He is the senior judge in the Bahrain Court, dealing mainly with criminal cases. At times when the local situation becomes difficult, such as when attacks on the Jews were threatened, he has shown a remarkable resolution in taking security precautions, and it was he who kept on urging his brother the Ruler to deal with matters firmly. Awarded the O.B.E., 1954.

8. Hassan al Mudaifi

Born about 1895. Shia. Close friend of Mansur al Oraiyyidh whose inseparable companion he is and whose views and opinions he reflects. He used to have considerable influence amongst the Shias, but has lost it and dropped out of politics. Owns some land but is chiefly a pearl merchant of high reputation. Has two sons.

9. Hussain bin Ali Yatim, M.B.E.

Born in 1914. The son of a chemist in Bahrain of Sunni Persian origin (Holi). Hussain Yatim, when quite young, was taken up by Major Holmes, a concession hunter through whom the Bahrain Oil Concession was arranged, and, after some years at the American Mission School, was sent to England to be educated. He was at Brighton Grammar School for about three years, usually spending his holidays at Major Holmes's house in Essex. He did well at school.

When he returned to Bahrain he was employed by Major Holmes as interpreter and secretary. He had inherited some money and property from his father and, in addition, had various commercial interests. After working for Major Holmes he was employed by the Bahrain Petroleum Company as interpreter and in various other jobs. Meanwhile he developed his own business, importing goods from America, starting an ice factory and petrol-filling stations. More recently he has started a water-distilling plant and a carbon-dioxide factory, and has become a director of the Gulf Aviation Company. He went to England again some years after he had left school and to America with Shaikh Muhammad bin Isa (No. 15).

Hussain Yatim married the daughter of Yusuf Lutfali Khunji who was at one time a wealthy piece-goods merchant in Manchester. The girl was brought up in England, studying medical work. Her father eventually lost most of his money and returned to Persia. Hussain and his wife live in European style. They lost a gifted daughter in the "Comet" disaster of January 1954.

Hussain Yatim is the only man in Bahrain who was educated in England. It is difficult to say whether the experiment has been a success. Naturally from the point of view of commerce his education, his experience in England, and his methods, have been of great use; but these things have given him a feeling of superiority over his fellow-countrymen and of dissatisfaction with social conditions. He is clever and versatile, but not very stable. He is continually launching experiments of which he tires before there has been time to judge the results. Speaks good English. Awarded the M.B.E., 1954.

10. Isa bin Salman al Khalifah, Shaikh

Eldest son of the Ruler (No. 18). Born 1932. Educated privately up to "primary" standard. With Khalifah, made his first trip to Europe in 1953, when he visited England, France and Italy after his father's return from the Coronation. They are believed to have acquired a favourable idea of the amusements that Europe can offer. Isa is of very small stature and not very impressive appearance; but he has pleasant manners, and with more experience may acquire something like his father's ease and affability with foreigners. It had been earlier assumed that he might succeed his father, but although the Ruler brings him into State business to a small extent, it is not thought that he has much chance of the succession. Some responsibility devolved on him when the Ruler was absent in England in 1953 and he carried it competently enough. He was married in 1949 and has several children. Speaks English.

He visited the United States and Great Britain with his brother Khalifah in 1955 under the auspices of the Bahrain Petroleum Company, and visited Britain again in 1956.

11. Kanoo Family

Founded by Yusuf whose father was a charcoal burner from Persia. Yusuf became a leading Persian Gulf merchant and private banker about the time of the first world war. He was also munshi of the Bahrain Political Agency and for his services there was awarded a C.I.E. His skill lay in playing off the Political Agent against the Ruler and then stepping in to effect a settlement from which he reaped benefit. He was eventually dismissed by Major Daly about 1925. He had no sons but three nephews Jassim, Khalil and Ali. The cousins who run Kanoos now, Ahmed and Muhammad, are sons of Ali (now dead) and Jassim respectively.

The firm to-day is the largest native Bahrain enterprise and is one of the most reputable local firms. It employs a number of Europeans, British, Dutch and Irish, who are well paid and treated and seem happy with their lot. The firm's chief interests are shipping agencies, travel—they handle BAPCO and ARAMCO travel work and are agents for American Express and CIT—and general agency work. They have a branch in Dhahran run by a Kanoo who has taken out Saudi nationality.

They also run a construction firm, Arabian Construction and Maintenance Engineering Company (ACME) which does work for the Government and the oil company. At first they were partners in ACME with D.C. and William Press but when the latter went bankrupt early in 1957 they took over the Press share.

12. Khalifah bin Muhammad al Khalifah, Shaikh

Son of Shaikh Muhammad bin Isa Al Khalifah (No. 15). Born about 1913. Director of Police and Public Security, educated at Beirut and spent a time at the Nasik Police School in India. He speaks English well and associates with Europeans more than any member of the family. He is fairly intelligent, enterprising and ambitious, and is on bad terms with a good many of the younger Al Khalifah, who are very jealous of him. He is not as soft as most of his young cousins but has become fat, which makes him less and less energetic. He is inclined to regard his services, for which he is well paid, as the conferring of a very great favour on the State. He has good manners, lives in semi-European style, is pleasant to deal with and has a sense of humour. He is interested in modern inventions such as cars, speed-boats, wireless and cameras. He is extravagant and in debt, but he does not use his official position to

his own advantage. He is not popular with the general public, who regard him as ostentatious and arrogant. In 1948 he visited the United Kingdom as a guest of the British Council. He visited the United States in 1952.

Married a third wife, aged 16, in May 1951.

In 1954 visited Japan with his father. Has travelled a good deal.

13. Khalifah bin Salman al Khalifah, Shaikh

Second son of the Ruler and full brother to Isa bin Salman (No. 10). Born 1936 and received the same education as his brother. Is rather taller, of more prepossessing appearance and a stronger character than his brother Isa. He appears to be at ease in the society of foreigners, likes being invited to their parties, and speaks good English.

He visited the United States and Great Britain in 1955 with his brother Isa under the auspices of the Bahrain Petroleum Company, and visited Britain again in 1956.

14. Mansur al Oraiyydh, M.B.E.

Born about 1890. Shia. Owns a good deal of land in Bahrain and is also a pearl merchant. The Oraiyydh family is a large one and the best-known Bahraini—as opposed to Arab—family in Bahrain. Many of its members work in Government employ. Mansur has a great deal of influence among the Baharina, which he usually wields with wisdom and sense. He was instrumental with Ahmad Fakhroo (No. 6), a Sunni, in settling, at least temporarily (and so reducing communal tension), the dispute in the summer of 1954 between the reformists, composed of Baharina (Shias) and Sunni Arabs, and the Government, during which the police opened fire on a crowd threatening the fort, killing and wounding several people. For this he was awarded the M.B.E. He went blind in 1955 as a result of neglecting cataract in both eyes. He has diabetes, although he is much better since a cure in London in 1955. He has connections in India. Has two sons, both of whom have had some education in England.

15. Muhammad bin Isa al Khalifah, Shaikh, C.B.E.

Eldest surviving son of Shaikh Isa and uncle of the present Ruler. Born about 1881. In appearance Shaikh Muhammad is thin and upright. He has a grey beard, sometimes dyed black, and long hair in the Bedouin style, which is usually hidden under a head-dress. He is very short-sighted, and nearly blind without his glasses. His dazzling smile reveals a complete set, top and bottom, of gold teeth.

Shaikh Muhammad's manner is rather stiff. He is the most travelled of all the family, and has visited most parts of the world. He is fairly well educated, something of a poet, and excessively proud of what he considers his superior ability in drafting important letters, proclamations, &c. He is politically minded, autocratic, and intensely proud of his family's achievements. He is not anti-British, but is critical of many things the British do and does not hesitate to voice his opinions. He is intolerant of Shias and actively dislikes the Baharina. He is extremely mean and always complaining of his debts. He is generous, however, to his own large family, which used to be better disciplined than others of the Al Khalifah. He is more moral than his relations and confines himself to women. He has had a good many wives.

Shaikh Muhammad is fussy, inclined to suspect that he is being slighted, and too fond of letting his personal interests influence his opinions on public matters. He is open to argument, but has a quick temper. He was very loyal to the late Shaikh Hamad, though the latter was usually bored by him

and could not appreciate his liking for foreign travel. Shaikh Muhammad "enjoys" ill-health, which is partly genuine and partly assumed. He is more often abroad than in Bahrain, often visiting the Lebanon, Egypt and sometimes India and Pakistan, usually ostensibly for medical treatment. He visited the World's Fair, New York, in 1939. In 1955 went round the world via Australia and in 1956 visited Japan for the second time.

Shaikh Muhammad fills no public office and is not relied upon by the Ruler in the same way as is his brother, Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa (No. 5).

16. Muhsin al Tajir

Shia. Has always dabbled in politics. Fairly intelligent. Has always been bitterly opposed to the Al-Khalifah. Since 1954 a member of the stlf-styled "High Executive Committee" (now called the Committee of National Union). Fell out with the committee in 1956. Was head of the Shia Waqf Committee, but removed by the Bahrain Government in 1955. Has relations in Persia, where he has remained since 1956.

17. Rashid Zayani

Born about 1915. Son of Abdul Rahman Zayani, respected merchant in Bahrain where the Zayani clan is numerous. Rashid worked in the Adviserate for many years and then entered his father's business—general trading, agency for Rover and Austin cars. Is ambitious, intelligent and unscrupulous in pursuit of his own ends. Disliked by the leading merchants in Bahrain and so inclined to work against them. Engineered a general refusal on the part of the merchants to pay an increased telephone call charge to Cable and Wireless in 1955 which resulted in the Ruler having to make good the company's deficit. Organised support for a Bahrain National Bank in 1956 but when other merchants jockeyed him out of this tried unsuccessfully to organised support for the Egyptian Banque du Caire to open a branch here. Speaks good English. His wife is from Bagdad.

18. Salman bin Hamad bin Isa al Khalifah, His Highness, Shaikh, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E.

The present Ruler of Bahrain. Born about 1894, eldest son of the late Ruler, Shaikh Hamad bin Isa. Has some education and a slight knowledge of the geography and history of the neighbouring countries. Has visited India and Egypt, and attended Her Majesty's Coronation in 1953 as the guest of Her Majesty's Government. On his journey he briefly visited France and Italy. Appointed successor by his father in a secret document in 1940 and elected Ruler by his immediate relations when his father died in February 1942. Does not speak English.

In disposition cautious, careful over money, in some directions progressive but in other ways old-fashioned. His private life is outwardly respectable and he holds the view that people's behaviour in the privacy of their houses is no concern of anybody. He has never been in debt, even before he inherited his father's wealth. His generosity towards his relatives is considered with a view to keeping them in subservience. He is considerably older than his seven brothers, none of whom is particularly fond of him.

Shaikh Salman has at present two wives, the senior one from the Khalid branch of the family. Her father and other relations were involved in murderous attacks on Baharina villages about twenty years ago and were later suspected of complicity in the attempt to assassinate Shaikh Salman's father. Some of this family were exiled for several years. The senior wife, though childless, has a certain amount of influence over Shaikh

Salman and she is not friendly towards the British. The second wife, mother of three sons and a daughter, is of the family of Khalifah bin Hamad of Jisra, politically a nonentity.

While genuinely attached to the British connexion and convinced of its necessity for Bahrain he is very jealous of the internal independence of his country and of his own position as its Ruler. He nurses two grievances; one, that Her Majesty's Government is slow, as he thinks, to help him to assert his "rights" in Zubarah against the Ruler of Qatar; and second, that the Bahrain Petroleum Company cannot produce enough oil to provide a greater revenue. He values such visible marks of independence and prestige as the cession to him of jurisdiction over subjects of other Gulf States (1952) and the establishment of his own internal postal service with stamps bearing his effigy (1952). He would like to see a tighter control of alcohol; (a strict abstainer himself he is grieved by the drinking that goes on among his family and subjects).

He was awarded an honorary K.C.I.E. at the New Year, 1944, and an honorary K.C.M.G. at the New Year, 1952.

19. Salman bin Muhammad al Khalifah, Shaikh

Son of Shaikh Muhammad bin Isa Al Khalifah (No. 15). Born about 1927. He was educated at the American University, Beirut, and knows English well. He received a limited amount of judicial training in Palestine and sits on the Bahrain Junior Court. He has travelled much in the Middle East and Europe and has also visited the United States. He is usually on bad terms with the Ruler who regards him as extravagant and he is very critical of the Ruler's conservatism. He is regarded as a possible source of trouble in the Ruling Family. He is always outwardly very friendly to the British political authorities. In 1954 became mentally deranged for a time, due to excessive drinking.

KUWAIT**The Ruling Family of Kuwait (Al Sabah)**

The Ruling Family of Kuwait is divided into two factions. These are the descendants of Jabir, father of the last, and Salim, father of the present Ruler. Abdullah Mubarak, uncle of both the last and the present Ruler sides usually with the descendants of Jabir but is loyal to the present Ruler. The succession in Kuwait went from Jabir to Salim (both sons of the "great" Mubarak) then to Ahmad son of Jabir and now Abdullah son of Salim. Abdullah Mubarak, who is the only surviving son of the "great" Mubarak of whom the last two rulers have been grandsons, thinks that his turn should come next.

The family maintain outwardly cordial relations with the Saudi Royal Family, though many of the younger shaikhs were critical of the party which accompanied King Saud to Kuwait in 1954. The Salim faction have never been their genuine admirers. The present Ruler was disliked by the late King.

Only members of the Ruling Family have the style of Shaikh.

1. Abdul Aziz Husain

Director of the Education Department. He received his primary education in Kuwait, but in 1941 went to Egypt to study at Al-Azhar. While there he learned English through the British Council and in 1950 went to England to complete his studies under their auspices. In Egypt he took a leading part in the life of the

Kuwait Students' Committee and he was editor of their magazine *Al Ba'tha* and was also in charge of the Kuwait Students' Hostel. When he returned to Kuwait he was appointed Director of Education succeeding the older and more experienced Palestinian Darwish Maqdadi who, however, agreed to stay on as his deputy. He appears to be intelligent and keen on his work and has been the central figure in the rapid expansion of the Kuwait Education Department in the last two years. Having been educated in Egypt he naturally leans towards Egyptian educational methods and the employment of Egyptian teachers in Kuwait schools. He is also a believer in inter-Arab co-operation and has more than once represented Kuwait at Middle East social and educational conferences. He was profoundly shocked by the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt and as a result became violently opposed to British policy and came out into the open as a leader of the pro-Egyptian element in Kuwait. He has at least once in public criticised certain aspects of policy of the Kuwait Oil Company towards its local employees. He is likely to be one of the leaders of the future.

2. Abdul Latif Ibrahim al Nusi

Member of the High Executive Committee. He is a personal friend of the Ruler, for whom he works as a confidential secretary. He was appointed to the High Executive Committee when it was formed, but up till now he has not taken a prominent part in its discussions. (Written in 1954.)

3. Abdullah al Jabir, Shaikh, C.I.E.

Born in 1902 and descended from a brother of the "great" Mubarak. Awarded C.I.E. in 1947. His father Jabir was not the ruler of that name. Is in charge of the administration of justice (in which he is assisted by his son Jabir, born 1930, educated for a few years at Victoria College, Alexandria, and by his younger son, Sabah). Department of Education and the Department of Auqaf. He is also in charge of a recently formed department for the registration of titles to land and is reported to have enriched himself on the proceeds. Rich but careful with his money and does not run up debts. In age and outlook he is closer to the Ruler than any other member of the Ruling Family, and possibly the only member of the family the Ruler turns to for advice. He acts as a peace-maker in the family quarrels of the Al Sabah.

He is somewhat obstinate and conservative in his general outlook but his administration of the Education Department is enlightened. Almost alone among the Shaikhs he takes an interest in gardening. Has two sons who have studied in England, Sabah born 1932 and Mubarak (No. 20) born in 1934.

He paid an official visit to London during the summer of 1956, and during his ten days in the United Kingdom he made a particular study of educational and legal matters.

4. Abdullah bin Khaza'al

Born about 1910. A son of the late Shaikh Khaza'al of Muhammarah (now Khurramshahr). Since the death of his eldest brother Chasib he claims to be the head of the family. In 1946 he led an abortive attack on Khurramshahr from Iraq territory and fled to Kuwait. His deportation was under consideration for some time but he was eventually allowed to settle in Kuwait where the Kuwait Oil Company gave him employment, and he has since started in business on his own account. He would renew his intrigues in Khuzistan if given the least opportunity.

5. Abdullah al Mubarak, Shaikh, C.I.E.

Born 1915. Awarded C.I.E. 1945.

The only surviving son of the "great" Mubarak and therefore an uncle of the present Ruler. He is uneducated and is unable to understand the present-day problems of Kuwait. Mental processes of any complication are repellant to him and he refuses to have near him anyone who attempts serious discussion. If compelled to listen to it he takes refuge in platitudes. He meets any suggestion of criticism, however faint, with sulky and irrelevant counter-criticism. It is perhaps the need to compensate for this inadequacy which leads him to surround himself with sycophants who encourage his belief in his own power and importance and who never venture to contradict him.

He has remained loyal to the present Ruler who has placed him second in the order of precedence and who allows him to perform the formal functions of the Ruler in his absence. Abdullah Mubarak would certainly like to succeed the present Ruler and if it came to a fight he might be able to arrange that he did. His swashbuckling demeanour has a certain appeal to the youth of the town, and others fear his power. However, his arrogant and cruel behaviour and his contempt for Arab ideas of propriety in his private life have left him few real friends.

He is in charge of the Public Security Department of the Kuwait Government which consists of the gendarmerie and Kuwait army. The former is ill-organised and inefficient and appears to be losing ground to the town police under Shaikh Sabah Salim and Shaikh Sa'd (Nos. 27 and 28). He is, however, proud of the latter which, with the help of a British officer, has achieved some degree of efficiency. He has made himself Commander-in-Chief of the army and field marshal. He is also interested in the Kuwait Flying Club and has the honorary wings of the Association of British Aero Clubs and Centres. When the Department of Civil Aviation was formed in 1956, subsequent to the signing of the new Civil Air Agreement, it came under the Public Security Department with Abdullah al-Mubarak as President.

After a period when Abdullah al-Mubarak made little effort to appear friendly, his relations with the Political Agency have once again improved and he is profuse in his expressions of pro-British sentiments. Inevitably, as a result of the Suez disturbances, the Agency has been drawn closer to him owing to his role of Commander-in-Chief of the Army and President of Public Security. Nevertheless, because of the continuing disorganisation in his department, it has been less easy to achieve as close a measure of co-operation with Public Security as has been possible with many other departments of the Kuwait Government.

He visited the United Kingdom in 1951 and in 1952, but rather obviously avoided doing so during a trip to Europe in 1954. He was an official guest of the C.I.G.S. for nine days in the summer of 1956, attending military ceremonies and being shown military equipment and installations. He spends much time in the Lebanon where his excesses cause some scandal.

He is married but has no children.

6. Abdullah al Salim al Sabah, His Highness Shaikh, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., Ruler of Kuwait

Born about 1888, created C.I.E. in 1938 and honorary K.C.M.G. in 1952. Became Ruler in early 1950. Cousin of the last Ruler whom he actively disliked and nearly unseated in 1938. As a result of the "democratic revolution" of that year he became head of the Advisory Council, which his

predecessor allowed to lapse and he himself has refused to revive, and was placed in charge of the State Treasury.

Unlike his predecessor the Ruler is not greedy, authoritative or fond of display. He claims to have the welfare of the State at heart and his general behaviour supports that claim. He has sold the luxurious yachts of his predecessor and abandoned the pretentious scheme to build a marble-lined palace. He has had a local dhow built for his own use and is happiest when away from Kuwait resting on the islands of Failaka. He is a bookish man with very simple tastes and has a reputation of never having incurred debts. He is invariably pleasant to deal with and to talk to although he has an impediment in his speech that makes him a little difficult to follow. He is acute in discussion and never misses a chance of scoring a point in a friendly way. Subjects he does not understand he petulantly dismisses.

His intentions are good but he is not a man of action. His health is not good, and in particular his legs give him considerable trouble. When in May 1952 his relatives gave trouble, he threatened to abdicate, and although he must have been sure that the threat would suffice to bring them to heel, he might not have been sorry if he had had to carry it out. Strong rumours of his abdication were renewed in October 1953, when he was said to be weary of family troubles and irritated by the pressure being exerted upon him by Her Majesty's Government. He shows an increasing unwillingness to make up his mind. He professes the greatest friendship for Her Majesty's Government in which he is doubtless sincere but tends to exaggerate the difficulties of his position. In 1953 he went to London for the Coronation as the guest of Her Majesty's Government, taking medical treatment at Vichy and Paris on the way. He came back with the knowledge that only one of his kidneys is working but glad to have met the great in England and to have enjoyed Paris.

He is fatherly towards the younger sons of his predecessor. Abdullah Mubarak has been known to threaten to oust him.

He went to Evian for treatment in 1954, and adopted a diet which he still follows, which has reduced his weight and improved his health somewhat. He did not enjoy Europe's bad weather, however, and seems to have decided to take his holiday in Lebanon in future where he has bought some land and has built a house.

In 1956 he paid State visits to Iraq and Syria.

His only children (Nos. 18 and 28) are by slave women. His morals are those of his race and class.

7. Ahmad Abdul Latif

Director of Finance. He was Secretary to Abdullah Salim, the present Ruler, when he was in charge of Finances at Kuwait under the late Ruler. On his accession the present Ruler did not nominate a Shaikh to be head of the Finance Department but instead appointed Ahmad Abdul Latif to be Director of the Finance Department under his own general supervision. Thus the Finance Department is the only department of the Kuwait Government that does not come under the direct supervision of a Shaikh other than the Ruler. He has leaned heavily on Colonel Crichton in coping with the problems of Kuwait expansion and he has been ready to listen to his advice. He is a member of the Development Board and of the High Executive Committee. (Written in 1954.)

8. Ali Dawud

Director of the Health Department. Was brought up by relatives in Bombay where he attended a

primary school and studied English. When he returned to Kuwait he worked for Haj Abdur Rahman Bahar, in his shipping firm. He stayed there for about seventeen years until Shaikh Fahad appointed him Director of the Health Department, in which position Dr. Parry has found him quite useless. (Written in 1954.)

9. Ashraf Tawfiq Lutfi

Born at Yafa in 1919. Educated in Palestine and was a schoolteacher there from 1938 to 1946. He holds the Higher Certificate for Secondary School Teachers. After four months as a refugee in Damascus he came to Kuwait and found employment with Abdullah al Mulla Salih in the Secretariat, also running a branch of Abdullah al Mulla's business.

In 1955 on the death of Abdullah al Mulla the Ruler appointed him Assistant Secretary to the State.

He is married to a German wife, speaks perfect English and is very westernised. He is frank, friendly and co-operative. He has greatly assisted the Political Agency's dealings with the Secretariat which he runs with efficiency. He seems to hold the confidence of the Ruler.

10. Badr al Abdullah al Mulla Salih

Born 1937. Educated in Palestine and for six years in England. He was brought back to Kuwait from England on the death of his father without having finished his education. He nominally inherited his father's title of State Secretary, but as yet has little or no influence and is immature and something of a playboy. Ashraf Lutfi (No. 9) does his work in the Secretariat for him though Badr often attends the Ruler on official occasions. He speaks good English and is pleasant and lively, if still rather irresponsible. He is reputed not to make a great success of his late father's business interests.

11. Fahad al Salim, Shaikh

Born in 1906. He is a half-brother of the Ruler. His mother was a slave girl and he is therefore negroid in appearance. He was educated at the American University in Beirut and speaks a fair amount of English when pressed to do so. Although a forceful personality he has not in the past got all his own way with the Ruler. Formerly in charge of the State finances to his own profit and the State's loss. For some time after his brothers' accession he was without any official post; but in February 1952 he was made head of the Health Department. His behaviour there produced a crisis that led to his "resignation"; but under the pressure of Sabah al Salim (No. 27), the Ruler reinstated him. Fahad was eventually made Head of the Municipality, from which post he also claimed to control the Public Works Department. By 1953 he had achieved this and was also made head of the Development Board and from this position has had considerable influence on the progress of development. He does not fully understand the complexities of the Departments under his control and possibly for this reason finds it difficult to make decisions, but he has since added to his empire the Department of Telegraph and Telephone and the Department of Housing and Administration.

Until now, therefore, his influence has been mainly negative. He is largely responsible for slowing and stopping the original development programme which he regarded as unduly extravagant, but he has not yet been able to start any new work to take its place.

He has therefore been blamed by merchants for the decrease in profitable business openings and he became a target for the discontent which came to

a head in the summer of 1954 and led the Ruler to appoint the High Executive Committee. However, when he returned from Europe at the beginning of 1955 he did not hesitate to alter any decisions of the High Executive Committee of which he disapproved, and it became clear that in the event of a direct clash between him and the Committee his views would prevail.

He used to have the reputation of being opposed to the British connexion in Kuwait, but this may have been because he felt that Her Majesty's Government were behind the claim of Abdullah al Mubarak (No. 5) to succeed the present Ruler. He probably has ambitions himself to follow his half-brother, but his slave birth may be too great an obstacle.

He has recently gone out of his way to be friendly and appears to pay some attention to reasoned argument if set out in simple terms. He seems genuinely ready to see contracts go to British firms wherever possible, but he is very suspicious by nature and does not wish to appear in any way influenced by direct British advice.

He is always an entertaining companion and ready talker and likes to display his extensive knowledge of Arabic poetry and proverbs. He visited the United States of America extensively in 1950, and was in the United Kingdom for a short while on his way back. He went again to the United Kingdom in 1954 and appears to welcome the greater attention which has been paid to him by the Agency. In 1956 Shaikh Fahad undertook a world tour accompanied some of the way by his wife, Shaikha Badria, who is among the most emancipated of the shaikhly ladies and takes a prominent part in the running of the Health Department. He travelled through Europe and having cancelled his plans to visit England owing to ill-health, went straight to America. From there, he continued to Honolulu and Japan and returned via Hongkong and India.

12. Fu'ad Abdul Baqi

Born about 1927 and of Lebanese Druze origin, educated at the American University of Beirut and did post-graduate work at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Illinois and Columbia University. He worked for a time for Kellogg's, the United States engineering firm, and obtained from them a "first preference" United States immigrants visa as a person whose technical skill is needed in the United States. However, he decided to visit Shaikh Fahad, with whom he travelled in the United States in 1950, and he was offered the job of Inspector-General of the Public Works Department by him. He is handicapped by his youth and some British firms disliked having to work with a man who in the nature of the case can have little practical experience. He does in fact tend to stick closely to his books when in difficulty, but he has on occasion shown himself ready to listen to the advice of more experienced men and British engineers in the Public Works Department have not found it impossible to work with him. He drew up a plan for the reorganisation of the Public Works Department which was adopted by the High Executive Committee. However, when Majd ud-Din Jabri was reappointed Chief Engineer in March 1955, he insisted on the removal of Fu'ad Abdul Baqi, who was transferred to the Municipality.

When Majd ud-Din Jabri himself fell from power, Fu'ad was reinstated in the Public Works Department as Inspector-General. He was abroad for a large part of 1956 and succeeded in having his younger brother, Sami, appointed to fill his post. This was probably because he could not trust anybody else to look after his interests.

13. 'Izzat Ja'far

Born 1912 in Egypt and educated in the Lebanon. Is believed at one time to have been a professional pimp. Has good manners and speaks English well. Attached himself to the late Ruler and ended up as his social secretary and controller of his household. Lived in the Ruler's palace where he made himself indispensable. The late Ruler's sons, Jabir and Sabah (Nos. 15 and 26), whom he saw grow up, are much attached to him as is the late Ruler's widow. His Majesty's Government insisted on his removal from Kuwait during the last war because of suspected intrigues with the Axis Powers. He claims to have rendered assistance to the Allied cause in the Lebanon during his absence. At the time of the late Ruler's death he was steadily acquiring more and more influence in Kuwait to the exclusion of the State Secretary, Abdullah Mulla, who referred to him as the snake. He brought members of his family into Kuwait, and has established them there with himself, as traders. He was the go-between in the negotiations for the American Independent Oil Company concession. That company took him to the States and feted him royally. He arranged the irregular Middle East Air Lines service from Beirut to Kuwait. He also tried to induce the Banque de l'Indo-Chine to break the (legitimate) monopoly of the British Bank of the Middle East.

Since the late Ruler's death he still lives at the palace (not used by the present Ruler) with the widow and some of the sons of the late Ruler, and describes himself as an employee of the State. In 1950 under the pretext of taking Jabir and Sabah to the Lebanon he took them to London without the Ruler's consent. He explained that he did this because he knew that if he had asked for permission it would be refused.

The present Ruler on his accession was pressed to expel him, but as a promise was given that he would not be allowed to regain the influence he had enjoyed under the previous régime the matter was dropped.

While in Europe he underwent a successful kidney operation and returned to Kuwait in the retinue of Shaikh Fahad (No. 11) early in 1955. Since his return, although he has wisely not resumed his seat on the High Executive Committee, he has appeared to regain all his old influence with the Ruler. It was, for example, he who signed the decree reappointing to the post of Chief Engineer, Majd al Din Jabri, who has since left Kuwait and returned to Syria.

By 1953 he had again established himself as a leading adviser to the Ruler and used his influence to further his own interests which have generally conflicted with those of Her Majesty's Government. He is not a good businessman and has not even been successful in using his personal influence to get business for himself. It is therefore probable that, largely out of chagrin, he tried to turn the Ruler against the British contractors engaged on development and it is known that he used a dispute over a dredging contract to try to replace the Anglo-Dutch Overseas Dredging Company by an American firm for whom he was agent. To buttress his position he introduced Ballantyne from Bahrain as legal adviser to the Ruler. He was appointed to the High Executive Committee when it was set up and in its early days was prominent in its discussions. However, he had, by the summer of 1954, overreached himself and earned the dislike of Shaikh Abdullah al Mubarak (No. 5), who is believed to have insisted that Izzat Ja'far should be removed from all his official positions. Since then Izzat has been in Europe for health reasons and the more sensational press has been full of reports that he has become engaged to ex-Queen Narriman. He is not popular with Kuwaitis and is a favourite

target for the attacks of anonymous pamphleteers. Owing to the fact that he spends the majority of his time abroad, 'Izzat Ja'far's influence in Kuwait has declined to some extent.

14. Jabir al Abdullah, Shaikh

Yet another son of No. 3 Abdullah Jabir. A pleasant young man. Much too fat. Went to England to study law, but was driven away by the inclement weather of Spring 1952. He is now assisting his father in the Law Courts.

15. Jabir al Ahmad, Shaikh

Born 1926. Third son of the late Ruler. His particular claim to eminence and the succession, is that both his father and mother were Sabahs. His mother is in fact the full sister of the present Ruler. He is very like his father both in appearance and disposition and would possibly make an arrogant and difficult Ruler. The present Ruler used to take him about with him on his travels and may also be tutoring him for succession. Speaks fair English. He is the Ruler's Representative at Ahmadi and is in charge of the Public Security Department for the Kuwait Oil Company's area. In 1956 this Department was separated from the Public Security Department under Shaikh Abdullah al Mubarak.

Since his return from his world tour in 1953 he has appeared to be given an increasingly prominent place amongst the Shaikhs. He is friendly and appears to enjoy the company of Europeans, and if the next Ruler is to be chosen from the younger generation he is the most likely candidate.

He paid a short visit to the United Kingdom in the summer of 1955, and an official visit in July 1956, when he studied police training and equipment. He was accompanied by his brother, Shaikh Sabah (No. 26).

16. Jabir al Ali, Shaikh

A younger brother of No. 29 Salim al Ali. He is the most active and intelligent of the younger Shaikhs. He is head of the Electricity Department where he has been prepared to listen to the advice of Mr. Addison, the Chief British engineer in the department. He has been appointed by the Ruler to be a member of the High Executive Committee and since the departure of 'Izzat Ja'far (No. 13) has acted as its unofficial chairman, initiating and guiding all discussions. In the absence of Shaikh Fahad (No. 11) in the autumn of 1954 he presided as chairman of the High Executive Committee at meetings of the Development Board. He has visited England and speaks a little English but generally prefers Arabic. He is always ready to discuss a wide range of topics and is never afraid to express his views. He has a liking for alcohol.

During the Suez crisis he was strongly opposed to British policy and ready to say so, and although he is prepared to laugh at the faults and weaknesses of Egypt, he has a considerable admiration for Colonel Nasser.

17. Jasim Qatami

Born about 1927, nephew of a boat-builder, and once a sailor in a dhow. He was sent to Egypt and then to England and studied police methods in both places—in England for about four months. He speaks good English. He was appointed Director of the Police Department with the rank of colonel under Shaikh Sabah al Salim (No. 27), who thought highly of him as did his many British friends, though he was recognised as being ambitious. He seemed to understand the need for modern police methods.

At the time of the Suez crisis, however, he resigned his post in support of Egypt and in opposition to

British policy. He has since become one of the main leaders in the clubs and in the nascent Reformist Movement. He was appointed manager of the Kuwait Cinema Company, where he has found posts for a number of the young police officers who resigned with him. He pays frequent visits to Egypt.

18. Khalid al Abdullah, Shaikh

An illegitimate son of the Ruler and half-brother of Shaikh Sa'd (No. 28). He is black and negroid in appearance. He spent a period in England at Bristol University and therefore speaks some English, but he is less fluent than might be expected. He is in charge of the Port and Customs Departments and is a member of the High Executive Committee in whose discussions he plays a fairly active part. It was due to his initiative that the minutes of the High Executive Committee were made available to the Agency. He is a close friend and companion of Shaikh Jabir al Ali (No. 16). (Written in 1954.)

19. Mubarak al Abdullah al Ahmad, Shaikh

The eldest son of Abdullah al Ahmad. Owing to his father's conservatism he has had less opportunity for travel than most of his contemporaries and he speaks little English. He has his full share of shaikhly arrogance and conceit but he can be pleasant and friendly to talk to. In the absence of Abdullah al Mubarak he takes charge of the Public Security Department.

20. Mubarak al Abdullah, Shaikh

A son of Shaikh Abdullah al Jabir (No. 3). He spent two years at Sandhurst where he found the restraints of military discipline irksome and his record was only fair. He has now returned to Kuwait and has been appointed as Colonel in Mubarak's Security Forces where he is allowed little authority and seems a little lost. This seems partly his own fault because, in order to avoid being beholden to Abdullah Mubarak he refused to accept pay from him. He speaks English well and enjoys the company of Europeans. (Written in 1954.)

21. Muhammad al Ahmad, Shaikh

Born in 1907. Second son of Shaikh Ahmad, the late Ruler of Kuwait. He is a full brother of the late Shaikh Abdullah al Ahmad, but is of lighter complexion. He is enormously fat. He was educated in Beirut and speaks English. He has managed His Highness's affairs in Basra, and in particular the litigation over his date gardens, for some time, and does his work with reasonable efficiency. In 1946 he was shot by an Iraqi patrol close to the Iraq-Kuwait frontier, in the belief that he was a smuggler, and wounded in the neck, but has since fully recovered from his injuries. It is doubtful whether he is a strict teetotaler, and he is reported to have a fondness for poker and a convivial evening. He is popular in Iraqi circles and knows how to get round minor officials.

22. Muhammed Qabazard

Director of Port. He comes from a prominent Kuwaiti merchant family (of Persian origin) but he has worked in the Port and Customs Department almost without a break since he was first appointed to the Customs. Many merchants oppose him and accuse him of being venal, and he resigned and worked as a merchant for a short time before he was appointed Director of Port (but not of Customs). (Written in 1954.)

declared himself to be a Muscat subject and sought protection from the Sultan's Wali at Khasab. His status as a subject of the Sultan has now been recognised, and he and his family carry Sultanate passports. The opposing faction in the Sha'am dispute belong to the Beni Shatair section of the Shihuh who are traditionally at feud with the Beni Hidayah section. The former are supported by the Qawasim tribe to which the Shaikh of Ras al Khaimah belongs, and the latter by the Sultan of Muscat so that the dispute has now broadened into opposing claims for the ownership of the territory in which Sha'am is situated.

6. Said bin Taimur, Sultan of Muscat

Born in 1910. He succeeded as Sultan on the abdication of his father in 1932. He is normally accorded the title of "His Highness," but he does not allow this to be used in treaties and similar documents. He is an honorary G.C.M.G. and G.C.I.E. He was educated at the Mayo College, Ajmer, and speaks excellent English. He was at school in Bagdad from 1927-28. He has visited the United Kingdom several times and the United States in the winter of 1937-38. He is small in stature and rather shy and timid in his manner, but very astute and careful to preserve his dignity. He has a remarkable knowledge of correct procedure and can be relied on to "do the right thing" in public, although he is often embarrassingly reticent upon such occasions. He is always most polite and courteous, and reasonable regarding all matters which have no effect on his personal status. He is genuinely anxious to maintain his family's long-standing friendship with Her Majesty's Government. His rule is of an entirely personal nature and he has few competent persons to assist him, and few even whom he can trust. He has now a British Minister for External Affairs, a British Administrator in Gwadar and British officers for his military forces, but so far has invested them with no more power than his other employees. They are, however, except for the Administrator, who is too far away, all comparatively recent arrivals. Once his confidence is won, the Sultan, perhaps because of his loneliness, is capable of very sincere friendship and absolute trust. At the end of 1955 he at last realised his chief ambition, to extend his control over the whole of Oman, of which he was ruler in name only. He spends much of his time in his province of Dhofar many hundred miles from Muscat, and the administration of his State is liable to suffer in consequence. Whilst in Muscat he renders himself rather inaccessible also, a fact which does not help to make him popular. He has one son born in 1940, Saiyid Qabus. Though he has made enquiries about tutors and schools in the Lebanon or Egypt, no decision has so far been made as to his education, which at present consists of private tuition by the schoolmaster in the Government school in Salalah. The boy is bright and fond of riding.

7. Salih bin Isa al Harthi

Until December 1955 the Tamimah of the Hinawi political faction in Oman and Shaikh of the al Harthi tribe.

Although formerly on good terms with the Sultan and seeking and receiving favours from him, with the appointment of Ghalib (see Muscat Personality No. 2) as "Imam," he joined the party for independence of the Imamate and with Talib and others sought Saudi assistance to gain it. In December 1955, when the Sultan ordered his forces to march on Nizwa to overthrow this plot, he fled, and was succeeded by tribal election and recognition by the Sultan by his nephew, Ahmed bin Mohammed bin Isa, a young man of intelligence and loyal to the Sultan.

8. Shihab bin Faisal, Saiyid

Born in 1902. Uncle of the Sultan of Muscat and full brother of the ex-Sultan, Saiyid Taimur (No. 10). He ordinarily acts as personal representative at Muscat for ceremonial purposes while the Sultan is absent at Dhofar. He has charming manners and speaks the best Arabic, but in administrative matters is inefficient and is not trusted by the Sultan, who latterly has been unwilling to grant him any real authority during his absences.

9. Sulaiman bin Hamyar al Nabhani, Shaikh

Born in 1911. One of the few signatories of the 1920 Agreement of Sib still alive. For some time sought recognition by Her Majesty's Government as an independent Shaikh. He also tried to do independent deals with oil companies, and is friendly with the American Mission Doctor, Dr. Thoms, in Matrah, by whom he has been visited frequently. He has visited Saudi Arabia, where he has also sought recognition of and support for his independence. He resides near the Jabal Akhdar at Tanuf and is Tamimah of the Ghafir. He has three sons, the eldest, Sultan, being his heir. Apart from his political activities he leads a somewhat dissolute life and he is disliked and distrusted by many of the other tribal leaders. When he visited the Sultan in 1948 he was lavishly treated and given presents of a motor car, rifles, ammunition, rice and a large sum of cash. He joined the conspiracy with Ghalib (No. 2) and Salih (No. 7) to obtain the independence of Oman with Saudi assistance, and proclaimed himself Ruler of Jebel Akhdar and its dependencies, but after visiting Muscat in 1955, he disassociated himself just in time to declare his friendship and support for the Sultan, when the latter's forces entered Nizwa in December 1955.

10. Taimur bin Faisal, Saiyid

Born about 1888. Sultan of Muscat, 1913-32, when he abdicated voluntarily. He was a weak ruler and was only too glad to be relieved of further responsibility for the management of affairs when his son Said (No. 6) was old enough to take his place. He receives an allowance of Rupees 2,000 a month from the Muscat Government. He had a catholic taste in wives and married amongst others a Turkish and a Japanese lady. He lived for some years before the war in Japan; and had one daughter by his Japanese wife. He is now living as a private gentleman in Bombay, and likes to be known by the name of "Mr. T. F. Al Said." He is on good terms with his son, the present Sultan, and paid a visit to him in Muscat in 1945. He was last visited in Bombay by the Sultan in 1949.

11. Talib bin Ali bin Hilal

Brother of the ex-Imam of Oman (see No. 2). Since his flight to Saudi Arabia in December 1955 he resides in Dammam and has been used by the Saudi Arabian Government to screen all Omanis arriving in Saudi Arabia.

12. Tariq bin Taimur, Saiyid

Born in 1922. Half-brother of the Sultan of Muscat and third son of the ex-Sultan, Saiyid Taimur, by his Turkish wife. He was educated during his early years in the English school at Constantinople, and later in Germany, and speaks good English and German. He returned to Muscat shortly before the war, and his first task there was to learn Arabic. During the war he spent some years in India, where he received training in police work and civil administration. He also spent some months attached as an officer with the Zhob Militia in Baluchistan. He is at present employed as Administrator of the Municipality of Matrah and Muscat.

He was married, it is believed somewhat against his will, to an Arab lady in 1946, and a son was born to him in 1947. He is very friendly and enjoys British society and games of hockey, tennis and bridge.

QATAR

1. Abdul Rahman bin Darwish

The youngest of the Darwish brothers. While he has neither the drive nor the ability of his brother, Abdullah (No. 2) he is far more capable, sophisticated and personable than the average Qatari. He is much used by the Ruler as an unofficial Master of Ceremonies and accompanies the Ruler when he is abroad as an aide. He speaks some English and understands more. He is generally helpful to the Agency.

2. Abdullah bin Darwish

Born about 1903. Of Persian origin. A man of great ability and energy. Until 1956 he was the driving force in a partnership consisting of himself and his brothers (No. 1 and No. 5) which had cornered most of the business in Qatar. He was the Ruler's representative in all matters concerning the oil companies. He was the Ruler's adviser in nearly everything else. But in reaching this position he antagonised the Ruling Family because of his influence over the Ruler and the merchants because he took most of the business. In the autumn of 1956 he fell from favour and has since lived in Dammam in Saudi Arabia, and on intimate terms with the Emir bin Jiluwi. It is possible that Abdullah continues to exercise from Dammam influence over the Ruler, it is certain that he does so over his brothers, but it is unlikely that he will return to Doha within the foreseeable future.

The overriding factor for him in any problem is his own interest. Hitherto he has considered that this has been well served by the British connection with Qatar and he has done much to maintain it. But this attitude does not spring from any innate loyalty towards us and will last only so long as it brings him profit. During 1956 and 1957 this attitude has cost him and his brothers much hostile criticism from Arab nationalists.

3. Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani, Shaikh

The second and favourite son of the Ruler (No. 4). He is intelligent and can charm but he lacks strength of character. Prior to the autumn of 1956 he had visited England in 1953 when he represented the Ruler at the Coronation, he had been his father's representative in the Qatar Court and he had acted as Ruler during his father's absences; but apart from this he had tended to remain at the back of the stage, being unwilling to compete for the front of it with Abdullah Darwish (No. 2). Since the disappearance of Abdullah he has taken over the management of day-to-day affairs from his father and has shaped surprisingly well. He coped admirably with the disturbances which followed British and French landings at Suez, has shown a much swifter comprehension of oil company affairs than had been expected and has generally helped the British elements in the Government and the Political Agent. But he still lacks firmness.

4. Ali bin Abdullah Al Thani, His Highness Shaikh, K.B.E.

Born 1894 and succeeded as Ruler in August 1949. He is his father's eldest son. Has a fine presence and in repose a dignity somewhat belied by his conversation. Among his characteristics are piety,

generosity, knowledge of the Arab world of yesterday, reluctance to face difficulties, and a patriarchal attitude to his Qataris.

Greatness was thrust on him late in life since his younger brother Hamad was his father's right-hand man and heir apparent, and it was only with Hamad's death in the forties that he gave up a life of contemplation and turned his hand to the affairs of the State. Since succeeding his father he has been to Bahrain, Beirut, Dammam for the conference in 1952, Egypt, Switzerland and England, and to Saudi Arabia, Syria and India as the official guest of those States. These visits and his contacts with Europeans in Qatar have broadened his horizons and have implanted in him, besides a new sense of his own importance, a genuine anxiety to see his people enjoy the benefits which civilisation has brought to others.

He has eight sons, of whom the second, Ahmad (No. 3), is at once his favourite, and the most intelligent and promising. The question of the succession is confused by the rival claims of Ahmed and of Shaikh Khalifa bin Hamad (No. 6) and this question is at the root of most of the troubles in Qatar since it prevents the Ruler from dealing drastically with troublemakers for fear that they and their friends will give their allegiance to Khalifa. It was almost certainly with a view to strengthening Ahmad's position *vis-à-vis* Khalifa that Shaikh Ali retired into the background in the autumn of 1956. Since then he has committed the running of day-to-day affairs to Ahmad and has himself either lived in the country outside Doha or been abroad.

As regards foreign affairs his wish is to be the friend both of Her Majesty's Government and the Arab States, in particular Saudi Arabia. The reoccupation of Buraimi and the Suez landings have in consequence embarrassed him, but neither have deflected him from his friendship for Her Majesty's Government.

He was awarded an honorary K.B.E. and the title of His Highness in 1954.

5. Jasim bin Darwish

The eldest of the Darwish brothers, and an essential element in their system. The other brothers defer ostentatiously to Jasim, who is very much the "chef de famille." He is also of a pious disposition, and helps lend an air of respectability to a family sadly in need of it. He scrupulously avoids any appearance of mixing in "politics," but is of great use in translating into suitably Koranic language, for the benefit of Shaikh Ali, the latest questionable scheme hatched by Abdullah (No. 2).

Until the autumn of 1956 he was the head of the Education Committee and did his best to ensure that education developed on conservative lines. Largely as a result of Abdullah's fall from favour he relinquished the position.

6. Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani, Shaikh

Born about 1932. His father, Shaikh Hamad bin Abdullah Al Thani had been designated as successor to Shaikh Abdullah bin Qasim, who ruled until 1949. As a result of Hamad's death the present Ruler (No. 4) succeeded instead, but on succeeding signed a document agreeing that after him the succession should pass back to Hamad's son, Khalifah, and should not pass on to his own son, Ahmed (No. 3).

Khalifah is a strong character, and is bent on asserting his position as the heir apparent. In particular he has crossed swords successfully with the British element in the Government, and has demanded, though so far unsuccessfully, that in the Ruler's absence he and not Ahmed (No. 3) should deputise. He has no love for the Darwish, who are supposed to have misappropriated his father's estate.

He has hitherto been well disposed to the Agency. However, in the autumn of 1956, he asked for and was given control of the Education Department. Previously the Department had been controlled by an Education Committee under the chairmanship of Jasim Darwish (No. 5), had been run on conservative lines and had been staffed to a notable extent by Muslim Brothers. Shaikh Khalifah has swept out a number of the Muslim Brothers and has shown a bias in favour of masters who admire Jamal Abdul Nassir. This and other signs indicate that whatever his real feelings may be towards Her Majesty's Government, they are not such as to prevent him from angling for the support of Egypt and of Egypt's local admirers.

7. Muhammad bin Uthman

Director of Customs, Dohah. He is related to the Darwish family and is married to their sister. A member of the Fakhrroo family (see Bahrain No. 6). He has been Director of Customs for about five years, and has made himself one of the wealthiest men in Qatar. Until about 1955 he was often used by the Ruler as a mediator in family feuds, an unenviable task which he appeared most successfully to fulfil. But since then he has lost influence and this process has been accelerated by his connection with the Darwish family and their fall. He remains a friend of the Agency and is worth consulting about internal trends in Qatar.

8. Nasir bin Khalid, Shaikh

Middle-aged. He is the most prominent member of the Beni Ahmad section of the Ruling Family. He is intelligent, amusing and untrustworthy. He has been a personal friend of most of the Political Officers and Political Agents and was with Mr. Ewart-Biggs when he examined the southern boundary of Qatar prior to the Dammam conference in 1952. Since then he has been head of the Municipal Council from which position he was dismissed for malpractices and is currently in the contracting business in partnership with a merchant, Ali bin Ali. He is a man of some importance because the Beni Ahmad are a large section of the Ruling Family and have considerable influence amongst the merchants. But he is a very slippery fish.

9. Salih al Mani'

Born about 1893, but does not look his age. He is a Nejd by origin, and started his career as a small pearl merchant, at the same time doing some clerking for the ex-Ruler, whose secretary and "Representative" he became. He acquired great influence and wealth while he had the ex-Ruler's complete confidence, but in 1949 he was eclipsed by the Darwish and for a period of years had little influence. With the fall of Abdullah Darwish in 1956 his influence increased again to a limited extent. He has always helped the Agency and his advice is often worth listening to.

Obituary

Abdullah bin Qasim Al Thani, His Excellency Shaikh
(No. 2 in 1956 Report.) Died May 1957.

TRUCIAL STATES

Abu Dhabi

1. Shakhbut bin Sultan bin Zaid, Shaikh

Ruler of Abu Dhabi. Born in 1904 and became Ruler in 1928. He is stubborn, a great procrastinator and parsimonious in the extreme, but is generally

considered to be fair in judgment and does not extort nor sell justice. Over the past five years he has become more and more unpopular with the tribes, and is now widely disliked for his meanness and his cavalier treatment of tribal visitors.

Shaikh Shakhbut looks delicate, has very small bones and suffers from syphilis, but he has an air of quiet dignity about him striking in an Arab Shaikh. Physically he bears a strong resemblance to the Van Dyck portraits of Charles I. After the death of his first wife he took a second one, a young girl, one Hamdah bint Ahmad bin Khalaf bin Utaibah, who left him after one night and never returned. In 1947 he married the daughter of Hamid bin Buti, his maternal uncle, and in August 1948 he also married a young Bedouin girl whom he casually met near his fort.

Shaikh Shakhbut is well disposed towards Her Majesty's Government, though his relations with Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast), Limited, and Abu Dhabi Marine Areas, Limited, are often strained, especially when he considers that his "rights" are being infringed. At such times he behaves like a sulky child, and refuses to do business on rational lines. He is on ostensibly friendly terms with the other Rulers and tribes. He seldom leaves Abu Dhabi except to go to the Abu Dhabi islands and Buraimi occasionally. Together with his brother Zaid (No. 4) and his son Said he visited Paris in August and September 1951 in connection with the sea-bed concession arbitration between Superior Oil Company and Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast), Limited. Shaikh Shakhbut has a growing knowledge of world affairs, gained mainly from the wireless, and he is particularly interested in geography. He visited England in 1953, partly to seek medical treatment and partly to see the Coronation, to which, in company with the other Trucial Rulers, he had not been invited. Having with great difficulty been given a seat in the Abbey, he left a few days before the ceremony for no apparent reason, and betook himself to Paris where he was turned out of his hotel for flooding his bedroom. He had great animosity against Ibn Saud, who claimed a large slice of his territory; and his presence at the boundary conference with the Saudis which took place at Dammam early in 1952 did nothing to contribute towards a settlement. Since then, he has been a firm supporter of the measures taken by Her Majesty's Government in connection with the frontier dispute, although his gratitude was hardly evident from his behaviour at the time of the Coronation.

His mother, Salamah bint Buti, is said to have great influence over him. He is now on excellent terms with his brothers Huzza, Khalid and Zaid (Nos 2, 3 and 4), though this has not always been so, and he relies more and more on their advice.

He has two sons, Said and Sultan. The former is a chronic alcoholic, whose irresponsible conduct has done much to lower the reputation of the Ruling family. Nevertheless, his lavish generosity (which manifests itself even when he is sober) endears him to the people. Sultan, who is now about 18, went through a wild phase in early adolescence, but has improved considerably of late, and now deputises for his father when the latter is away.

2. Hazza' bin Sultan, Shaikh

Born about 1908. Brother of Shaikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi (No. 1). A skilful negotiator and great talker, he has a remarkable knowledge of tribal affairs, wider, in fact, than any of his brothers, and his views on tribal policy are generally sound. He is popular with the tribes, but less so than his brother Zaid (No. 4), who is more generous and more manly.

He has a pleasant manner, although he can be childish and querulous at times. He is genuinely pro-British.

He underwent a serious operation in India in 1956 and although his condition improved, he was flown to America for further operations in 1957. His condition has made him somewhat of a spent force.

In the autumn of 1955 he accompanied his brother Zaid to Geneva to take part in the frontier arbitration proceedings with Saudi Arabia. He subsequently visited London.

3. Khalid bin Sultan

Born about 1914. Brother of Shaikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi (No. 1). Though somewhat stolid and illiterate—he is known locally as "cold coffee"—he often comes out with surprisingly shrewd remarks which show that he has a very clear idea of what is going on. He is not ungenerous and is generally well liked.

He has been suffering from a neurosis for the past year and accompanied his brother (No. 2) to America in search of treatment.

4. Zaid bin Sultan

Born in 1916. The youngest of the three brothers of Shaikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi and the strongest character of the four. He is now the most efficient, most powerful, most generous and most popular of all the desert Shaikhs of the Trucial States. No Shaikh on the Trucial Coast is more courteous and forthcoming to the British or adjusts himself better to their ways. Though slightly less well versed in tribal politics than his brother Hazza' (No. 2), he has a remarkable memory for names and places and is a very good judge of character. Like most Bedu he prefers ease to action, but has great organising talent and is undoubtedly a fine leader.

He has been an unfailing source of strength to Her Majesty's Government in their struggle to stem Saudi encroachment, constantly buoying up waverers, often with considerable sums of money from his own pocket, and never hesitating to put all his resources at the disposal of the Agency or the Trucial Oman Levies in their prosecution of the blockade against Turki bin Ataishan, in 1953-54.

Zaid accompanied his brother Hazza' to Geneva and later to London in the autumn of 1955, where it became known that he had refused a bribe of £30 million from the Saudis.

He accompanied his brother to America in 1957.

Ajman

5. Rashid bin Humaid al-Na'imi, Shaikh

Ruler of Ajman. Born in 1904 and became Ruler in 1928. He is tall with a long grey beard, and a typical Bedouin in appearance. He is even more parsimonious and avaricious than the average, but he is not unjust and is liked by his people. He spends a lot of time in the desert and is on good terms with the other Trucial Shaikhs and tribal chiefs. His relations with the Ruler of Sharjah have been strained recently over the question of the frontier at Manamah, but he is doing his best to placate Shaikh Saqr. He gets around a great deal and visited Shaikh Sulaiman bin Hamyar of the Jebel Akhdhar in 1948 and again in 1950, and has been in Bahrain, Muscat and Saudi Arabia more than once. His territory is secure. He is a good shot and generally kills his man if he gets him in his sights, which has twice landed him in trouble, once when he killed a robber with whom he was at feud in Umm al Qaiwain territory, and once when he killed the cousin of the paramount Shaikh of the Beni Qitab by mistake. He can read and write

Arabic fairly well and listens to the news on the radio (when it is in working order).

His eldest son, Ali, who handles much of the business of the State, is handsome, surprisingly well read and well travelled. But his prepossessing exterior conceals a wealth of cunning. Both father and son are genial characters who, on the whole, do as they are asked by the Agency.

Following the reoccupation of Buraimi, Shaikh Rashid hoped he might inherit Buraimi and Sua'ara. His eldest son and prominent merchants persuaded him not to broach the matter with the Agency, because of the absurdity of such a claim. He is growing old and spends much of his time in his villages, Manama and Masfut, where he owns tobacco gardens. He is entirely under the influence of his Beni Qitabi wife, who has succeeded in poisoning the relations between him and his eldest son, Ali. Her two sons, Humaid and Nasir, are untutored bedouin and visit Saudi Arabia each year to receive a joint annual allowance of Rs. 10,000/-.

Dubai

6. Said bin Maktum, Shaikh, C.B.E.

Ruler of Dubai. Born in 1882 and became the Ruler in 1912. He is a Bedouin in appearance and at heart. He is conscious of the traditional duties and responsibilities of an Arab Shaikh, though he has now allowed these to devolve on his eldest son, Rashid (No. 7); he himself spending his time hawking, shooting and travelling in the desert and at sea. He has recently become interested in agriculture and spends much of his time in attending to his gardens in Ras al Khaimah, where he has installed water pumps and made other improvements. Shaikh Said's relations with the other Trucial Shaikhs and the tribes are good. His dispute with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, which absorbed most of his shaikhdom's resources for three years, has been finally settled. He is on particularly good terms with the Sultan of Muscat and is also friendly with the Shaikhs of Qatar and Bahrain. He is well disposed towards Her Majesty's Government. He has lately not been on good terms with his eldest son, Shaikh Rashid, for two reasons; one, because he has been pressing Rashid to allow Juma and his sons to return to Dubai and two, because he (Shaikh Said) receives what he considers to be an insufficient allowance. Whenever he puts sufficient pressure on Shaikh Rashid, the latter pays him something to keep him quiet. Shaikh Said is suffering from rheumatism in his legs and has visited India on three occasions for treatment.

Created C.B.E. in 1951.

Generally liked and venerated by both Arabs and British. Of recent years has shown signs of becoming senile.

7. Rashid bin Said bin Maktum, Shaikh

Eldest son of the Ruler of Dubai (No. 6). Born about 1914. Since 1938 he has been Regent for his father, who, however, "acts" for him during his absence. He is married to a wife, whose influence on him and Dubai affairs is still strong. She is a daughter of Hamdan bin Zaid, one of the Rulers of Abu Dhabi who was murdered in the 1920s. She is opposed to the Ruler's pro-Saudi brother Shaikh Jum'a (No. 8) and his family. During the war with Abu Dhabi in 1946-47 Rashid adopted a defiant attitude to His Majesty's Government which only changed after punitive measures had been taken against his father. Of recent years, however, he has "grown up" considerably. His main interest at present is to improve his customs revenues and to encourage foreigners to reside and trade in his country. He spends some of his income

on hawking and a great part of it on real estate in Dubai; he already owns nearly half of Dubai and Deira, including shares in the cinema and ice factory. Shaikh Rashid visited the Ruler of Kuwait in 1956 to thank him for his promise of help over the Dubai creek scheme and to discuss educational problems. Recent educational progress in Sharjah and critical comments by his people have compelled Shaikh Rashid to undertake educational improvements in his State. He is kindly and generous and genuinely liked not only by his people but also by the British community in Dubai. He makes real efforts to do as he is asked by the Agency. He does not, however, like taking unpleasant decisions and in a crisis is usually to be found at his country estate 60 miles out of Dubai. He relies overmuch on the advice of self-interested members of his entourage, few of whom are well-disposed to reforms, which threaten to deprive them of their unlawful perquisites. Like Shaikh Saqr of Sharjah (No. 18) he has been trying hard to heal the various feuds he has inherited himself as well as to act as peacemaker in other peoples'. He conducted himself well in the difficult position he found himself in owing to the blockade of Buraimi and has on many occasions loyally supported the Agency against the immediate interests of himself and his subjects. With Saqr of Sharjah he is the Ruler of whom most can be expected for the future.

8. Jum'a bin Maktum, Shaikh

Born about 1888. Eldest brother of the Ruler of Dubai (No. 6). Is entitled to a salute of one gun. This old man, with his direct noisy manner, used to be regarded as a source of comic relief to the ceremonial visits to the Shaikh. During the Dubai-Abu Dhabi dispute in 1946 he revealed himself, however, as an influential intriguer carrying weight in the Dubai councils which was thrown into the scale against the interests of His Majesty's Government. He is believed to have played a prominent part in the slave traffic before the advent of the Levies. He leads the pro-Saudi faction in Dubai, and there is good evidence that his support to Turki bin Ataishan, moral and material, was considerable.

He dislikes the British, and has not called at the Agency for many years. Exiled in 1955 to Saudi Arabia by the Acting Ruler (No. 7) with his three eldest sons, after challenging the latter's rule.

He is in continuous contact with his brother, Shaikh Said bin Maktum (No. 6) and has been trying to persuade him to allow him to return to Dubai.

9. Khalifah bin Said bin Maktum

Second son of the Ruler of Dubai. He spends much of his time hawking in the desert. He is on good terms with all the Rulers, but not with his brother. He has a childish character and listens to the advice of his influential wife and of self-interested persons in Dubai. He is heavily indebted in the suq. Despite recent visits to Kuwait, Bahrain and India for medical treatment, he is still chronically ill.

10. Hamad bin Majid bin Fateim

Sunni Muslim and Dubai merchant. He has always dabbled in politics and was a well-known Saudi agent in Dubai. He used to pass on information to the Saudis and spread anti-British propaganda; as a result of these activities Shaikh Rashid exiled him in 1956.

11. Hamad bin Majid bin Ghurair

Sunni Muslim and Dubai merchant. He is leader of the Beni Yas section. He has three sons, Saif, Abdulla and Majid. Saif is the leader of the National Front and collected Rs. 40,000 for the Egyptian arms fund. The whole bin Ghurair family

are pro-Saudi and anti-British. They interfere whenever they can in internal affairs and are always attempting to upset improvements in the town.

During the past year, his disruptive activities have increased and he has recently involved himself in the frontier dispute between Fujairah and Ras al Khaimah. He is related to the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah by marriage and is said to have considerable influence over him.

12. Ubaid bin Thani

Sunni Muslim of Dubai. He is leader of the Beni Yas and a former Customs Director. He owns a considerable amount of land and, like the Ghurairs, attempts to interfere in Dubai's local affairs. Ubaid has been accused of creating trouble between the Ruler and his sons. He is anti-British and a supporter of the Saudis.

13. Thani bin Abdullah

Sunni Muslim of Dubai. He is now pro-British and anti-Saudi, and constantly advises Shaikh Rashid to co-operate with the Agency and to improve his administration. With Shaikh Rashid's approval he has taken to acting on Shaikh Rashid's behalf when the latter is away.

14. Murshid al Rashid al Usaimi

Sunni Muslim of Kuwaiti origin. A prominent merchant in Dubai, he is one of Shaikh Rashid's closest friends and advisers. Murshid owns property in Dubai, gardens in Ras al Khaimah, having made a fortune out of real estate speculation.

Fujairah

15. Muhammad bin Hamad al Sharqi, Shaikh

Ruler of Fujairah. Born in 1906. Became Shaikh of Fujairah after the death of his elder brother in December 1940.

Recognised by Her Majesty's Government in April 1952, and thus joined the ranks of the Trucial Rulers. Though generally well disposed towards Her Majesty's Government—he actively pressed for recognition from the time of his accession until achieving his object—he is a masterly intriguer and would undoubtedly serve two masters if it suited him. He showed remarkable reticence about his visit to Riyadh early in 1953. Much of the territory controlled by him used to be under Qawasim rule, but his father broke away from Qawasim control and the latter exercise no influence in the Fujairah area now. Most of Shaikh Muhammad's tribesmen, the Sharqiyeen, pay complete allegiance to him and he exercises full authority over them, though some pay zakat to Shaikh Saqr bin Muhammad of Ras al Khaimah (No. 16). Following the recent announcement of the frontier settlement, his relations with Shaikh Saqr have sharply deteriorated and he has also quarrelled with the Ruler of Ajman. He is friendly with the other Trucial Rulers, and has succeeded in restoring good relations with the Ruler of Sharjah. His relations with the Sultan of Muscat, from whom, apparently, he got a Sultanate passport in 1951, are particularly close. He had for long been anxious that P.C.L. should take up an oil concession in his area, and in August 1953 the Company concluded an agreement with him. He often makes real efforts to do what the Agency ask of him. He has an engaging and rather childlike manner which makes it difficult to be angry with him in the face of his periodical "enormities" of one sort or another.

Shaikh Muhammad is married to the daughter of the Ruler of Ajman (No. 5), with whom he always stays when visiting the Trucial Coast, and has one son of about 7 who lives at present in Ajman. During his absences from Fujairah, Shaikh Muhammad usually appoints Suhail bin Hamad to run the State.

Ras al Khaimah

16. Saqr bin Muhammad bin Salem, Shaikh

Ruler of Ras al Khaimah. Born in 1920. Seized power from Sultan bin Salim (No. 17) in February 1948, and was recognised as Ruler in August 1948.

Though on first encounter he strikes one as an unprepossessing character, this one-eyed young man has so far showed himself a strong Shaikh and strict Ruler. Occasionally he takes cruel and violent action—he has been known to put out the eyes of criminals—but he is, on the whole, impartial in his conduct of affairs. He is intelligent and in business shows a welcome ability to understand points of view other than his own. He attends to his affairs, security and good order prevail in his territory and crimes are uncommon. He is supported in his rule by his father and his five brothers and is friendly with all the other local Shaikhs and tribes and loyal to Her Majesty's Government. Although Sultan bin Salim made away with a large part of the funds of the Shaikhdom, Saqr has waived a number of taxes and reduced the customs duty.

He has a dispute with Shaikh Muhammad of Bakhah (Muscat No. 5) over rights in the village of Sha'am which has led to several incidents. In 1950 he extended his rule near the island of Jazirat al Hamrah, and in 1951 he successfully occupied the rebellious village of Rams. In 1954 he married the daughter of Hamad bin Majid bin Ghurair, one of the Beni Yas leaders in Dubai. Since this marriage Shaikh Saqr has become the victim of intrigues by bin Ghurair and has not always co-operated with the Agency. He is always short of money and has not yet settled his disputes with Sultan bin Salim and the former Shaikh of Rams and the other refugees from there.

He has been greatly incensed at the recent frontier settlement which, in his opinion, gave him less than his due. He refused to accept the settlement and travelled to Bahrain to plead his case before the Political Resident. He returned after a month having met with no success and is a disgruntled man. Bin Ghurair has fanned his resentment and strengthened his stand against Fujairah.

17. Sultan bin Salim al Qasimi

Ex-Ruler of Ras al Khaimah. Born in 1891. An unpleasant character—thoroughly untrustworthy and intriguing. He neglected the interests of his Shaikhdom for years in order to squeeze money out of the people to aggrandise himself through trade. In February 1948 his nephew, Shaikh Saqr bin Muhammad bin Salim (No. 16), seized power with the people of Ras al Khaimah and the Khawatir tribe during Sultan bin Salim's absence in Dubai. They have only recently composed their differences, as the result of arbitration by the Political Agent. Sultan is liable to take violent courses, one of which (shooting at the Political Agent) obliged Her Majesty's Government to impose upon him a fine and a year's exile in Muscat. He is now living in Damman with Saudi permission and draws a regular salary from the Saudi Government.

His eldest son, Saqr, murdered Shaikh Hamad bin Said al Qasimi, Ruler of Kalba, whose guest he was, on 4th July, 1951, and usurped the Shaikhdom of

Kalba. He withdrew under pressure in May 1952, the former Shaikhdom of Kalba reverting to Sharjah rule.

Sharjah

18. Saqr bin Sultan bin Saqr al Qasimi, Shaikh

Born about 1924. Officially recognised by His Majesty's Government as Ruler of Sharjah in succession to his father on 8th May, 1951, after having canvassed popular support for his claim to succeed instead of his uncle Muhammad (No. 19). Like all the Qawasim of Sharjah, he has an exaggerated notion of his own importance and a tendency to think of the glorious past of his family as though it had survived into the present day. He is, however, morally upright, young, comparatively energetic, sometimes remarkably businesslike, and modern in his outlook; he is foremost among the Trucial Rulers in having constructive ideas for the improvement and development of his Shaikhdom. He has a likeable personality and is the only one of the Trucial Rulers who has any real interest in, or knowledge of, the affairs of the Western world.

Shaikh Saqr undoubtedly enjoys more local popularity than did either his father or his uncle. He has shown himself consistently loyal and co-operative towards Her Majesty's Government. On two occasions he has visited Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, where he met Neguib, Gamal Abdul Nasser and other members of the Egyptian Government. In 1955 he called on Nuri al Said in Baghdad and was warmly received. He is very keen on encouraging education in Sharjah and has succeeded in obtaining the services of two teachers from Egypt and six Jordanians through the help of the Kuwait Government. He spends more than his income and is heavily in debt. This makes him susceptible to offers of help from all quarters, but he remains very friendly towards Her Majesty's Government and would prefer to receive help from them alone. Throughout the past year he has been increasingly co-operative, though he is still inclined to be influenced by the Jordanian teachers in his State. His enthusiasm for Gamal Abdul Nasser has waned somewhat, but he is still on very close terms with Kamal Abdul Hamid one of the Egyptian military junta.

Three of his brothers, Khalid, Muhammad and Salim speak remarkably good English—unique among Trucial Coast Shaikhs—which they learned in India. The first two visited London in 1951 and seem to have profited considerably from their trip. Saqr visited Riyadh in 1955 to complain about Khalid's activities in Al Khobar, whence he is spreading seditious propaganda against Sharjah's British connection, but returned with a poor view of the Saudis.

After the Buraimi operation, Shaikh Saqr was attacked by the Saudis in their press and on the radio for co-operating with the British.

19. Muhammad bin Saqr al Qasimi, Shaikh

Born about 1913. Acted as Regent of Sharjah during the prolonged illness of his brother the late Shaikh Sultan, in 1949–51. Announced his succession as Ruler on the death of Shaikh Sultan in April 1951, but subsequently allowed himself to be displaced by the former Shaikh's eldest son, Saqr (No. 18). He receives a larger allowance than his brothers, though it does not meet his expenditure. He owns some landed property in Sharjah and a date garden in Ras al Khaimah.

He is a well-meaning, rather ineffectual character who co-operated loyally with His late Majesty's

Government during his Regency provided he was not asked to do anything dangerous or unpleasant.

In addition to his land revenue, he receives a regular annual allowance of Rs.10,000 from the Saudis and another Rs.10,000 from the Ruler of Qatar. He has finally settled his financial claims against the Ruler of Sharjah and good relations now exist between them.

Umm al Qaiwain

20. Ahmad bin Rashid Al Mu'alla, Shaikh, M.B.E.

Ruler of Umm Al Qaiwain. Born in 1904 and succeeded in 1929. He is enormously fat and quiet and, to meet him in audience, one would imagine that he was anchored permanently to his chair; yet in his small way he is a wise, straightforward, peaceful and efficient administrator. He keeps his word

and avoids interference in other people's affairs. Is, therefore, popular and much respected by the other Shaikhs who, with their tribes, regard him as an authority on their affairs and approach him often for mediation in their disputes. He has full authority in his territory and is loyal to Her Majesty's Government. Was awarded the M.B.E. in 1950 for his services as a pacifier and mediator in disputes between other Trucial Shaikhs. Is weakened in health by chronic diabetes which he can only check by a near-starvation diet.

He has a strong aversion to the Saudis, caused by the almost unbelievably rude treatment accorded to him on the 1953 pilgrimage.

In addition to his oil concession revenue, Shaikh Ahmad runs a taxi service between Dubai-Sharjah-Umm al Qaiwain and the Batinah Coast from which he receives a considerable income. He is encouraging agriculture in his gardens at Falej al Ali.

CHAPTER II.—SAUDI ARABIA

ES 1011/1

No. 23

SAUDI ARABIA : ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1956

Mr. Parkes to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received January 3)

(No. 82. Confidential) Saigon,
Sir, December 20, 1957.

In writing this Annual Review at the request of your Department, I am handicapped by the absence of records, the fact that in 1956 I spent only six months in Jeddah, and that I left Saudi Arabia over a year ago. It will accordingly be of a more than usually general nature and deal with major trends only. It will also inevitably be sadly out of date. A chronological summary of the principal events of 1956 is appended to this despatch.

Internal

2. In this still largely feudal country King Saud would be amply justified in saying, with Louis XIV, "l'état c'est moi." For this flabby, self-important and somewhat naive 57-year-old son of an illustrious and domineering father at present constitutes the apex of a pyramid, rising from the not unsound base of the few Najdi families, intermarried with the House of Saud, to whom the administration of the various Saudi Arabian provinces is entrusted, through some meretricious layers of Princely blocks (one is tempted to write blockheads) to the rarefied heights where a handful of xenophobic, sycophantic and largely alien Advisers support the pretentious Royal pinnacle. The pyramid is far from sound, founded as it is on shifting sand with an oleiferous substratum. Admittedly it has so far shown no serious signs of stress; but this does not mean that, for example, a few prolonged blasts from the Voice of the Arabs trumpet might not set it dangerously shaking. Such indeed was the case when, in July 1956, Colonel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal without informing his Saudi allies. Alarmed by this threat to his oil revenues, and piqued by Egypt's lack of confidence, King Saud maintained for some tense days a sulky silence which was widely remarked upon both inside and

outside the country. But this unwonted temerity was of relatively short duration and it needed only a touch of asperity from the Cairo Broadcasting Station, combined with a few Egyptian-inspired demonstrations, to send the Saudi Ambassador scuttling into line with his other Arab colleagues and transmitting yet another congratulatory message to the Egyptian dictator.

3. The fundamental weakness of the Saudi régime is its refusal to face the facts of twentieth century life, and its determination to maintain intact the country's existing structure which, despite the Cadillacs, palaces and apartment blocks which the new-found oil wealth has produced, has remained largely unchanged for centuries. There is, for example, no representative institution in the accepted sense of the term in Saudi Arabia to-day; and such social services as exist are mainly the result of Royal whims and represented as Royal charity. The maintenance of this precarious vacuum is just possible so long as the army, police and tribal forces are loyal and ruthlessly employed, and so long as the present top-heavy prosperity lasts and is able to overspill and trickle through to the grass roots. But already the writing on the wall is clear. For the radio and heterogeneous Moslem immigrants from the outside have combined to open Saudi eyes; and despite an annual income of approximately one hundred million pounds the national economy, as a result of Royal and Princely extravagance, is systematically overspent. Thus the mild but symptomatic labour trouble that broke out in June at the Dhahran and Ras Tanura depots of ARAMCO was not aimed at the company, which is a model employer, so much as at the régime itself. It was neither Communist, nor even alien, inspired, but a modest protest movement by Saudis against Saudis. The ferocity with which it was repressed,

and the punitive labour decrees with which it was followed, cannot but lead to further trouble, though just when this trouble will materialise it would be rash indeed to attempt to forecast. Logically the vacuum cannot long remain intact. Yet the country is superficially quiet and it would be decidedly misleading to suggest that the kettle on which the somewhat flimsy lid of the Saud family now sits is in imminent danger of eruption. At the same time I am very far from sharing the optimism of my late American colleague, who saw in the abortive ARAMCO demonstrations of the summer of 1956 little more than another example of King Saud's masterly handling of an awkward situation; and indeed was then of the opinion that there was no particular reason why the present anachronistic state of affairs should not continue virtually indefinitely.

External—Relations with Foreign Countries

4.—(a) United Kingdom

The main features in Anglo-Saudi relations over the year were the Buraimi dispute and, latterly, the Anglo-French intervention over Suez. Negotiations over the former reached deadlock with the presentation by Prince Faisal in June of four completely unacceptable preconditions to formal talks. Subsequent discussions in London with Abdur Rahman Azzam, though they helped to clear the air, had no tangible result. The Pilgrimage, and thereafter the Suez Canal dispute, served temporarily to divert Saudi attention from this intractable problem, but in October King Saud returned to the charge indicating that, if Her Majesty's Government were not prepared to discuss Buraimi constructively, he would be obliged to refer the question to the United Nations General Assembly. And there the matter rests, following the rupture of diplomatic relations on the 6th of November. There is little doubt that King Saud soon regretted this precipitate action which was, I understand, taken under strong pressure from Cairo. Buraimi was his overriding preoccupation but since, in the absence of diplomatic relations, direct negotiations are impossible, no Saudi reference to the United Nations would appear likely to succeed prior to their resumption. At the close of the year under review it was my view that it would be premature to consider a return to Jedda until the general Middle East situation had become substantially clearer. Once relations were resumed

it would be harder than ever to maintain our delaying tactics; yet it was essential, if we were ever to reach a substantive settlement, to know exactly where Saudi Arabia stood *vis-à-vis* Egypt and *per contra* the Baghdad Pact countries.

(b) The United States

American influence, which was powerful enough before in all conscience, substantially increased over the year. Indeed towards the end of the period under review personal messages between the King and President Eisenhower were passing with bewildering frequency. How much this rather heavy-handed fraternisation owed to the not over-enlightened self-interest of ARAMCO, the uncritical admiration of my late American colleague, or genuine American self-deception, it is difficult to say. I am inclined to think that Saudi Arabia is regarded in Washington as an all too rare sphere of genuine American influence; and that Washington is not prepared to admit that this influence may not be wholly good, or as effective as the State Department would like to think it is. Being heavily committed to the Saudi régime, and faced with few alternatives, the Americans seemed determined to back it to the limit. Time alone will show the wisdom of such a policy. For our part I was of the opinion that American pressure to make substantive boundary concessions to the Saudis should be ignored, unless the Americans themselves were prepared to under-write them in some way or another.

(c) Other Western Countries

Saudi relations with France, already delicate owing to the latter's subsequent refusal to supply the arms for which she had contracted earlier in the year, deteriorated still further as a result of developments in North Africa. Some hundred French subjects employed at the Al Kharj ammunition factory were placed under house arrest on suspicion of sabotage, following an explosion in the factory almost certainly organised by Egyptians, and kept *incommunicado* for a considerable period. A spirited intervention by the French Ambassador secured their eventual release and deportation, but the last straw was provided by the Anglo-French action over Suez and diplomatic relations were broken off on the 6th of November. Relations with Italy and Western Germany remained friendly and a new Spanish Ambassador put in a brief appearance during the year.

(d) Baghdad Pact Countries

One of the few dividends resulting from the Suez dispute may prove to have been the ending of the traditional Saudi-Hashemite dynastic feud, since Colonel Nasser's intemperate piracy served to underline the fundamental common interests of the two Royal houses. In September, following a preliminary reconnaissance by Amir Zaid, King Faisal had a friendly if inconclusive meeting with King Saud at Dammam, and although Iraqi-Saudi rapprochement was obviously a delicate plant careful nurturing seemed likely to yield substantial results. Saudi relations with Turkey remained cool during the year; but Pakistani influence, despite a temporary setback in October over some offensive Karachi newspaper articles, grew steadily to culminate in President Iskandar Mirza's visit to Riyadh in November. Relations with Iran remained friendly, apart from a clash over the Persian Gulf island of Farsi which both countries claim.

(e) Other Arab Countries

In 1956 the key to Saudi Arabia's evolution seemed clearly to lie in her relationship with Egypt. When Ibn Saud paid his original visit to King Farouk in 1946 his object was to end Saudi isolationism and acquire a powerful but relatively disinterested Arab ally. Much water has since passed under Kasr-el-Nil bridge but the uneasy Saudi-Egyptian partnership has lasted, and continued throughout the year in the face of growing counter-indications on the Saudi side. The alliance, which had already found formal expression in a military agreement, was expanded in April to link Saudi Arabia and Egypt with the Yemen. Saudi misgivings, however, over the extent of Communist influence in both these countries, as well as Syria, grew apace; and her relations with Egypt were certainly not improved by Colonel Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The emotional conflict between Arab solidarity and self-interest was acute, and, though common hostility towards Israel and constant assurances about the ideological irrelevance of Communist assistance served as temporary palliatives, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and these three countries became increasingly strained. But whilst the Yemen was despised, and Syria regarded as relatively unimportant, Egypt's hold—emotional and physical—over Saudi Arabia was considerable and appeared unlikely to be relaxed short of a weakening in the revolu-

tionary Egyptian régime or American military assistance to Saudi Arabia making itself seriously felt. Relations with the Lebanon continued friendly, but Jordan's financial, defence and political weaknesses caused considerable concern and made fresh inroads on Saudi largesse.

(f) Other Afro-Asian Countries

Sudan and Tunisia opened missions during the year. King Saud was reluctantly compelled to cancel his proposed visits to Afghanistan and Indonesia as a result of the Suez tension. India continued to gain ground, mainly in the economic field, and the visit of Mr. Nehru in September undoubtedly reinforced King Saud in his non-alignment policy, and went some way to counter the effects of the Pakistan Prime Minister's visit in the previous month. The Chinese Nationalist and Ethiopian representatives continued to haunt every diplomatic party given in Jedda, but were otherwise completely ineffective.

Economic

5. Throughout 1956 Saudi Arabia continued to pursue a vacillating financial policy. Owing to continuous bickering amongst Ministers no budget was produced, and Royal extravagance, particularly in Riyadh, coupled with loans and payments, e.g., to Syria, Yemen and Egypt, dissipated a large proportion of the country's annual revenues from the Arabian-American Oil Company. These amounted in 1956 to \$80,344,000 in royalties and \$199,457,000 in taxes. By August the banks were faced with an acute shortage of foreign exchange to meet the growing demand for imported goods. By the middle of November no letters of credit could be opened without the express approval of the Ministry of Finance, essential foodstuffs alone being exempted from this restriction. The economy was thus ill-prepared to meet the falling off in foreign exchange earnings which followed the Saudi gesture towards Arab solidarity at the time of the Suez crisis by cutting off the supply of oil to Bahrain; at that time supplies to Bahrain represented approximately one-fifth of the country's total oil production.

6. The reconstruction of Riyadh as the capital and administrative centre proceeded throughout 1956 and was given renewed impetus by the discovery of fresh water in the area. Work was started on the enlargement of the Mosque precincts at Mecca.

British firms played some part in development projects although increasingly strained relations between the two countries made it proportionately more difficult for United Kingdom contractors to secure Saudi government contracts. The break in diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia in November did not, however, result in a break of trading relations and, although a show was made of encouraging the development of trade between Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt, there was no significant increase in this direction. Exports from the United Kingdom in the month of December were less than half those for December 1955 (£481,380 compared with £995,183); and exports for the last quarter of 1956 were £2,121,541 as against £2,234,226 for the corresponding 1955 quarter. Total exports over the year were, however, substantially higher than in 1955, the total for 1955 being £7,814,902 as opposed to £9,079,178 in 1956.

7. Arrangements made with the Polish firm Sikop for a survey of the Hejaz railway were cancelled, ostensibly on the grounds that Sikop could not produce satisfactory proof that it was not connected with Israel. Further tenders were called for and the contract was secured by a United States firm.

8. There were reports from some sources in mid-1956 that ARAMCO were about to sign an agreement with the Saudi Arabian Government which appeared to be a complete surrender to Saudi demands. The main points were understood to be:—

- (a) Replacement of the "refinery fee" principle by a share of realised profits on products.
- (b) Surrender of the 2 per cent. marketing discount.
- (c) No provision for incentive discounts.

In the event no agreement seems to have been signed. ARAMCO were able to postpone a decision by agreeing to conduct a scrutiny of the books of their parent and subsidiary companies to discover whether the Saudis would in fact be better off if provision (a) were carried out. This scrutiny had not been completed by the end of the year.

Conclusion

9. It is not unfair to say that by the end of 1956 King Saud's power in Saudi Arabia was limited only by the degree of interest in any particular subject he was inclined to

take, and the extent to which he then cared to exert himself. That he was both prepared and able to over-rule his Advisers and act independently on occasions was certain. The personal character of this absolute monarch is, therefore, of considerable relevance and the most striking development in the year under review was the way in which King Saud, previously largely content to leave things to others, tended more and more to take the reins into his own hands, and indeed on occasions to show unsuspected shrewdness and common-sense. The reason for this is not hard to find. The re-occupation of the Buraimi oasis by Trucial Oman Levies in October 1955 put King Saud in an extremely awkward position in which his face, always a sensitive feature, was deeply involved. This firm, and indeed irresistible, British reaction was totally unexpected and marked the failure of an expansionist policy the scheming detail of which had been mostly left to the Deputy Foreign Minister, Yusuf Yasin. Thus, for the first time in his relatively brief reign, King Saud was brought up against hard reality and the experience was salutary. He was temperamentally unable to resist some preliminary bluster, but as the dust settled it became increasingly obvious that he was more ready to see reason than some of his closest Advisers. In the negotiations leading up to his eventual acceptance of my credentials and the advent of the Dodds-Parker mission in April 1956, the Royal hand was clearly visible; and from then until diplomatic relations with Britain were broken off the King's responsibility waxed apace, culminating in one sensational week in September when he was visited in quick succession by King Faisal, Colonel Nasser and President Kuwatly, and last but not least Mr. Nehru. During these hectic seven days the King worked at a pressure which it took some weeks of subsequent relaxation in the harem to offset; but he came through his ordeal creditably and had a number of not unintelligent tête-à-têtes with his visitors at which no Advisers were present. Since in the previous month he had had similar conversations with Mohamed Ali, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, the hitherto widely-held belief that he was unable, or at any rate unwilling, to conduct a rational conversation for more than a very limited period was seen to be incorrect. A serious weakness, however, came to light during these conversations. King Saud, well-meaning but impulsive and often gullible,

showed himself to be a man on whose feelings it was relatively simple to work. He was completely outclassed mentally by his visitors, and in his subsequent utterances the echo of the various voices he had heard was all too plainly discernible.

10. What is the significance of this late Royal flowering? The motive forces behind King Saud are probably, in order of significance:—

- (a) A sincere, even fanatic, hatred of Communism.
- (b) An equally sincere, equally fanatic, hatred and fear of Israel.
- (c) A powerful but discreet ambition to be not only supreme in the Arabian peninsula—and master of its oil revenues—but also, eventually, the spiritual and temporal leader of the Arabs and a real force in the wider realm of Islam generally.
- (d) A somewhat woolly conviction, notwithstanding conventional anti-colonial reflexes, that good relations must somehow be preserved with the West. King Saud's main links with the West are anti-Communism and his association, originally through ARAMCO, with Americans generally. Whilst determined to avoid any serious military commitments he is very willing to wring the maximum concessions from any non-Communist Western source that offers. Thus in the year under review he bargained hard but realistically both with ARAMCO for an increased share of their takings, and with Washington over the terms for the renewal of the Dhahran air base agreement; despite his general abhorrence of her policy in North Africa he would have been prepared to accept any amount of arms from France; and, even though it necessitated the temporary abandonment of expansionist adventures in Eastern and Southern Arabia, he undoubtedly hoped to achieve a foothold in Buraimi, and some degree of benevolence over Western arms supplies, out of Britain.

11. The fundamental contradictions between his Arabian ambitions and friendship with Britain in particular, and between emotional anti-semitism and anti-colonialism and rational relations with the West generally, King Saud seemed either incapable of grasping or to have deliberately

ignored. Whilst they exist the long-term unwisdom of founding, e.g., an Eisenhower Doctrine on so feeble, unreliable and possibly transitory a support is obvious. Admittedly alternatives are few; but flattery and massive injections of dollars are no cure for one suffering from delusions of grandeur. Appetite develops with eating; as well take a watering-can to the Arabian desert. The correct prescription for this dollar addict is probably discreet shock treatment, since the only times King Saud has displayed anything like the shrewdness of his father have been when brought up against hard facts. Temperamentally he is far too inclined to relax in a fool's paradise, where unpleasantness can be exercised by fair words and everything will be all right *inshallah*. Yet shocks are the last things his admiring American patrons seem likely to administer. There comes a time when, as in my abortive negotiations with Prince Faisal, conventional expressions of goodwill on both sides become painfully inadequate and real concessions are needed.

THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN
CLOSED UNTIL
..... UNDER FOI
EXEMPTION No 2.7(1)(a).....

I have, &c.

R. W. PARKES.

Enclosure

Calendar of Events for 1956

January

Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian offer of financial assistance to Jordan.
20 Saudi Arabia recognised the Sudan.

February

17 United States Government's decision to suspend arms shipments to Israel and neighbouring States. This affected the export of 18 Walker Bulldog tanks loaded for shipment to Saudi Arabia.
18 President Eisenhower cancelled embargo and permitted shipment of tanks.
26-28 Visit of M. Selim Lahoud, Lebanese Foreign Minister, to Riyadh.

March

6-11 Meeting of President Nasser, President Kuwatly and King Saud in Cairo.
15 Saudi Arabian Government gave Jordan dinars 100,000 as a first instalment of assistance to the Jordanian National Guard.

March

- 28 The 18 United States Walker Bulldog tanks arrived at Dammam. A squadron of Egyptian jet aircraft was delivered to Saudi Arabia under the terms of the bilateral military agreement with Egypt.

April

- 3 King Saud opened Jeddah Quarantine Station for pilgrims. Reported cost of construction £1,200,000.
- 5 King Saud inaugurated the extension of the Holy Mosque at Mecca, costing approximately £45 million.
- 7 Notice given to British anti-locust team to leave Saudi Arabia within six weeks.
- 20-24 Visit of Imam of Yemen and Prime Minister of Egypt.
- 21 Signature of Saudi-Egyptian-Yemeni Defence Pact at Jeddah.
- 26 Her Majesty's Ambassador presents credentials to King Saud.
- Arrival of Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Mr. A. D. Dodds-Parker, for talks with King Saud.

May

- 20 Incident on Saudi-Aden frontier involving arrest of Protectorate subjects returning, evidently from Saudi Arabia, with supplies of small arms.

June

- 11-14 Her Majesty's Ambassador visited Riyadh for talks with Prince Faisal: Faisal's "Four Points."
- 18 President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Mr. Eugene Black, visited Riyadh.
- 19 The United States and Saudi Arabia agreed to extend the Dhahran air base agreement (which expired on June 18) until July 18, pending the outcome of negotiations between the two Governments.
- 20 Royal Order was issued prohibiting the entry into Saudi Arabia of Saudi currency, whether in Saudi gold, pounds, silver riyals or pilgrims receipts.
- 21 Discovery of oil in a wildcat well on the Persian Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia announced by the Arabian-American Oil Company. The well is approximately 80 miles north-west of Dhahran.
- 22 The Saudi Arabian Government published a decree banning strikes and demonstrations on pain of imprisonment. This decree followed disturbances among ARAMCO workers at Dhahran and Ras Tanura during King Saud's visit to the eastern province. At Ras Tanura 12 persons were publicly flogged, four of whom subsequently died.

July

- 10 Talks in London between the Secretary of State and Abdur Rahman Azzam on behalf of the Saudi Arabian Government.
- 29 Her Majesty's Ambassador delivered a Note which, in reply to the "four points," stated that Her Majesty's Government were prepared to consider:—
- (i) repatriation of Buraimi "exiles";
 - (ii) placing Buraimi higher in the agenda for talks;
 - (iii) an arrangement to give Saudi Arabia privileged access to the sea east of Qatar.

August

- Unenthusiastic reaction in Saudi Arabia to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal despite Egyptian attempts to organise demonstrations.
- Visit of Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. Mohamed Ali, and Pakistan Chief of Staff, Major-General Newabzada Sher Ali Khan, during the pilgrimage.
- 26 Visit of Amir Zaid of Iraq to Saudi Arabia.
- 29 Prince Faisal's Note on Anglo-Saudi talks.

September

- 1 Arrival in Riyadh of Jordanian military mission under Ali Abu Nuwar.
- 7-9 Conference in Riyadh on Jordan defence, attended by military delegations from Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon and presided over by Prince Mishal, Saudi Minister of Defence.
- 20 King Faisal of Iraq met King Saud at Dammam.
- 22-24 Visit of Colonel Nasser and President Kuwatly, resulting in communiqué supporting Egyptian action over the Suez Canal.
- 24-27 Visit of Mr. Nehru.

October

- Attacks on King Saud in Pakistan Press led to temporary strain in relations between the two countries.
- 18 Saudi occupation of Arabi.
- 24-27 Her Majesty's Ambassador's talks in Riyadh.
- 30 Mobilisation of Saudi forces.

November

- Concentration of troops on the northern border.
- 6 Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic relations with Britain and France.
- 8 109 French, 5 Italian and 2 Swiss employees of the Al Kharj ammunition factory expelled from Saudi Arabia, after being charged with responsibility for explosions at the factory.
- ARAMCO announced that none of their oil, including Tapline output at Sidon, would be made available to British or French ships. The flow of oil to the Bahrain refinery was also cut off.
- 10 Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs accepted Her Majesty's Ambassador's *pour mémoire* on Anglo-Saudi relations.
- 12 King Saud attended meeting in Beirut of Arab Heads of State convened by President Chamoun.
- 13 Saudi donation of £205 for relief and reconstruction work in Port Said.
- 17 Her Majesty's Ambassador left Saudi Arabia.
- 21 Visit of President Iskander Mirza of Pakistan to Saudi Arabia.

December

- Gulf Aviation refused permission to operate between Bahrain and Dhahran.

SECRET

THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN
CLOSED UNTIL
UNDER FOI
EXEMPTION No. 27(1)(a)

VISIT OF KING SAUD TO THE UNITED STATES

Sir Harold Caccia to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received February 19)

(No. 42. Confidential) Washington,
Sir, February 15, 1957.

I have the honour to report that the much heralded visit to the United States of King Saud took place between January 29 and February 10.

2. King Saud had for a year or more been hinting that an invitation would be welcomed, but had been put off by the State Department, partly because certain political embarrassments attached to such a visit, and partly on account of the President's extreme distaste for state visits. The distractions of an election year provided a sufficient excuse.

3. The launching of the Eisenhower doctrine, however, made this a suitable time for the President to issue an invitation. Although estimates of Saud's importance vary amongst Americans, there is no disputing the importance which the President himself attaches to Saudi Arabia on the grounds that the King must by definition be anti-Communist, and that this is a factor which should be exploited to strengthen resistance to the Russian penetration of the Middle East. Once the invitation had been received, King Saud seems to have been less sure that the time was suitable from his point of view. Being an inveterate rider of two horses, the more he heard of designs to detach him from Nasser, the more reluctant he must have been to put himself in a position where he might appear to be abandoning the horse with the sharper teeth. He was no doubt also genuinely apprehensive of a possibly hostile reception in a country in which, according to his ideas, the Jews exert a nefarious influence.

4. According to one reliable reporter, he tried to get out of the visit on a point of protocol, when he was told that President Eisenhower would not greet him on arrival. President Eisenhower has in the past four years caused embarrassment to his advisers by refusing to follow the normal rules of protocol and meet visiting Heads of State in person. Having done so on the first occasion, it had to be made the rule, which was followed even in the case of the King of Greece, that his visitors should be met by

the Vice-President. To accommodate King Saud, however, the precedent was reversed and President Eisenhower met him at the airport on his arrival in Washington. King Saud, being aware of the previous history, must have found this very satisfying and may have made a mental note on what intransigence can do.

5. The satisfaction may have been the more soothing because it followed a distinctly chilly reception in New York. The King had travelled by air to Naples from his meeting in Cairo with Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian leaders. There he embarked on the S.S. *Constitution* which arrived in New York on January 29. It has been the practice that State visitors arriving in New York are received by the Mayor and civic authorities with a display of noisy enthusiasm, of which streaming fire-floats are an indispensable part. The day before his arrival, however, Mayor Wagner, himself a Roman Catholic, announced that he had declined to offer any official welcome to King Saud and was reported to have said:—

"He is a fellow who says slavery is legal and that in his country our Air Force cannot use Jewish men and cannot permit any Roman Catholic chaplains to say Mass."

6. I have heard that Mayor Wagner acted reluctantly under pressure from his political advisers, who were concerned to appease the Jewish and Catholic vote in New York City. President Eisenhower, in a Press conference on January 30, rebuked those who interfered with the course of diplomacy by confusing an invitation to a foreign leader with approval of his policies (dangerous ground, this, in view of the Republican Party's views on Communist China). The matter was aired vigorously in the Press, where doubts about King Saud's visit were tied up with similar doubts—also expressed by Mayor Wagner—about a visit by President Tito. The weight of opinion, with a noisy dissenting minority, seems to have come down on the side of the President and condemned the Mayor's action. *The New York Times* commented, sensibly, that it

SECRET

would be better to drop the whole idea that there had to be a demonstration of simulated enthusiasm for every distinguished foreign visitor.

7. None of this prevented extensive publicity, which was of course stimulated by pro-Israeli elements in this country, for the seamier side of the Saudi régime, namely slavery, autocracy, polygamy, extravagance and religious bigotry. For the past twelve months the American Jewish Congress has been pertinaciously lobbying Congress about the ban, dictated by the Saudis, on the posting of Jewish United States air force personnel to the Dhahran air base (a discrimination which the servicemen themselves might well regard as penalising non-Jews) and on the entry of any American Jews into Saudi Arabia. At one point, they started a campaign for the closing of the Arabian American Oil Company's recruiting office in New York on the grounds that it practised religious discrimination. This whole subject was therefore a useful stick with which to beat the Saudis.

8. On the whole, however, the Press, with official encouragement, built up a picture of King Saud and his "oil rich" kingdom as a powerful force in the Middle East, at once the friend of America and at the same time influential with anti-colonial Arab nationalism; a guardian of the Moslem holy places, and therefore a natural leader of Islamic peoples in a crusade against world Communism. A lot of eccentricities can be swallowed for such a prize; and many of the eccentricities, the outlandish costume, the extravagant tips and presents to all and sundry, and the Arabian nights atmosphere of the whole caravan, even the unresolved uncertainty as to whether the party was sixty or eighty strong, have their own appeal to the United States public. However, the stroke of genius in public relations, the card with which Saud trumped the Zionist aces, was to have brought along the 3½ year old crippled boy, Prince Mashur. The solemn face with the eyes of a gazelle, and the small left hand touching his forehead in a salute, made the pictures of the week for most American newspapers. The Prince was fitted with surgical boots and a brace by the President's army medical advisers, and a team of three is to visit Saudi Arabia to continue his treatment. He was sent cowboy suits, teddy bears, toys, crayons, telegrams, letters and cards. Whole kindergartens and first grades wrote to him. Obviously, the father of such a child can be no ogre.

9. King Saud's programme in New York on January 29 included an address to the United Nations Assembly, a collection of clichés through which he is reported to have mumbled inaudibly, and receptions in his honour given by the Secretary-General and by the Saudi Arabian Delegate, who is also the Ambassador in Washington.

10. On January 30, after being escorted by the President to Blair House (the Presidential guest house; he did not stay at the White House), King Saud began a round of state dinners given by the President, the Vice-President, the Secretary of State, and one given by himself. He had two meetings with the President, on January 30 and February 1, and with the Secretary of State on January 31, besides a final meeting with the President on February 8. He laid wreaths at appropriate places; and visited Mount Vernon and Annapolis, where he lunched with the Midshipmen and attended a basketball game.

11. King Saud was to have left Washington for a quiet stay at White Sulphur Springs in Virginia on February 3; but at the last minute he changed his plans and, no doubt to the confusion of those responsible for his programme, decided to stay on in Blair House. There for the following week he held Court. Arab Ambassadors called on him. Ambassadors of Bagdad Pact countries, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan called on him. The Lebanese Foreign Minister called on him. The Crown Prince of Iraq called on him on February 6, and King Saud returned the call on February 7. He saw newspaper correspondents, and even made a brief appearance on television.

12. His decision to stay in Washington and not to carry out the programme of visits and sightseeing which had been arranged for him seems to have been an indication that he had come to Washington to talk business, and was determined to stay in charge whilst business was talked rather than leave discussions in the hands of his advisers. These included several members of his family, Yusuf Yasin, Khalid Bey Abu Al-Walid, Jamal Bey Al-Hussaini and Abd al-Rahman Azzam. The King seems to have shown mistrust of them by insisting on conducting some conversations with only one inadequate interpreter.

13. The main item on the agenda of the discussions was the terms on which King Saud would renew the Dhahran air base agreement; but discussions ranged over all

Middle Eastern, and indeed world, problems. The Saudis at the outset presented a memorandum setting out their views on various matters, to which the State Department have given a written reply. They also presented a memorandum drawn up at the meeting held in Cairo before King Saud's departure for Washington, a document expressing the joint views of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria, and signed by King Saud, King Hussein, Colonel Nasser, and Sabri el Assali. The burden of this was that it would be a mistake to press for an early settlement of the Palestine dispute. After the initial round of conversations, joint sub-committees were set up to discuss various subjects.

14. The State Department have said that they are well pleased with the result of the visit. They think it has done much good, and created a situation from which they expect to extract further good. They believe that, as a result of the explanations given to him, King Saud has left with a better awareness of the dangers of Communism, especially in Syria and to a lesser extent in Egypt. He had expressed incredulity, which they think is genuine, about the reports of Russian arms deliveries to the Yemen; and they hope to give him convincing evidence of this.

15. The State Department are also satisfied with King Saud's response to their explanations of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and they evidently hope that he will in some degree act as advocate for it. King Saud did in fact make some useful public statements on the subject whilst he was here: he told the Press that the Eisenhower Doctrine as explained to him was a good thing and that he thought his Arab friends would see its merits if the same explanations were made to them. It is believed that on King Saud's return to the Middle East, there will be a further meeting with his three associates at which King Saud will explain the results of his visit. King Saud has, however, been careful to make it clear that he is not abandoning Colonel Nasser, and has said publicly that the Communist threat in the Middle East has been exaggerated.

16. The Buraimi question seems to have been touched on only lightly, though the State Department say that the King made it clear that the issues of Buraimi and the Islands of Arabi and Farsi in the Persian Gulf were important to him. The Americans took no position on Buraimi except to recommend that there should be a renewal

of diplomatic relations with Her Majesty's Government, since there could otherwise be no negotiations. Without committing himself directly, King Saud gave the impression that he favoured a resumption of relations and would do so when it was politically possible.

17. Most time seems to have been taken, however, on the haggle over the renewal of the Dhahran base agreement—not about the terms of the agreement, which appear to be unchanged, but about the *quid pro quo* to be provided by the United States Government. The Saudis seem to have retreated a long way from their bid last spring for \$250 million worth of free arms. Under the bargain struck, the United States Government has made certain commitments, of which the following are the most important:—

- (a) A substantial military training programme on a grant basis.
- (b) An agreement to build an air terminal at Dhahran.
- (c) An agreement, which is in fact a repetition of the largely undischarged obligation under the reimbursable military aid agreement of 1951, to sell some arms in the course of the next two years or more. Mr. Dulles mentioned to me a figure of \$100 million worth of arms over a period of five years, but according to the State Department the agreement will not mention figures. To make the sales more palatable in the United States it is being argued that they will be necessary for the defence of the Dhahran Base.
- (d) An agreement to consider a certain amount of economic aid for development in the Dhahran area. In fact, the development will be of facilities which are used by the Dhahran base: there are obvious reasons why it would be difficult to get the American public to accept an outright grant of economic aid to the Saudis. Some details of the new agreement remained unresolved on King Saud's departure, and at the time of writing Sheikh Yusuf Yasin's bazaar is still open in Washington.

18. A feature of the arms negotiations seems to have been a distinct lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Pentagon, who regard the programme as wholly political. This seems to mark the diminution of

interest in the Dhahran base, as well as an increased interest in strengthening the military potential of Iraq. This has been confirmed in other ways, notably the recent testimony of Admiral Radford before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

19. The State Department believe that, as a result of their conversations, King Saud has come to adopt a more understanding attitude toward the Bagdad Pact, and also towards Iraq and Iran. Their efforts in this direction were supported by other callers on King Saud. Of these meetings the most important were those with the Crown Prince of Iraq on February 6 and 7. They were arranged without American intermediation, although King Saud no doubt suspected, wrongly, that the Americans had engineered the Crown Prince's visit in order to bring them about. According to the Iraq Embassy in Washington, the Crown Prince was confident after his meeting that King Saud would view the Bagdad Pact with a more benevolent eye and believed that an atmosphere had been created which would make further meetings between members of the two Royal Houses possible and productive.

20. Neither the Crown Prince nor the Ambassadors of the other Asian Bagdad Pact countries attempted, as had been feared in some quarters, to persuade King Saud to join the Pact. They concentrated on explaining to him its importance and on disabusing him of his erroneous ideas of its nature and purposes. Dr. Amini, the Iranian Ambassador, said after his meeting that plans for a visit to Saudi Arabia by the Shah of Iran would now be carried through in about a month's time. Mr. Mohammed Ali, the Pakistan Ambassador, said he had found King Saud deeply suspicious of Nuri es Said and of the United Kingdom's position as a member of the Pact. Otherwise he appeared no longer to have any great suspicion of it. He made it clear that he could not join the Pact, and in so doing take sides with one group of Muslim Powers against another; but at the same time, he insisted that he wished to remain on friendly terms with all Muslim countries.

21. After a final meeting between President Eisenhower and King Saud on February 8 a joint communiqué referred in guarded language to six points:—

- (i) The vital importance of Saudi Arabia in the Middle East.
- (ii) A joint determination to settle Middle Eastern problems by peaceful means within the framework of the United Nations.
- (iii) That an aggression from any source against the political independence of Middle East countries should be opposed.
- (iv) That King Saud wished to continue close co-operation with the United States and had received with satisfaction the explanation of the Eisenhower doctrine.
- (v) That agreement had been reached on the military defence of Saudi Arabia, including the use of Dhahran air field and the provision of United States military assistance to Saudi Arabia.
- (vi) That there had been an exchange of view on other matters of common interest.

(The full text of the communiqué was sent to you as my telegram No. 85 Saving of February 12).

22. It will be clear from the above that there was from the beginning a tendency on the part of the United States Press and radio to oversell the visit and its significance. The same has been true of Press comment on the results, and for the time being at any rate we are likely to hear much that it unrealistic about Saudi influence and Saudi intentions in the Middle East.

23. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador in Bagdad, Ankara, Tehran, Beirut, Amman, Khar-toum and Tripoli, to the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Karachi, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bahrain, and to the Political Representative of the Middle East Forces in Nicosia.

I have, &c.

J. E. COULSON
(for the Ambassador).

ES 1051/9

No. 25

SUMMARY OF ANGLO-SAUDI NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN OCTOBER 1955 AND NOVEMBER 1956

After the re-occupation of the Buraimi Oasis, Her Majesty's Government while standing firm on the declaration made by the Prime Minister on October 26, 1955, expressed willingness to negotiate directly with the Saudi Arabian Government on Buraimi and other items in dispute between the two countries, e.g., Persian Gulf islands, boundaries of the Saudi-Kuwait neutral zone, &c. In April 1956, the Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Mr. D. Dodds Parker, visited King Saud at Riyadh to re-establish contact between the two Governments and it was agreed that the next stage of the negotiations should be conducted by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Jedda. Mr. Parkes accordingly visited Riyadh in June for discussions on the Agenda for further talks. "Matters arising out of the Buraimi dispute" was the penultimate item on the draft Agenda. Her Majesty's Government hoped by deferring consideration of Buraimi to avoid a head-on clash at the outset and to create an atmosphere of confidence by settling less important problems first.

2. The Saudi Arabian Prime Minister, Prince Feisal, with whom Mr. Parkes held all substantive discussions, showed no interest in the draft Agenda, but put forward four points, the acceptance of which, he alleged, the Saudi Arabian Government regarded as essential for the continuance of negotiations. The points were:—

- (i) Withdrawal from all disputed areas of troops stationed there.
- (ii) Repatriation of all inhabitants of those territories who have been expelled therefrom, the resumption of their normal activities with assured freedom of movement, restitution of all their movable and immovable property and payment of equitable indemnities for any damage incurred.
- (iii) Re-entrusting the original inhabitants of those areas with the duty of maintaining law and order.
- (iv) The setting up in the area of a supervisory administration by a number of neutral States that have no direct interests in the areas concerned, pending a conclusion of the dispute.

3. Her Majesty's Government considered that points (i), (iii), and (iv) were unacceptable because the removal of troops from Buraimi would enable the Saudis to regain access to the area and thus to revive the campaign of bribery, gun-running and corruption which had previously distorted the loyalties of the local inhabitants, destroyed the basis of the Arbitration and made it necessary for Her Majesty's Government to sanction the re-occupation of the Oasis. Moreover, the removal of the Trucial-Oman Scouts would have seriously weakened the confidence of Persian Gulf rulers in Her Majesty's Government's determination to maintain their position in the Persian Gulf and thus in Her Majesty's Government's ability to protect them.

4. After informal talks in mid-July between the Foreign Secretary and Azzam Pasha, formerly Secretary-General of the Arab League who acted as Agent for the Saudi Arabian Government, at the Buraimi Arbitration Tribunal Her Majesty's Government replied to Prince Feisal (Her Majesty's Ambassador's letter of July 29) stating that the four points, though obviously attractive from the Saudi point of view, would represent a complete surrender on the part of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi. Moreover, public opinion in the United Kingdom would not permit Her Majesty's Government to have any part in such an arrangement.

5. In the hope of going some way to meet the Saudis, Her Majesty's Government proposed:—

- (a) Placing the consideration of Buraimi higher in the Agenda.
- (b) Approaching the Sultan of Muscat about the return of certain exiles who had fled to Saudi Arabia. (This would meet the second of Prince Feisal's points.)
- (c) Considering some arrangement whereby Saudi Arabia might have privileged access to the sea, East of the Qatar Peninsula.

6. The Saudi Arabian reply, which was received on August 29 (in a Note from Prince Feisal to Her Majesty's Ambassador), brushed aside Her Majesty's Government's offers and re-asserted that Buraimi alone was of importance and should be settled first. Despite the uncompromising tone of the Note, Her Majesty's Ambassador considered that it might be the Saudi intention to put Buraimi into cold storage. While Her Majesty's Government's reply was under consideration, the Suez crisis supervened. There were indications that King Saud was aware of our preoccupations elsewhere and did not wish to pursue the negotiations too assiduously. But towards the end of October it became clear that interest in Buraimi was reviving and Her Majesty's Ambassador accordingly recommended (Jedda telegram No. 367 of November 2) that a message should be sent without delay from the Foreign Secretary to King Saud stating that the circumstances of the moment did not allow for careful consideration of the alternatives proposed in the last Saudi Note but that he appreciated the sympathetic understanding with which, in the initial stages of the Suez crisis, His Majesty had abstained from pressing us over Buraimi and he trusted that in the present emergency we could count on similar forbearance. At the same time, His Majesty was to be assured that as soon as conditions in the Middle East returned to normal, Her Majesty's Ambassador would be recalled from Jedda for consultations, following which a considered reply would be sent. Her Majesty's Ambassador was authorised to send this message but before he could do so the Saudi Arabian Government severed diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom on November 6. The letter was, however, accepted *pour mémoire* by the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Eastern Department,
July 17, 1957.

SECRET

ES 1941/8

No. 26

KING SAUD'S VISIT TO ETHIOPIA

Mr. Furlonge to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received August 13)

(No. 63. Confidential)
Sir,

Addis Ababa,
August 5, 1957.

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 355 and 356 of July 25 regarding King Saud's visit to this country, I have the honour to report that the Ethiopian Minister for Foreign Affairs, when I called on him on August 2, volunteered the following information on this visit.

2. He confirmed that King Saud's decision to come to Asmara, and subsequently to Addis Ababa, was taken on the spur of the moment and apparently on an impulse. (The American Embassy have information that it arose from the fact that his yacht, on which he had intended to make a cruise, was not ready when he arrived at Jedda.) He thought his main motive was, as I had surmised, to escape from the summer heat of his own country to a place whose climate is renowned in the Middle East; but that an additional motive was to see for himself whether reports of oppression of the Moslem minority by the Christian majority in Ethiopia were well founded. The Minister thought that his conversations with the Emperor, and his own observations whilst here, had relieved his mind on this score; the Emperor had told him categorically that this country was run on the principles of religious toleration and equality for all sects, and there could be no question of Moslems being oppressed or penalised in any way merely on account of their religion.

3. The discussions on world affairs were apparently in general terms, but those on the Middle East somewhat more detailed. The Emperor had explained that Ethiopia was determined to preserve her complete independence and to resist any attempt from outside to interfere in her affairs. He had scornfully dismissed a report which had reached King Saud that Assab was a British base (because an Englishman is employed as Port Manager) or that Ethiopia lay under either British or American domination. On the other hand, he described the continued Egyptian attempts to intrigue, especially amongst the Moslems, and his expressed resentment on this apparently found a strong echo with King Saud, who complained of similar interference in his own country. In fact the two monarchs, according to the Minister, found themselves in agreement on almost every question except that of Israel: on this, King Saud seems to have stated the Arab case in familiar terms, whereas the Emperor felt obliged to say that although Ethiopia had not yet recognised Israel, she would in due course feel bound to do so, in pursuance of her general policy and because of the increasing commercial relations between the two countries.

4. The visit seems thus to have been successful. I should doubt, however, whether it will have many results apart from the possible establishment of diplomatic relations; and even on this I should expect the Emperor to go as slow as possible, for he could hardly welcome the advent of a diplomatic mission which, however friendly King Saud may have shown himself on this occasion, could obviously not be trusted not to intrigue amongst the Moslems of this country.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Khartoum and to the Political Officer, Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

G. W. FURLONGE.

SECRET

CHAPTER III.—THE YEMEN

EM 1011/1

No. 27

YEMEN : ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1956

Mr. Monteith to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received January 29)(No. 4. Confidential)
Sir,*Taiz,
January 18, 1957.*

I have the honour to submit my Annual Report on the Yemen for 1956 and a chronological list of the main events.

2. The most important feature of a rather uneventful year was probably the Yemen's flirtation with Russia and other Communist countries.

3. The Soviet-Yemeni Treaty of Friendship had been renewed in October 1955; trade negotiations took place in Cairo in January, a Russian economic mission visited the Yemen and in March a commercial agreement was signed; at the time none of this seemed to amount to much, if only because the Yemen had so little of commercial value to offer. Then in June and July the Crown Prince, Mohamed al Badr, with a large retinue visited Russia, Czechoslovakia and East Germany; he was well received, he is an impressionable young man and the trip had results. In July it was agreed that the Russian and Yemeni representatives in Cairo should be accredited to each other's countries, though neither has yet, as far as I know, presented his credentials, and commercial agreements were made with Czechoslovakia and East Germany. It still seemed possible that these agreements would mean no more than many others which the Yemen has made at various times, but in October a Russian ship unloaded at Salif a large quantity of small-arms and perhaps something over seventy anti-aircraft guns; reports of the arrival in December of MiG fighters and other aircraft in crates now appear to have been inaccurate but there seems no doubt that they were discussed.

4. It is difficult to assess the importance of this. There can presumably be no doubt that the Russians would like to get a footing in the Yemen at the back door of both Aden and Saudi Arabia. The Yemen, though not yet industrialised, would probably be a fertile field for Communist

propaganda; the Imam and his family are widely disliked, officials are grasping, incompetent and corrupt and the mass of the people live a miserable existence, weighed down by taxation and oppression and solaced only by drugs. Arabic pamphlets about Communist leaders started to appear at about the beginning of November and are being eagerly studied by semi-educated young officers and others. The Yemen agreed in October to open diplomatic relations, again via Cairo, with Communist China. And Russian stock is high.

5. It would be dangerous to underestimate all this, but there is something to be said on the other side. Because of their habit of arming dissidents in the Protectorate and the continual trouble they cause on the border, the Yemenis have for some years been unable to obtain arms in any quantity from the West, so it is not surprising that they should have turned elsewhere for supplies; however much we may regret this result of our ban it does not mean that the Yemen is turning Communist.

6. The arms seem to have been pushed at the Yemen. It is even more difficult to get accurate information about arms than about most things here—the local Press has been forbidden to mention anything about them—but there are indications that the guns and rifles were supplied against payment in twenty or thirty years and that the aircraft also were offered on extremely easy terms. Little other trade seems yet to have developed despite considerable Russian encouragement and it may be significant that a Russian offer of kerosene, at about three-quarters of the price charged by the Shell Company in Aden, has not apparently been accepted.

7. The Imam may not know much about the world outside his own borders but I have little doubt that he realises that Communism is against both monarchy and Islam; and I have no reason to suppose that his basic suspicion of foreign countries

excludes Russia. At the moment he seems to be stalling on accepting Communist technicians. Officials also seem to be aware of some of the dangers of Communism; I was recently shown in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a translation of a speech by General Glubb; as the officials approved highly and had made many copies of it, I was interested to see that the speech, after explaining the need for Anglo-Arab friendship, emphasised the dangers to Arab countries of Communist infiltration—and of Egyptian imperialist ambitions.

8. Russian stock, as I have mentioned above, is high, but nationally and not ideologically. Israel, thanks to incessant propaganda by Cairo Radio, bulks so large in Yemeni minds that any country that helps the Arabs, by arms or other means, against the Jews is automatically admirable. What the Russians are doing in Hungary is irrelevant; the Yemenis are not interested in that. It remains to be seen how much the Russians will be able to use this national popularity for Communist ends.

9. I hesitate to draw any conclusions from all this, but I am inclined to think that, for the moment at least, the supply of arms to the Yemenis—and thence to Protectorate dissidents—presents a greater danger than the spreading of Communist doctrines. For the future much must depend on whether or not the Imam has over-estimated his ability to deal with the propagandist ability of any Communist technicians who may arrive in the Yemen.

10. Relations with Egypt are also rather confused. The Jedda Treaty between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen was signed in May and on paper suggested much closer co-operation; in practice it has not yet amounted to much. It seems that the Imam was bounced into signing it and disliked it from the start. He sent an odd military contingent to Cairo for the Evacuation Day parade and has continued to exchange conventional telegrams with Colonel Nasser, and Sanaa Radio has tended to follow the Cairo line, but that seems about the limit of co-operation. Egyptian offers of irrigation engineers, who would be extremely useful in the coastal plain, have been refused; Egyptian teachers went on leave from Sanaa several months ago and are not being encouraged to return; only one of the Arab-solidarity strikes called by Egypt—the one about the Algerian leaders—was observed in the Yemen, and that half-heartedly; Egyptian generosity in educating

Yemeni students in Cairo seems to be doing more harm than good; and Cairo remains the main base of the anti-Imamic Free Yemenis. The Joint Military Committee set up by the treaty has meant nothing as far as the Yemen is concerned, except that a handful of young Yemenis were given some hasty instruction in Egypt on how to deal with the weapons expected from Russia. No Egyptian military mission has visited the Yemen and Cairo Radio has remarkably often omitted the Yemen from recitals of Egypt's friends and allies. In the November Suez crisis the Yemen made much of its recruiting volunteers to go and fight in Sinai; but no attempt was made to arm, train or despatch these volunteers and there was apparently never any suggestion that the Yemeni Army should go and join in the battle—not that it would have helped its allies if it had. Many Yemeni officials are critical of Colonel Nasser's actions and suspicious of his ambitions; and if one can now hear songs in his praise being sung in the towns of the Yemen, that is less evidence of friendship at any level than of the remarkable efficiency of Cairo Radio.

11. Relations with the United Kingdom remain bad and in November they became worse; at first the Anglo-French intervention on the Canal was greeted with some pained respect but it soon, again thanks to Cairo Radio, became regarded as an attempt to help the Jews against the Arabs; and the careful moderation of our intervention and our early withdrawal were regarded as evidence of weakness. The B.B.C. has been lamentably unsuccessful in correcting either of these ideas; unless our propaganda improves greatly I fear that our flying visit to Port Said will take a lot of living down. (The nationalisation of the Canal Company earlier in the year had, on the other hand, remarkably little effect in the Yemen, perhaps because many Yemenis could not distinguish between the Company and the British base on the Canal.) The Yemen did not follow its allies in breaking relations with the United Kingdom in November, though it was under pressure to do so, especially when the Crown Prince attended the meeting of Arab leaders in Beirut; this however proves no particular good-will but merely a shrewd realisation of how hard the Yemen would be hit if its trade through Aden was blocked.

12. More local relations remain bad, too. It is obvious that the Yemenis have not given up their hopes of incorporating Aden Colony and Protectorate (and Kamaran) in

their domain. To this end they have continued to cause trouble on the border, directly by offering guns, money, refuge and encouragement to malcontents in the Protectorate; also by subversive pamphlets and subversive broadcasts from Radio Sanaa. This campaign went on throughout the year but was greatly intensified in the last three months, though with a significant short break in early November, and the year ended with a protective barrage of protests at United Nations, through diplomatic channels, over Cairo Radio and in the Press about imaginary British aggression across the Yemeni borders.

13. Commercially there has been little progress. A branch of the Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia was opened in Hodeida—for several years there had been no bank in the Yemen. A spinning-factory is now in operation in Bajil, manned principally by small boys removed from school for that purpose; but not enough cotton is grown in the Yemen to keep it fully employed, and the use of long-staple cotton to make cheap local cloth seems economically unsound.

14. Last year I reported high hopes of mineral development but these have not been fulfilled. The West German firm of Deilmann Bergbau were then, after several years' work, optimistic about finding oil near Salif; the American Yemen Development Corporation had been given a large concession and the Yemenis expected shiploads of technicians and machinery at any moment. But complications started in February because it turned out that the Yemeni Government had included in the Y.D.C. concession an area on which they had already given Deilmann's an option; negotiations started and dragged on; in July Deilmann's patience was exhausted and, although by this time their drilling equipment had arrived, they stopped work; and in August they packed up and went home. Reports now say that the Y.D.C. have bought out Deilmann's rights and that they will soon be coming to start work, but these are not confirmed. During the year a handful of Y.D.C. geologists wandered round the country and were not very optimistic about what they saw.

15. Missions from East and West Germany, Czechoslovakia, China, Pakistan and Syria visited the Yemen. The West Germans signed contracts for telephone systems in Taiz and Hodeida, which will not greatly affect the lot of the ordinary

Yemeni. The Pakistanis got a contract to mint coins for the Yemen but, as this means only the replacement of one silver currency by another, it is of little significance. The other missions discussed ports, roads, cement factories and lighting—all the things that other missions have discussed many times in the past and with equally little result.

16. In other respects the internal situation remains much the same. The Imam, apart from his trip to Jedda, has spent the whole year in Hodeida or in his lonely, squalid palace at Sukhna where the hot springs are thought to be good for his rheumatism. This seclusion has not pleased his subjects; his increasing age, the many diseases from which he suffers and the drugs he takes to dull their pain—or merely as a habit—have decreased his energy; he remains unwilling to devolve any authority and affairs of State move more slowly than ever. The Free Yemenis produce high-flown democratic constitutions; small groups talk about revolt; anti-Imamic slogans appear on the walls; the Crown Prince grows steadily more unpopular; officials talk of the need for reform and the down-trodden masses grow more and more discontented. In spite of all this the Imam is still firmly in control; while he remains in control there is likely to be little change and, when he dies, the odds are on chaos.

17. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Governor of Aden, the Head of the Political Office with the Middle East Forces, and to the Political Resident, Bahrain.

I have, &c.

W. N. MONTEITH

(H.M. *Chargé d'Affaires*).

Chronological Summary of Principal Events in 1956

January

Crown Prince al Badr visits Saudi Arabia.
Russian Economic Mission to Hodeida.

February

25 Soviet Government ratified renewal of Soviet-Yemeni Treaty of Friendship.

March

2 Yemen-Japan trade treaty signed in Tokyo.

April

East German mission in Hodeida.
Chinese (Nationalist) mission in Hodeida.
21 Imam signs Jedda Pact with President Nasser and King Saud.

June-July

Crown Prince al Badr's tour of Russia, East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

June

East German Mission in Bajil to consider cement factory.

July

Crown Prince al Badr signs Friendship and Trade Agreement with Czechoslovakia.

August

24 Yemen recognises Chinese People's Republic.

September

Czech mission at Bajil to consider cement factory.

October

12 Russian ship unloads arms at Salif.

November

Crown Prince al Badr attends meeting of Arab leaders at Beirut.
24 Death of Prince Qasim.

December

Czech "economic" mission in Hodeida.
An East German "commercial and educational" mission in Hodeida.

from Hodeida and Sanaa and the local merchants are directly beginning to feel the effects of the new situation. The first is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The second is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The third is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The fourth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The fifth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The sixth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The seventh is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The eighth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The ninth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The tenth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The eleventh is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The twelfth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The thirteenth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The fourteenth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The fifteenth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The sixteenth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The seventeenth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The eighteenth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The nineteenth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The twentieth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The twenty-first is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The twenty-second is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The twenty-third is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The twenty-fourth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The twenty-fifth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The twenty-sixth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The twenty-seventh is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The twenty-eighth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The twenty-ninth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The thirtieth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The thirty-first is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The thirty-second is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The thirty-third is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The thirty-fourth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The thirty-fifth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The thirty-sixth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The thirty-seventh is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The thirty-eighth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The thirty-ninth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The fortieth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The forty-first is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The forty-second is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The forty-third is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The forty-fourth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The forty-fifth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The forty-sixth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The forty-seventh is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The forty-eighth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The forty-ninth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The fiftieth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The fifty-first is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The fifty-second is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The fifty-third is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The fifty-fourth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The fifty-fifth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The fifty-sixth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The fifty-seventh is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The fifty-eighth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The fifty-ninth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The sixtieth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The sixty-first is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The sixty-second is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The sixty-third is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The sixty-fourth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The sixty-fifth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The sixty-sixth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The sixty-seventh is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The sixty-eighth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The sixty-ninth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The seventieth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The seventy-first is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The seventy-second is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The seventy-third is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The seventy-fourth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The seventy-fifth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The seventy-sixth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The seventy-seventh is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The seventy-eighth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The seventy-ninth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The eightieth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The eighty-first is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The eighty-second is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The eighty-third is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The eighty-fourth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The eighty-fifth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The eighty-sixth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The eighty-seventh is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The eighty-eighth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The eighty-ninth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The ninetieth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The ninety-first is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The ninety-second is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The ninety-third is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The ninety-fourth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The ninety-fifth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The ninety-sixth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The ninety-seventh is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The ninety-eighth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The ninety-ninth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to export their goods to the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships. The one hundredth is the fact that the local merchants are no longer able to import goods from the Yemeni ports. This is due to the fact that the Yemeni ports are now closed to foreign ships.

4. At least two Russian engineers are studying the problems of building a port at Hodeida. Many people have studied this before but my Yemeni informant tells me that the Russians have offered to build it free; if this is true, or even if the offer was of typically long credit, the port may at last be built.

5. From Czechoslovakia (Signor Gullit) they are bringing the Czechs are giving military instruction in Sanaa. Nine Egyptian officers have also gone there to instruct; it may be wrong to include this in a despatch on Communism but Signor Gullit was struck on his foot by the coincidence of photographs of Colonel Nasser and pro-Russian slogans.

6. My Yemeni informant says that three more shiploads of arms were on their way when the Canal was closed and are now coming round the Cape. If they had really been on their way at the beginning of November they would surely have arrived in Salif by now even on the slowest boat, but it may well be that more arms are coming. He told me that he had made a list of the arms but had not got it on him when I saw him; I hope he will show it to those interested in Aden. He told me that the anti-aircraft guns were Skoda; Signor Gullit said he had seen some on two wheels as well as those on four which I had previously reported. I must apologise for my contradictory reports on the impact of these arms but information has not been easy to get.

7. Nineteen East German engineers have been in Hodeida, Bajil and Sanaa. Signor Gullit says they are being sheltered by a Syrian colonel. They are certainly interested in making a cement factory at Bajil; my Yemeni informant and other less reliable sources—say they have actually signed a contract for it, also for installing electric light and telephones in Sanaa—they were certainly there a contract for telephones some months ago.

8. Another Czech mission has been trying to get contracts for factories for sugar, china and soap (given Yemeni standards of efficiency I doubt whether any of these would be economic—or even the cement factory unless oil is found in

EM 1016/1

No. 28

COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN THE YEMEN

Mr. Monteith to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received February 19)

(No. 8 S. Secret)

Taiz,

Sir,

February 12, 1957.

There has been, in the last month or so, a marked increase of Communist activity in the Yemen; I have the honour to submit some details.

2. Little is observable in Taiz, but plenty of stories are drifting through from Hodeida and Sana'a and the local merchants are already beginning to get worried. I have however received reports from two sources; the first is my Italian colleague who, thanks to uncomfortable years during the war which he spent as a private individual in Sana'a, has a knowledge of the Yemen probably unequalled among Europeans and who has just completed a tour of the country; the second is a Yemeni who was born and educated in Ethiopia, spent two years in Czechoslovakia, speaks several languages and has recently been acting as interpreter for the Czechs in Sana'a; he is fed up with his first—and, he says, last—visit to the Yemen and is now returning to Ethiopia via Aden, where I hope he will give some more information; he admits that his time in Czechoslovakia made him strongly anti-Communist, so his reports may be biased, but he struck me as an intelligent man and his account agrees closely with Signor Guillet's.

3. Two Russian doctors, one of whom is from Azerbaijan and speaks perfect Arabic, have arrived to work in Hodeida. It is rumoured that more will come; 20 is the number quoted but that may be doubtful. These doctors are being provided free. The Italian doctors are naturally apprehensive that the Imam may prefer free Russians to fairly well-paid Italians, even though the Imam assured Signor Guillet that any such doctors would be additional and would not replace the Italians. Signor Guillet is worried for other reasons for he remembers the political influence of the Italian medical mission in Sana'a before the war.

4. At least two Russian engineers are studying the problems of building a port at Ras Kateeb; many people have studied this before but my Yemeni informant tells me that the Russians have offered to build it free; if this is true, or even if the offer was of typically long credit, the port may at last be built.

5. Four Czechs (Signor Guillet thinks they are Russians calling themselves Czechs) are giving military instruction in Sana'a. Nine Egyptian officers have also gone there to instruct; it may be wrong to include this in a despatch on Communism but Signor Guillet was struck on his tour by the coincidence of photographs of Colonel Nasser and pro-Russian slogans.

6. My Yemeni informant says that three more shiploads of arms were on their way when the Canal was closed and are now coming round the Cape. If they had really been on their way at the beginning of November they would surely have arrived in Salif by now even on the slowest boat, but it may well be that more arms are coming. (He told me that he had made a list of the arms but had not got it on him when I saw him; I hope he will show it to those interested in Aden. He told me that the anti-aircraft guns were Skoda; Signor Guillet said he had seen some on two wheels as well as those on four which I had previously reported. I must apologise for my contradictory reports on the subject of these arms but information has not been easy to get.)

7. Nineteen East German engineers have been in Hodeida, Bajil and Sana'a. Signor Guillet says they are being shepherded by a Syrian colonel. They are certainly interested in making a cement factory at Bajil; my Yemeni informant—and other less reliable sources—says they have actually signed a contract for it; also for installing electric light and telephones in Sana'a—they were certainly close to a contract for telephones some months ago.

8. Another Czech mission has been trying to get contracts for factories for sugar, china and soap (given Yemeni standards of efficiency I doubt whether any of these would be economic—or even the cement factory unless oil is found in

SECRET

Salif—but the Yemeni authorities seem to have a strange passion for self-sufficiency); they are also hoping to open an agricultural school in Sana'a, which would pave the way for irrigation work. So far I do not think any contracts have been signed.

9. In Sana'a at least these various groups are busy with propaganda and leaflets (the East Germans being probably less busy than the others) and, according to both my informants, are already having some success with the masses. On their success at the top my informants differed; Signor Guillet thought that the Crown Prince was losing his enthusiasm for East Europeans, my Yemeni informant said they were loading him with gifts with good effect; he also said that his own anti-Communist propaganda went unheeded.

10. It is hard to understand why the Yemeni authorities are encouraging this infiltration. Free gifts or long-term loans are of course attractive and Russia is popular at the moment for its anti-Jewish and anti-imperialist policy; but I think that most officials are genuinely opposed to Communism. I can only suppose that they are wildly over-estimating their ability to deal with Communist propaganda. Sayid Hassan Ibrahim was probably voicing the official view—though I find it hard to believe that he agrees with it himself—when he said in his recent interview with journalists, "Communism is a feeling, not something to create by treaty. Where is that feeling here? It does not exist". He is probably right that there is little feeling for Communism in the Yemen at the moment, but there is so much discontent that Communist propaganda might spread very fast; and Communist-indoctrinated army officers might provide the leadership that is needed for a successful revolt.

11. I have little sympathy for the Imam or for Yemeni officials and I believe that the average Yemeni might be no worse off under Communism than he is now. But Communism at the back door of Aden is another thing altogether and I suggest that we might well give more thought to anti-Communist propaganda in this country.

12. I am copying this despatch to the Governor, and Security Liaison Officer, Aden, the Political Office, Middle East Forces, and the Regional Information Officer, Beirut.

I have, &c.

W. N. MONTEITH,

Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires.

SECRET

EM 1013/5

No. 29

FINAL DESPATCH OF HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ON LEAVING THE YEMEN

Mr. Monteith to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 24)

(No. 11. Confidential) Taiz,
Sir, March 20, 1957.

As I am approaching the end of my tour in Taiz, I have the honour to submit some general comments on the Yemen and on the changes that have taken place in the last eighteen months.

2. My predecessor in his final despatch (No. 34 of the 6th August, 1955) wrote "Anglo-Yemeni relations are bad and unlikely to improve much, if at all, as long as the frontier question remains unsettled." The frontier question still remains unsettled and relations have become worse.

3. It is important to realise what this frontier question means to the Yemenis, for this is at the root of practically all the troubles between the Yemen and the United Kingdom and Aden. It might be thought that, as the 1934 Treaty fixes the frontier temporarily and provides for negotiations for a final settlement, the question might easily be solved; to us it presumably means modifications of the frontier a few miles in either direction followed by definition, and to most other countries it would probably mean the same thing. Here things are seldom as easy as that. I suggested in a previous despatch that the best introduction to work in the Yemen might not be experience in other Middle Eastern countries but a study of "The Thousand and One Nights"; that, I think, was unjust to Haroun al Rashid; a better background would be some games of croquet with the Red Queen, for here the normal rules simply do not apply. The phrase in the Treaty "the settlement of the question of the southern frontier of the Yemen" obviously means to Yemeni officials, with their Humpty Dumpty-ish mastery of words, that the protectorates should be surrendered and that the frontier—probably a temporary one at that—should be fixed somewhere close to the present boundary of the colony. The Imam, making up the rules as he goes along, goes further than that, ignores the Treaty completely and flatly asserts that there is no frontier at all.

4. Mr. McGregor analysed carefully and refuted completely the Imam's claim to

Aden Colony and Protectorate. I will not repeat his arguments, which are as valid to-day as when he wrote them, for, unless the case is taken to an international court, the important point is not whether the claims are justified but whether the Imam himself believes them to be so; and there seems every reason to suppose that he does. As long as the Imam or his successor believes that the Yemen has a valid claim to the protectorates and that there are any prospects of getting them, I can see little hope of agreement on a final frontier anywhere near the present one, for the agreement on such a frontier would mean the abandonment of the Yemeni claims. Further, as long as the Yemenis see any hope of colonising the protectorates (though of course, to those who have sat at the feet of Humpty Dumpty colonisation of Arabs by Arabs is not colonisation at all), we must expect them to try to cause trouble on the frontier and spread subversion where they can. The future position of the frontier (and not the intermittent skirmishes along it) is the basic problem; Yemeni officials keep repeating that they would rather be friends with Britain than with Russia or anyone else; what they mean is, I think, that they would be genuinely delighted to be friendly if only we would give them what they wanted.

5. What then is the answer? If we were prepared to take the case to an international court and if the decision went in our favour, that might publicly demolish the Yemeni claims but it would not necessarily lessen their ambitions. If we took the dispute to the United Nations successfully, that might lessen border trouble and subversion for a while, but I do not believe it would lead to a final settlement. The only real answer, I think, is to convince the Yemenis that they have no chance at all of grabbing the protectorates; but how can this be done? The answer to this must be found in the protectorates themselves. If most of the protectorate rulers could be persuaded to say loudly and publicly—as I believe many of them say privately—that they want nothing to do with the Yemen, it would surely discourage Yemeni ambitions; but

SECRET

as long as the rulers remain quiet or hedge their bets the Yemenis will pose as the champions of the victims of imperialism. Further, if the rulers could be persuaded to improve their own administrations it would make things far more difficult for the Yemenis; as long as there are internal troubles the Yemenis will happily continue to pour oil on the flames; and as long as malcontents from the protectorate seek refuge in the Yemen, the Yemenis will be able to go on saying that the rulers are imposed by the British and do not represent their people. This is easy to say; I realise that it would be extremely difficult to do; but until it is done, Yemeni ambitions will remain and we will be able to hope for nothing better than reducing the more unpleasant symptoms of these ambitions.

6. That may explain why Anglo-Yemeni relations have not improved. Why have they become worse? It is always dangerous to give reasons for anything that happens in the Yemen as so much depends on the whim of the Imam, but here, I think, three main causes can be traced; our intervention at Suez, Cairo Radio and the arrival of Russian arms. I am aware that there was an increase in border trouble before Suez and before the Russian arms arrived, but border trouble has been fluctuating for years and I am not convinced that that particular increase was specially significant. Our intervention at Suez in itself might not have had much effect here, for the Yemenis, despite the Jedda Treaty and the usual talk of Arab solidarity, have no great love for the Egyptians; but Cairo Radio's interpretation of our intervention—and no other interpretation got much of a hearing—as imperialism and support of Israel struck a responsive chord in the Yemen, as it probably did in most other Arab countries. And Cairo's subsequently increased attacks on imperialism in Aden have had an effect which should not be underrated. Some months ago most Shafa'is in the Yemen would probably have welcomed a British invasion to save them from the rule of the Imam and the Zeidis; now, though they like the Imam and the Zeidis no more, they like us a good deal less than they did. I have discussed in a recent despatch the arrival of Russian arms and technicians; here I will say only that these arms are apparently proof to the Yemenis that they can treat foreign relations as an auction sale and that they are not as dependent on British or Western friendship as they had thought. Whether or not these are the

correct reasons, relations with the United Kingdom have certainly become worse lately; that the Imam has not yet responded to Arab pressure to break relations completely is probably only because the Yemen, until it acquires a decent port, will remain dependent on Aden for most of its trade.

7. Internally also the situation remains bad. It is difficult to draw any firm conclusions for much of the evidence is contradictory; there is much enthusiasm for mineral development, the prospects for which are doubtful, but almost complete neglect of agricultural development, the possibilities of which, according to well-qualified experts, are very large indeed; there is insistence on Arabism but a lack of both normal Arab virtues and of any real co-operation with other Arab countries; there is condemnation of alcohol but disastrous addiction to qat; there is great national conceit combined with yells for baksheesh that would have been noticeable even in pre-revolution Cairo; there is an airline, which is admittedly not more than a royal taxi service, but no public transport and the roads are appalling even by Middle Eastern standards; the hospital boasts equipment of which most London hospitals would be proud and is staffed by many specialists but no efforts have been made to introduce dispensaries or preventative medicine; many students are sent abroad—though few return—but the local schools are contemptible; there are well-publicised visits by commercial missions but few of them seem to achieve much; there is genuine dislike of Communism among those who understand what it is but Russian arms and technicians are welcome. This is all confusing but there is at least one hard and obvious fact; the Yemen is an extremely unhappy and backward country. Discontent is almost universal and there can be very few Yemenis who do not sympathise either with the Free Yemenis, who want reform by revolution, or with the unorganised progressives who want reform by constitutional persuasion. There is plenty of reason for this longing for reform; whatever may be thought of absolute theocratic monarchy in principle, the results in practice, when the monarch is a sick and reactionary old man, are injustice, incompetence, oppression and stagnation. Despite all the official talk of progress, what has been achieved in the last eighteen months? Constitutionally nothing, for the much publicised Council of Ministers soon proved to have no meaning; materially very

SECRET

little; a branch of a Saudi Bank; a cotton-spinning factory which employs small boys who ought to be at school; a mineral concession to an American corporation which, though signed over a year ago, has so far led only to a little superficial exploration; a road so badly made that the contractors spend more time repairing than extending it; a fine new school but no staff. It is not an impressive record: but however much, from one point of view, we may deplore this régime, we should realise that its very misrule must discourage any intelligent rulers in the Protectorate from switching their allegiance. Presumably in the nature of things, and possibly with Communist

help, there will gradually be more progress but it is difficult to believe that there will be much without another revolution. Yet this is the country whose monarch thinks we should hand over Aden Colony and Protectorates to him; as a local Palestinian refugee remarked to me, "That would be a bigger crime than handing over Palestine to the Jews."

8. I am copying this despatch to the Governor of Aden.

I have, &c.

W. N. MONTEITH,

Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires.

EM 1016/2

No. 30

RELATIONS OF THE YEMEN WITH THE SOVIET-EGYPTIAN BLOC

Mr. Kemp to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received May 20)

(No. 16. Confidential)

Sir,

Taiz,

May 14, 1957.

In my despatch No. 13 of the 14th April, 1957, I reported that although the Imam Ahmed was reluctant to forgo Soviet *bloc* assistance or to risk a break at present with the Egyptians and Saudis, he was taking characteristically forceful steps to minimise the effect of their influence on his own position as absolute ruler. Since then there have been further signs of a movement away from the Soviet-Egyptian bloc and an improvement in the attitude towards us, and in this despatch I have the honour to suggest some of the factors which may be bringing the Yemenis round to a more reasonable attitude.

2. The older generation of educated Yemenis, who fortunately still have the ear of the Imam, realise how dangerous it is to permit the spread of Communist ideas among a half-starved population and an arrogant but ignorant generation of younger Sayeds, particularly when such ideas find their way into the Yemen in the company of the Egyptian brand of extreme nationalism. Hassan Ibrahim's *dictum* that the Yemen is not fertile soil for Communism just does not hold water: Yemenis can be attracted as much as any other Arab if the bribes are big enough and the presentation of Communist ideas skilfully enough disguised beneath glib talk of Arab nationalism. The Voice of the Arabs is a force which even the Imam cannot ignore, although a refreshing new development has been the appearance of anti-Nasser talk in the suq and a recognition that Nasser has fallen into the Communist trap. More could be achieved if the Imam were prepared to risk a break with Egypt or to give up Communist help, but so far he has not been persuaded to either course. He is too unwilling to risk his position for the former, and too avaricious for the latter course—unless of course the Americans offer more than the Soviet *bloc*, when he may be expected to continue accepting Soviet help while denying them any political advantages.

3. The Yemenis are superb realists even by Middle Eastern standards, and it seems that even the Imam has now realised through the heavy curtain of sycophancy which surrounds him that his claim to the Protectorate has been broken by our determination to resist Yemeni acts of aggression. He has been told that his policy has alienated Arab opinion in the colony and Protectorate, he must know from the Naibs of Ibb and Beidha that their border folk are restless and want peace, and he himself has reportedly told the dissidents that the Treasury, which means his own tight purse, can no longer afford to keep them. It is hoped that their stay here will be protracted to the mutual and abiding estrangement of both parties. I had at one time thought that the Imam was moving towards a policy of increased subversion inside the Protectorate, the first aim of which would be the removal of the Amir of Dhala and the fall of Dhala into Yemeni hands. He would no doubt welcome this if he could achieve it, but I now consider that the talk of a restoration of peaceful conditions and the desire to be rid of the dissidents are more due to a desire to avoid too deep an involvement with the Russians and Egyptians, and to more serious complications nearer home.

4. For it appears by all accounts that he is an ailing man and has not long to live. He probably realises that he cannot in the short time left to him achieve his cherished ambition of Yemeni suzerainty over the Protectorate, and that his main concern now must be to secure Crown Prince Badr's claim to the throne. Rumours that he intends shortly to abdicate appear to be well-founded: a risky operation in all conscience, with the Egyptians watching an opportune moment to install a Free Yemeni Egyptian-sponsored régime, the Saudis hoping that they can march into the northern territories by invitation or otherwise, and strong tribal leaders supporting the claims of the rival Prince Hassan. A period of peace on the Yemen-Protectorate border has thus become an essential part of the Imam's manoeuvres.

5. I therefore attribute the Yemenis' present inclination to be more friendly and reasonable firstly to our consistently firm stand, and then to a fear of the

by *sharia* law. The post—a weekly event—is sorted under chaotic conditions making it necessary to re-sort the bundles on the doorstep. As there is no check on the issue of stamps, private arrangements between officials in the various towns ensure a lucrative addition to their meagre salary. The telephone is still mercifully absent although its installation is now threatened. The Director of Transport is the secret police chief, the public executioner, the manager of the water works and right-hand man of the Minister of Works, who has no office but does his work in the coffee-house. The sanitary squad are the dogs and vultures by day and the hyenas by night.

5. The crying need is for reform in agriculture, public health, communications and education. The Yemeni peasant has a remarkable aptitude for terracing his valleys: but he has inherited it from the distant Sabaeans when irrigation was better and the great dam of Marib the wonder of the pre-Islamic world. For the rest he is content to scratch away at his land or draw water for his fields with the same primitive implements his forefathers used. Little thought is given to manuring, crop rotation, seed selection or the replacement of their diseased cattle by healthy stock. The soil is fertile, and life is easy without these troublesome improvements. Public health is practically non-existent. The Pakistani W.H.O. public health officer has achieved little during his three years here, perhaps because Yemeni officials are disdainful of projects submitted by a Pakistani. Few villages have doctors, and malaria, V.D., bilharzia, typhoid and other waterborne diseases are rampant. More infants and children die than survive. The lucky ones make their way, invariably in advanced stages of disease, to Taiz hospital, where the majority are cured by the Italian doctors—against maddening administrative odds—only to return to the same squalid conditions which produced the disease. There are no roads, the towns and villages being linked by tracks fit for camel caravans but totally unsuitable for motor traffic. The result has been the continued isolation of the Yemen and a prohibitive price for her exports due to the heavy costs charged by transport drivers for the rapid deterioration of their vehicles. There is little organised education, the much-photographed schools in Taiz, Sana'a and Hodeida giving a rudimentary grounding in Arabic and the Koran only to a select few: the majority

receive no education. Handicrafts and fine metalwork have died out with the departure of the Jews and no training is undertaken to repair the loss. A certain tradition in masonry survives from the distant Sabaeans past in the solid exteriors of upper-class buildings, but there is not the slightest conception of window and door fittings, interior decorations, plumbing or sanitary arrangements, which consist of the crudest mud channels and holes in the wall. The rat-infested earth alleys of Taiz are most unsavoury and substantially unchanged since Niebuhr's time.

6. Such are the basic realities of life, and the improvements which have been made have been for the Imam's own comfort or for window-dressing: the road from Taiz airport to the Palace, the promise of a few factories and the threat of telephones, the Yemen airlines and now the helicopters. The hospitals are the only exception benefiting the people. The Yemen cannot, however, remain aloof much longer from the main stream of modern development. The radio and Communist propaganda reach across frontiers, and the Imam and his successors will be obliged to undertake a development programme if only to counter Free Yemeni agitation for reform. The wealth of Saudi Arabia and social progress in the Protectorate must also impel them to take similar steps inside the Yemen. They will accept what aid they can from all sides, but are hardly likely to fall under Soviet *bloc* influence. They will be more willing to see their country developed with American aid, but the pace at best will be slow, unless of course oil or uranium are found.

7. The above is a grim picture, but hardly does justice to the appalling conditions under which most Yemenis live. There are however compensations for the European in the good climate, the impressive mountain scenery and the abundance of wild life, which makes the Yemen a paradise for the naturalist and is admirably described in Hugh Scott's "In the High Yemen." The historian and Arabist will also find much to interest him in the mosques and ruins and customs of the people. One wonders finally whether the poorer Yemeni is not after all better off than his Egyptian peasant brother. Both live in abject squalor, and for both there is little hope of improvement for years to come. But at least living in a stone hut on the mountain side in an equable climate

must be infinitely preferable to living in a mud hut on the banks of the Nile, even if both are hovels. And the Sayeds though haughty are better company than the slick, arrogant Egyptian middle-class whom half-education has turned into smart lawyers, sharpsters and professional politicians.

8. Copies of this despatch are being sent to the Governor of Aden, the Political

Officer with the Middle East Forces, the Regional Information Officer in Beirut, and Her Majesty's Representatives in Bagdad, Washington and at the United Kingdom Delegation, New York.

I have, &c.

O. KEMP.

EM 1051/330

No. 32

TALKS WITH PRINCE BADR

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Mr. Kemp (Taiz)

(No. 69. Secret)
Sir,Foreign Office,
December 20, 1957.

I enclose for your information copies of the records⁽¹⁾ of the formal and informal talks which were held with Crown Prince Badr and members of the Yemeni delegation during their visit to London from the 10th to the 21st of November.

2. The suggestion that Prince Badr should be invited to visit this country originated from the Imam of the Yemen in August 1957. At that time Her Majesty's Government were engaged in considering a parallel proposal made by the Yemeni authorities in Taiz for a meeting to be held locally. This proposal had emerged from earlier discussions between the two Governments, which had dragged on for many months, of a meeting to be held at Mukeiras in the Aden Protectorate to discuss disputes arising over conditions on the border. It was difficult to assess the relative weight of the two parallel proposals, each apparently carrying the authority of the Imam. In the end, however, it became clear that the Imam attached considerable importance to the visit of his son and that a rebuff of his initiative might have disproportionate effects on our relations with the Yemen. It would also have been hard to explain to friendly countries. Furthermore, Her Majesty's Government considered that a visit by the Crown Prince would afford an opportunity of counteracting the impression that had been made on His Royal Highness during his visit to Soviet *bloc* countries in 1956. The Yemeni Chargé in London was therefore informed on the 18th of September that Her Majesty's Government would welcome a visit by the Crown Prince. It was also made clear to him that the visit could not take place unless peaceful conditions were restored on the border beforehand. Shortly after this approach, Yemeni forces were withdrawn from the post of Shukair in Aden Protectorate territory which had been for long the centre of armed disturbances on the border. This may have been due to the intensive aerial attacks on their position carried out by British forces during the previous weeks, but from that time until the Crown Prince arrived in London, and indeed up to the present day, armed disturbances on the border itself have remained at a low level.

3. In order to secure Yemeni agreement it was necessary to consent to a form of agenda, the wording of which, while reasonably restrictive, left it open for the Yemeni delegation to raise questions of substance. In order to help to set at rest Yemeni suspicions, and to afford the Imam the satisfaction of receiving a representative of the British Government from London before sending his delegation to the United Kingdom, it was also necessary to send Mr. D. M. H. Riches, the Head of Eastern Department, to Taiz for a brief visit.

4. The Crown Prince arrived in London on the 10th of November, attended by a delegation which, in Yemeni terms, was more appropriate to a full-scale discussion of all problems outstanding between the two Governments than to the relatively restricted and informal discussions which were envisaged by Her Majesty's Government.

5. The British objectives in the discussions which followed were modest. There was no ground for supposing that any Yemeni Government would renounce its long-term claims on Aden Protectorate territory or would cease to pursue these claims by whatever means seemed most promising at any given time. During the previous months, however, there had been certain developments in Yemeni policy which had given ground for the hope that some temporary accommodation might be possible. The Imam had shown signs of desiring to lessen his increasing dependence on the Soviet *bloc*. The internal situation in the Yemen was believed to be insecure, and the Imam probably attached particular importance to building

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

SECRET

up the position of his son as the chief claimant to the succession. The Imam had also shown interest in tentative offers of economic assistance from the United States.

6. Apart from the object of impressing the Crown Prince personally, the maximum objectives of the United Kingdom delegation were to secure an effective cessation of hostilities on the *de facto* border, and of aggression by subversion, to secure execution of the Anglo-Yemeni agreement of 1951 under which, among other provisions, a Joint Commission was to demarcate certain disputed areas, and to set up local conciliation commissions for settling disputes along the whole of the border. Little confidence was entertained that these objectives might be achieved.

7. From the first day of the discussions, which opened on the 11th of November in the Foreign Office, it became clear that the Yemeni delegation were interested only in discussing what they called "the main issue," by which they meant the Yemeni claim to sovereignty over the West Aden Protectorate and Aden itself. As an additional issue they made a claim to the island of Kamaran, the British interest in which, however, rests upon a footing different from that of the Aden Protectorates. On the "main issue" the United Kingdom delegation put forward the following view. Her Majesty's Government adhered to the obligations undertaken in the 1934 Treaty and 1951 Agreement. It was, however, clear that no fruitful discussion of the southern frontier of the Yemen could take place in conditions resembling those of the present. The first step was to ensure the creation of peaceful conditions in the area. Her Majesty's Government did not at present expect the Yemen to renounce her view about the legal ownership of the disputed territories. On the other hand the Yemen should not expect Her Majesty's Government to renounce theirs. Both sides should be content to discuss means of securing a *modus vivendi*, without renouncing their basic view on the "main issue." Mr. Beeley, leading the United Kingdom delegation, stated also that in 1934 Her Majesty's Government had recognised only "*de facto*" the existing state of affairs on the border and that Her Majesty's Government regarded the "*de jure*" line between Yemeni and Protectorate territory as being constituted by the 1914 line agreed between the British and the Ottoman Governments. That is to say, a *de jure* British claim to parts of present Yemeni territory must be weighed against Yemeni claims *de jure* to Protectorate territory.

8. The Yemeni delegation refused seriously to discuss any proposals put forward by the British delegation for reaching a *modus vivendi*. They said that agreement could easily be reached on these points if Her Majesty's Government gave some sign of readiness to agree on "the main issue." It must, I consider, be concluded that the Yemeni delegation had set out for London in the expectation that Her Majesty's Government were ready to make some concession on this "main issue." This assumption would explain much of the Yemeni tactics both before and during the meeting. Both the Crown Prince and a member of the Yemeni delegation stated informally that the United States Minister in Taiz (who is also the Ambassador in Jedda) had led the Imam to expect such a concession, and although there is no confirmation of this in records seen of Mr. Wadsworth's conversations, the Imam may have drawn the wrong conclusion from some innocent remark. Another possibility is that other Europeans in the Yemen in contact with leading Yemenis may have unwittingly led them to believe that such a concession was possible. There is also evidence that members of the Yemen Government have for some time nourished wholly unrealistic ideas deriving from British withdrawals elsewhere in the world. Whatever the reason, they appear to have hoped that we would agree to issue some statement recognising Yemeni rights in Aden and opening the way to the eventual incorporation in the Yemen of Protectorate territory and perhaps of the Colony as well.

9. When the Yemenis understood that they could obtain no concession on "the main issue" they declined to agree even to the issue of a joint communiqué. They said that they could not allow any impression to be given that an agreement of any sort on any subject had been reached. The text of an official British communiqué was, however, cleared with the Yemeni delegation before release, and since the Crown Prince's departure Yemeni propaganda has conspicuously failed to comment adversely on the London talks.

10. It is agreeable to record that the social side of the Crown Prince's visit was conducted apparently with great success. I consider that the attendance of

SECRET

yourself on His Royal Highness contributed materially in this respect, and that the personal impression made on the Crown Prince may in the end prove a significant factor in Anglo-Yemeni relations. Certain members of the Yemeni delegation, who are believed to favour a pro-Western course, may also have been impressed by the friendly and cordial atmosphere in which the discussions were conducted throughout. His Royal Highness was particularly impressed by the audience accorded to him by Her Majesty the Queen. The Prime Minister also received the Crown Prince who, in addition to many friendly formal and informal discussions with myself, had the opportunity of meeting Ministers of the Crown and distinguished persons in various walks of life. His Royal Highness was also given a demonstration of armoured warfare training and of aerial attack, and he visited many places of historical interest.

11. It is impossible at present to assess the effect of the Crown Prince's visit on Anglo-Yemeni relations. The Crown Prince has unfortunately, since leaving London, accepted invitations extended to him by certain Soviet satellite States, as well as by the Italian and French authorities, and firm conclusions may have to await his return to the Yemen. Secondly, during the weeks following the Crown Prince's visit, the situation has been disturbed by relatively large-scale subversive efforts in the Protectorate by the Yemeni authorities and, whether or not the decision to engage in these was taken after the failure of the talks, the existence of such subversion, and the necessity of counter-measures to meet it, may itself seriously affect Anglo-Yemeni relations.

12. I am sending a copy of this despatch without enclosures, to Her Majesty's Ambassador in Washington, and to the Political Officer with the Middle East Forces.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

EM 1012/1

No. 33

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN THE YEMEN

(Enclosure in letter from Taiz Chancery to Eastern Department No. 1015/1/57 of February 11, 1957.) (Received February 19, 1957.)

1. Ahmed al Nasir Li Din Allah bin Yahya Hamid al Din (His Majesty the Imam).
2. Mohamed al Badr (Saif al Islam).
3. Abdel Rahman (Saif al Islam).
4. Ali (Saif al Islam).
5. Hassan (Saif al Islam).
6. Ismail (Saif al Islam).
7. Abdel Kerim Ibrahim al Amir (Saiyid).
8. Abdullah Abdel Kerim (Saiyid).
9. Abdel Melik al Amri (Qadhi).
10. Abdel Rahman Abdel Raba al Beidhani (Qadhi).
11. Abdel Rahman Abdel Samad Abu Talib (Saiyid).
12. Abdel Rahman Ahmed al Siyaghi (Qadhi).
13. Adnan Tarsisi (Dr.).
14. Ahmed Abbas (Saiyid).
15. Ahmed Abdel Rahman al Shami (Saiyid).
16. Ahmed Ahmed al Siyaghi (Qadhi).
17. Ahmed al Hadharani (Qadhi).
18. Ahmed al Jarafi (Qadhi).
19. Ahmed Mohamed Ahmed Zabara (Saiyid).
20. Ahmed Mohamed Noman (Sheikh).
21. Ali Ibrahim (Saiyid).
22. Ali Mohamed al Jabali (Sheikh).
23. Ghalib Ahmed al Jarmouzi (Aqid).
24. Hamoud al Washali (Saiyid).
25. Hassan Ali Ibrahim (Saiyid).
26. Hussein Ali al Waisi (Saiyid).
27. Mohamed Abdullah al Amri (Qadhi).
28. Mohamed Abdullah al Shami (Qadhi).
29. Mohamed Abdel Rahman al Shami (Saiyid).
30. Mohamed Abdu Saleh al Sharjahi (Sheikh).
31. Mohamed Ahmed Pasha (Saiyid).
32. Mohamed Hussein al Amri (Qadhi).
33. Mohamed Hussein Musa (Saiyid).
34. Mohamed Mahmoud al Zubeiri (Sheikh).
35. Mohamed Raghib Bay (Qadhi).
36. Saleh Muhsin Sharaf al Din (Sheikh).
37. Salim Hussein al Rummah (Sheikh).
38. Yahya Ahmed al Amri (Qadhi).
39. Yahya Mohamed Abbas al Mutawakkil (Saiyid).
40. Yahya Mohamed al Kibsi (Saiyid).

1. Ahmed al Nasir Li Din Allah bin Yahya Hamid al Din (His Majesty the Imam)

Imam and King of the Yemen. Born in 1895, eldest son of Imam Yahya, who was assassinated near Sana'a in 1948. Before the death of his father held the title of Crown Prince (though this is contrary to strict Zeidi doctrine) and was successively Naib of Hajja and Taiz. Played a considerable part in subjecting various tribes who had contested his father's sovereignty and, less successfully, led the army in the Saudi-Yemeni conflict. Organised the defeat of the revolutionaries who had killed his father and succeeded as Imam on 3rd Jamad al Awal 1367 A.H. (March 1948).

18941-10 51283

Put down the ill-organised *coup d'état* in April 1955 without great difficulty, executing some seventeen of the supposed leaders, including two of his brothers.

In every sense an absolute monarch, retaining in his own hands the responsibility for almost every decision, large or small. Delegates very little authority to his officials, most of whom he rightly distrusts and few of whose views really influence him. He is generally surrounded by ignorant sycophants and astrologers.

He has a sturdy constitution but suffers much from bilharzia, rheumatism and probably other diseases; to dull their pain he has become addicted to morphia which, together with fat, reduces his energy.

His often repeated desire for the progress of his people, whom he despises, has not been borne out by his actions. A conservative and bigoted ruler, ruthless to opposition, shrewd and patient for revenge, he is respected by some of his subjects, hated by more and feared by all. With all his faults certainly not a man to be under-rated.

He is ignorant of the outside world, having left the Yemen only twice, the first occasion being a visit to Aden in 1946 and the second a visit to Jedda in 1956; profoundly suspicious of foreign Governments and foreigners, including those from other Arab States. No lover of the British and obsessed with his desire to gain control of Aden Colony and Protectorate and Kamaran Island.

At his accession transferred the capital from Sana'a to Taiz, where he lived; but since late 1955 has lived in Hodeida or Sukhna either for the good of his rheumatism or to avoid work.

He has three sons, Mohamed al Badr (No. 2), Abdullah and Abbas, of whom the last two are still infants.

2. Mohamed al Badr (Saif al Islam)

Born in 1926, only adult son of Imam Ahmed. Crown Prince (proclaimed April 1955), Deputy Prime Minister, the Imam being Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence (proclaimed October 1955). Till 1955 was Naib of Hodeida, but now lives mostly in Sana'a. Helped to lead, mainly by radio, the reaction against the 1955 *coup d'état*.

Earlier visited Egypt, Italy and the Levant; latterly paid many visits to Saudi Arabia, where he married early in 1956 the daughter (or niece?) of King Saud and paved the way for the Saudi-Egypto-Yemeni Treaty of April 1956. In June/July 1956 headed a Yemeni Mission to Russia, East Germany and Czechoslovakia and also visited Switzerland. In November represented the Yemen at the meeting in Beirut of Arab heads of States.

Is being groomed for stardom by his father, in opposition to Hassan (No. 5), but complains that he is given little or no real authority. Was popular as Naib of Hodeida, but is now rapidly losing popularity.

An amiable, rather stupid, easily influenced, weak young man with some probably genuine but certainly woolly ideas of progress; notoriously addicted to alcohol and young men. He is little respected and few people think he could hold down the Imamate without considerable internal or external support. Hates his uncle Hassan who opposes his succession and is his obvious rival.

3. Abdel Rahman (Saif al Islam)

Born about 1938, youngest son of the late Imam Yahya.

Recently spent some years in Italy with his mother, who was having mental treatment there. Picked up a scrappy education and a considerable love of the bright lights. Returned to Sana'a in early 1956, married and went back to Italy in October "to continue his education."

Said to be on good terms with the Imam, whom he criticises forcibly in private.

A cheerful, amiable, lecherous and rather stupid young man not yet of any political importance.

4. Ali (Saif al Islam)

Born about 1904, son of late Imam Yahya.

Nominally Minister of Education but, being allowed no authority by the Imam, takes little interest in the job. Also Amir of Taiz, a title which has no apparent meaning whatever. A fair poet and a great drinker, seldom being seen sober; he claims that it was the lack of anything to do that drove him to drink but this may be doubted. Takes no part in politics and has little ambition or influence. Does not greatly like the Imam. Is said to be intelligent and not anti-foreigner. Dislikes ceremonial and is friendly with all classes and is therefore probably the most popular of the Imam's brothers.

He has visited Egypt and the Lebanon and in September 1956 returned to Sana'a from Italy where for some months he had been undergoing medical treatment.

His son Hassan is said to be strongly anti-Imam.

5. Hassan (Saif al Islam)

Born about 1897, second surviving son of the late Imam Yahya.

In his father's lifetime he was Naib of Ibb. When Ahmed succeeded he became Prime Minister, which meant little, and Naib of Sana'a which meant a lot; he was virtual ruler of the northern Yemen, where many people regarded him as, or as more important than, the Imam. He was also custodian of the Treasury for Yahya, in a peculiar way, had left the Kingdom to Ahmed and the Treasury to Hassan.

Till 1952 he had not been out of the Yemen except on pilgrimage and was extremely ignorant of conditions in other countries. Then he went to Italy, via Aden, for an operation; shortly afterwards he went to Germany to negotiate the oil-concession at Salif with Messrs. Deilmann Bergbau, and impressed those he met there as a practical man with both feet on the ground.

During the 1955 *coup d'état* he was in Cairo at a conference of Arab Prime Ministers. The Imam suspected him of complicity in the plot—probably wrongly, though he did seem to sit slightly on the fence. Since then he has not returned to the Yemen though there have been some half-hearted negotiations about the conditions of his return. He represented the Yemen at the Bandung Conference and paid an official visit to India; now he is living in America loosely attached to the Yemeni Delegation to United Nations.

Shortly after the *coup d'état* he was demoted from Prime Minister to mere adviser and he was not

included in the Council of Ministers appointed in late 1955.

He had the reputation of being a fanatical Zeidi, isolationist, very conservative—except in agriculture which is his main interest—and extremely miserly. He was, however, respected as a strong, just and energetic ruler and a sober and uncorrupt man. Later reports suggest that he is becoming less miserly—an important point with the Yemenis—and less conservative and narrow-minded; he is learning English and has taken to wearing European clothes.

He was strongly opposed to the Imam's nomination of Mohamed al Badr as Crown Prince, partly because he disliked al Badr, partly because such nomination is against strict Zeidi doctrine and partly because he hoped for the succession himself. There is no reason to suppose that he has changed his mind about this; he is still regarded by many as the only hope of the country, is far more respected than the Imam's other brothers and may be a serious rival to al Badr when the Imam dies.

There have been reports that he was plotting with the Free Yemenis but such reports are unlikely and are probably false.

He has two sons of about 20, Abdullah and Hassan, and various younger children; these two were carefully supervised after the *coup d'état* but later returned to favour and were both married in Sana'a in September 1956 with a good deal of obsequious official publicity.

6. Ismail (Saif al Islam)

Born about 1910, son of the late Imam Yahya and full brother of the late Saif al Islam Abdullah.

Previously held the title of Minister of Health but lost it for heavy drinking, for which he was imprisoned though he is not in the same class as Saif al Islam Ali. Now holds no official position. Cheerful, carefree and intelligent but without political ambitions or influence. Had been living in Cairo since the *coup d'état* but returned in September 1956 to Sana'a.

7. Abdel Kerim Ibrahim al Amir (Saiyid)

Born in 1912. Lives in Sana'a where he edits the Government fortnightly newspaper *Al Imam*. Fairly intelligent and has progressive ideas but does not dare to let these appear in his paper.

8. Abdullah Abdel Kerim (Saiyid)

Born in 1910. Naib of Taiz since 1955 by virtue only of his marriage to the Imam's daughter. Generally in the Imam's favour and has some slight influence with him. Conservative, untravelled, unambitious and unintelligent; reasonably friendly to foreigners but nervous of meeting them.

9. Abdel Melik al Amri (Qadhi)

Born about 1918 of an important family; cousin of Mohamed Abdullah al Amri (No. 27). Private secretary and cypher clerk to the Imam whose confidence he enjoys. Discreet and quiet, fairly intelligent and rather conservative.

10. Abdel Rahman Abdel Raba al Beidhani (Qadhi)

Born about 1920 in Beidha. Chargé d'Affaires in Bonn. Took a degree in economics at Bonn University (being allowed to take it in English) in spite of which he is regarded by many as a fool with little commonsense. The United Nations Currency Adviser thought him mainly responsible for spiking his scheme for currency reform. Has travelled considerably in Europe and the Middle East and in 1956 visited Japan for commercial talks. Thought by some to have had a hand in the *coup d'état*. Often used by the Imam in dealings with foreign missions to the Yemen.

11. Abdel Rahman Abdel Samad Abu Talib (Saiyid)

Born about 1910. Minister in Cairo since 1952. Appointed Minister of State, which means nothing, in 1955. Also appointed Minister to Russia and Red China in 1956. Previously held no official position but was a favourite companion of the Imam.

A friendly, amusing, fairly intelligent and travelled man; in favour of progress in the Yemen and probably not anti-Western in spite of his recent declarations. At present somewhat out of favour with the Imam as a result of misuse of official funds and rumoured sympathies with the Free Yemenis; such rumours were probably at one time well-founded, but now he appears to have broken with them.

Married a daughter of Mohamed Abdullah al Amri.

12. Abdel Rahman Ahmed al Siyaghi (Qadhi)

Born about 1902. Naib of Sa'ada, where he lives. Was given the meaningless title of Minister of Finance in 1955. Was previously headmaster of a religious school in Sana'a and a friend of the late Saif al Islam Abdullah for whom he worked when Abdullah was Naib of Hodeida. Reputed to be an energetic and fairly honest ruler. Has not been outside the Yemen. Brother of Ahmed Ahmed al Siyaghi (No. 16).

13. Adnan Tarsisi (Dr.)

Lebanese. Appointed Yemeni Chargé d'Affaires in Beirut in 1955. Originally came to Yemen on an educational mission. Became a friend of the late Saif al Islam Abdullah and was employed as adviser on foreign affairs. Travelled with Abdullah to United Nations and other places and made much money, mostly from contracts for printing of postage stamps. Author of an absurd book on the Yemen published when it joined United Nations. Very conceited and wholly unreliable.

14. Ahmed Abbas (Saiyid)

Born about 1913. Brother-in-law of late Imam Yahya. Lives in Taiz and is styled Director of Workshops, which means that he looks after stores and Government vehicles. A supporter of the Imam and generally in his favour. Makes a show of friendliness but is untrustworthy and generally anti-foreigner.

15. Ahmed Abdel Rahman al Shami (Saiyid)

Born about 1903. Nephew of the Imam and brother of Mohamed Abdel Rahman al Shami (No. 29). Director of Aviation in Sana'a, which means airstrip-controller; also styled Director of Roads. Said to be in the confidence of Saif al Islam Hassan.

16. Ahmed Ahmed al Siyaghi (Qadhi)

Born about 1905, brother of Abdel Rahman Ahmed al Siyaghi (No. 12). Naib of Ibb, where he lives. Also given the empty title of Minister of the Interior in 1955. Was previously a clerk working for Saif al Islam Hassan with whom he is said to remain on good terms. A strong, conservative and unpopular ruler whose position has brought him much wealth. Has a considerable hand in subversion in the Protectorate.

17. Ahmed al Hadharani (Qadhi)

Born about 1888. Poet, court-jester, sycophant and sponger on the Imam. Has travelled widely to Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt, Indonesia. Aden (where he spent several years) and India (whence he draws a

small Hyderabad pension). Not particularly anti-Western but wholly unreliable.

His son Ibrahim sometimes acts as secretary to Saif al Islam Mohamed al Badr.

18. Ahmed al Jarafi (Qadhi)

Born about 1882. Chief Judge of the Court of Appeal in Sana'a. Also given the meaningless title of Minister of Justice in 1955. Puritanical, reactionary and a strong supporter of the Imam.

One son, Ismail, is a secretary in the Yemeni Legation in Cairo; another, Ahmed, is Amil of Sana'a.

19. Ahmed Mohamed Ahmed Zabara (Saiyid)

Born about 1910 of one of the leading families. Son-in-law of Imam Ahmed. President of the Imam's Court of Appeal and appointed Chief of the Royal Cabinet (*i.e.*, hangers-on at Court) in 1955. Reactionary, unpopular and not of much importance. Has travelled little but accompanies Saif al Islam al Badr to the meeting of Heads of Arab States in Beirut in November 1956. His father is the author of a recent, laudatory and inaccurate history of "The Imams of the Yemen."

20. Ahmed Mohamed Noman (Sheikh)

Born about 1905 of prominent Shafa'i family in southern Yemen. Tutor for some years to Saif al Islam al Badr. Leader of Shafa'i branch of Free Yemenis since about 1944. Imprisoned for his part in the 1948 *coup d'état* but subsequently released as he had opposed the assassination of Imam Yahya. Returned to something like favour and after the 1955 revolt, in which the part he played is obscure, accompanied al Badr on the Pilgrimage. Thence he fled to Egypt and made violent propaganda against the Imam on the Egyptian radio and in a short-lived paper *Sawt al Yemen*. Still a leading figure among Free Yemenis in Cairo.

His son Mohamed holds intermittently an important place among Free Yemenis in Aden.

21. Ali Ibrahim (Saiyid)

Born about 1878. Lives quietly in Sana'a. Nominally Prince of the Army, but the title means nothing and he has no military knowledge or experience. A respected old man but not politically active or ambitious. Father of Hassan Ali Ibrahim (No. 25).

22. Ali Mohamed al Jabali (Sheikh)

Born at Hodeida in 1902. Started his career as servant and office boy to a Greek coffee merchant there; then made his own way in the world and is now the Yemen Government's main trade agent in Aden, where he normally lives.

A rich, able and active merchant; directs the affairs of the Yemen Navigation Company and the Salif salt works and has lately started growing cotton on a considerable scale in the Tihama. He has offices in Hodeida, Asmara and Addis Ababa; agents in the Levant, Egypt, Italy and the United States. He has particularly close links with Italy, probably because he can get a large rake-off from firms in that country. Has travelled widely and is well-versed in the ways of the world. Largely responsible for recruiting foreign employees for the Yemen Government.

He cheats the Imam shamelessly on almost every contract he makes for the Government; the Imam knows this but continues to trust him and even, on occasions, to take his advice. He is not popular with most Yemeni officials.

He is able, progressive, smoothly amiable and untrustworthy, but quite the most active man connected with the Yemeni Government. He considers money-making much more important than politics, but has a considerable hand in Yemeni subversion in Aden.

23. Ghalib Ahmed al Jarmouzi (Aqid=Colonel)

Born about 1906 of Turkish origin. Colonel of the artillery, which means nothing, and Director of Aviation in Taiz, which means that he transmits the Imam's orders about flights by Yemeni Airlines, and hands out spares when the Swedish engineers give him enough alcohol.

A cheerful, heavy drinker and not unpleasant to meet, but spends much of his time passing on to the Imam information about foreigners in Taiz.

24. Hamoud al Washali (Saiyid)

Born about 1910. Cousin of Imam Ahmed. Previously Naib of Taiz and now a member of the Royal Cabinet. He was arrested after the 1955 *coup d'état* because he had advised the Imam to abdicate, but was later released. Has little knowledge of the outside world but is moderately progressive and not anti-Western.

25. Hassan Ali Ibrahim (Saiyid)

Born about 1911, son of Ali Ibrahim (No. 21). Minister in London since 1951; also subsequently Minister in Rome and Bonn. Appointed Minister of State in 1955 and Deputy Foreign Minister in September 1956, replacing Mohamed Abdullah al Amri (No. 27). Previously represented the Yemen at United Nations.

One of the few outstanding Yemenis, sane, able and intelligent; he has also acquired a fair knowledge of English. He would genuinely like development in the Yemen and better relations with the United Kingdom. He is much used by the Imam in dealing with foreign missions to the Yemen. Regarded by some Yemenis as a candidate for the Imamate in the future.

His brother Mohamed acts as Chargé d'Affaires in London in his absence.

26. Hussein Ali al Waisi

Born about 1910. Took part in the 1948 *coup d'état*, became a Minister in Abdulla al Wazir's short-lived Cabinet and was imprisoned as a result. Later released and was appointed Director, Ministry of Works, in 1955 and Secretary-General in the Foreign Ministry in January 1957.

A friendly, mildly progressive man without much apparent influence, and a fairly intelligent student of Yemeni history and geography.

27. Mohamed Abdullah al Amri (Qadhi)

Born in 1912, son of Qadhi Abdullah al Amri, who was Minister of Imam Yahya and was assassinated with him.

In 1948 became Deputy Foreign Minister and held that position till September 1956. As such he was in charge of the Foreign Ministry (the only Ministry in Taiz) and therefore the main channel of any official business and the Imam's general factotum, concerning himself with all sorts of affairs of State. Apart from intervals when he was out of favour he generally had as much influence as anyone with the Imam, but had little authority to act on his own.

He went to the United States in 1947 as a member of the first Yemeni Delegation to the United Nations and, in the same year, toured Europe with the late Saif al Islam Abdullah. He has visited the United Kingdom more than once, the last occasion being

as head of the Yemeni Delegation to the Anglo-Yemeni Conference of 1951. In 1956 he toured Eastern Europe with Saif al Islam Mohamed al Badr. He has visited Egypt many times; also India, Pakistan and the Levant; he generally seems to like getting out of the Yemen.

He is, by Yemeni standards, intelligent, able and enlightened; his travels abroad and meetings with foreign statesmen have broadened his mind considerably; he would like to see a fair amount of constitutional progress in the Yemen. As the Imam's factotum his position has often been difficult; he is regarded as insincere by Yemenis and foreigners alike and is not much liked by either.

In September 1956 he fell out of favour and was demoted to Assistant Deputy and, though living in Taiz, has not been near the Ministry since.

28. Mohamed Abdullah al Shami (Qadhi)

Born about 1877. Lives in Beidha and rules that area.

Well known to the officials of Aden Government as he is the official with whom frontier affairs are usually discussed. Trusted by the Imam, whose arguments he voices strongly; convinced of the justice of the Yemeni claim to the Protectorate.

Went to London in 1939 as a member of the Yemeni Delegation to the Palestine Round-Table Conference and again in 1951. Has also visited France, Italy, Egypt and the Levant.

A Zeidi of strong religious convictions and of conservative ideas, he is a loyal servant of the Imam and his country and one of the probably few Yemeni officials who are not out for their own ends.

29. Mohamed Abdel Rahman al Shami (Saiyid)

Born in 1922, nephew of Imam Ahmed and brother of Ahmed Abdel Rahman al Shami (No. 15).

He was Secretary-General in the Foreign Ministry for some years until late 1956, when, for no clear reason, he went to Italy.

He is quiet, popular and respected; has some progressive ideas but not much influence.

30. Mohamed Abdu Saleh al Sharjabi (Sheikh)

Born about 1910. Editor of Yemeni fortnightly newspaper *Saba*, which is published under strict official censorship in Taiz.

Lived for many years in Aden, where his paper was published and where he wants to publish it again. He was deported from Aden in 1954 but the order was rescinded in 1956.

Intelligent though not at all well-educated. Not anti-British though he prints anti-British articles when he has to. Plays with both sides when he thinks it will help him and his paper. An amusing rogue with some courage.

31. Mohamed Ahmed Pasha (Saiyid)

Born about 1888. A descendant of the Mutawakkil family that provided in the past seven Imams of the Yemen. As a result of quarrels with the Hamid al Din family, his family moved some time ago from Sana'a to Taiz and joined the Shama'i sect of Islam. His father co-operated with the Turks during their occupation and was rewarded with the title of Pasha, which has been adopted as a family name.

He was involved in the 1948 *coup d'état*, was arrested and tried, but bribed his way to an acquittal. Later became Amil of Taiz and in 1955 Naib of Hodeida. Cheerful, corrupt, selfish and unreliable, he has been reported as in sympathy with the Free Yemenis. A notable astrologer, which may keep him in favour with the Imam.

One son, Ahmed, was till recently Chargé d'Affaires in Khartoum; another, Yahya, is Amil

of Taiz and a third, Mohamed, Amil of Mukbina. They are among the few Shafa'is in official positions.

32. Mohamed Hussein al Amri (Qadhi)

Born about 1907. Previously Naib of Hodeida and now Director of Agriculture, whatever that may mean, in Sana'a.

Materially progressive—under him Hodeida got a piped water supply—but unintelligent, corrupt and probably anti-Western.

33. Mohamed Hussein Musa (Saiyid)

Born about 1915. Editor of Yemeni Government fortnightly newspaper *Al Nasr*, which is published in Taiz. Also in charge of Government printing-press and is styled on occasions Director of Publicity. Intelligent and well-educated by Yemeni standards.

34. Mohamed Mahmoud al Zubeiri (Sheikh)

Born about 1905. A leader since about 1944, and now for some years the most important figure, of the Zeidi branch of the Free Yemenis. Took a prominent part in the 1948 *coup d'état*. Has been living for some years in Cairo, where he co-operates closely, if not always happily, with Ahmed Mohamed Noman (No. 20) in genuine but impracticable schemes for thorough-going constitutional reform.

35. Mohamed Raghib Bey (Qadhi)

Born in 1872. A Turk who served in the Turkish Diplomatic Service in St. Petersburg and other European capitals and later held various posts in the Yemen towards the end of the Turkish occupation. At the Turkish evacuation he went home but shortly afterwards returned to the Yemen at the request of Imam Yahya, who made him Foreign Minister. He retained this post till soon after the accession of Imam Ahmed. Since then he has been living quietly in Sana'a taking no part in Government affairs.

A civilised, intelligent and respected old man who would probably like to return to Turkey if only the Imam would let him. One of his daughters was married to the Imam but was divorced; another was married to the late Saif al Islam Qasim.

36. Saleh Muhsin Sharaf al Din (Sheikh)

Born about 1920. A favourite servant of the Imam before his accession and brought up in his early years with Saif al Islam Mohamed al Badr. Took part in the 1948 *coup d'état* but was pardoned by the Imam, who retained him at Court with the meaningless title of Chief of Protocol in the Royal Palace.

In 1950 was sent to Asmara as the Imam's representative or trade agent, but returned to Taiz in 1952,

reverting to his life at Court. Latterly and intermittently has acted as secretary to al Badr and went with him to Saudi Arabia in 1956.

Would probably like to see some progress in the Yemen. Is more trusted than most officials by the Imam. At present in Cairo nominally investigating misuse of funds in the Yemeni Legation there.

37. Salim Hussein al Rummah (Sheikh)

Born about 1918. Amil of Beidha, in charge of Customs Post there and right-hand man of Mohamed Abdullah al Shami (No. 28). Respected by the people of Beidha and reasonably progressive. Co-operates on occasions with officials of Aden Government to ensure his welcome there should things go wrong in the Yemen.

38. Yahya Ahmed al Amri (Qadhi)

Born about 1920, brother of Abdel Melik Ahmed al Amri (No. 9). Director of Sana'a Hospital; appointed Deputy Director of Public Health in 1955.

39. Yahya Mohamed Abbas al Mutawakkil (Saiyid)

Born about 1877. Chief Judge of Sana'a Court. Extremely conservative and puritanical; has not been out of the Yemen.

40. Yahya Mohamed al Kibsi (Saiyid)

Born about 1905. Member of the Court of Appeal and previously Naib of Taiz. Apparently a loyal supporter of the Imam. Untravelled and unintelligent.

Obituary

Ali Mohamed al Rubaidi (Sheikh)

No. 20 in 1955 list. Died at Rahida in January 1956.

Qasim (Saif al Islam)

No. 4 in 1955 list. Returned to the Yemen from Cairo, where he had been living, in the autumn and died at Sana'a in November 1956.

NOTE

"Saiyid" means in the Yemen an (alleged) descendant of the Prophet; it is not used, as in some other Arab countries, for important officials regardless of descent.

"Qadhi" is a title awarded, in theory, by the Imam but is sometimes self-conferred; it corresponds roughly with Bey in pre-Revolution Egypt. In the Yemen it does not mean a Sharia Judge.

"Sheikh" covers tribal leaders, merchants and intelligentsia; no titles such as Ustaz or Effendi have been introduced in the Yemen.

"Naib," sometimes translated Viceroy, means the Governor of a Province.

"Amil" is the administrator of a town or district under a Naib.

Appendix 1

THE ROYAL FAMILY TREE


IMAM YAHYA murdered 1948	—AHMED (No. 1) ...	MOHAMED AL BADR (No. 2) ABBAS ABDULLAH Daughter = Ahmed Mohamed Ahmed al Zabara (No. 19) Daughter = Abdullah Abdel Kerim (No. 8)
	—MOHAMED drowned 1923	Daughter
	—Amat Illah ... = Ali al Shami	Mohamed (ex-Naib of Beidha)
	—Shams al Hur ... = Hussein al Kibsi	Ahmed (Amil of Osab)
	—HASSAN (No. 5) ...	YAHYA MOHAMED ABDULLAH HASSAN AHMED ALI HUSSEIN
	—HUSSEIN killed in 1948 ...	YAHYA AHMED ALI HASSAN
	—MUTAHIR died 1953 ...	YAHYA died 1956
	—Um Hani ... = Abdel Rahman al Shami	Mohamed (No. 29) Ahmed (No. 15)
	—Amat al Rahman ... = Abdel Qaddus al Wazir	Abdel Kerim Mohamed
	—ALI (No. 4) ...	HASSAN HUSSEIN ALI
	—ABDULLAH executed 1955	MOHAMED
	—IBRAHIM poisoned 1949 ...	
	—ISMAIL (No. 6)	
	—YAHYA died 1950	
	—Amat al Khaliq	ABDULLAH MOHAMED HUSSEIN ISMAIL
	—QASIM died 1956 ...	
	—ABBAS executed 1955	
	—MUHSIN killed 1948	
	—Takkiya ... = (1) Abdulla Ali al Wazir	Abdel Rahman Mohamed Hussein Muhsin
	—= (2) Ahmed al Kibsi ...	Mohamed (Amil of Rus)
	—ABDEL RAHMAN (No. 3)	

Not in order of birth. Capitals show the male line. Brackets indicate children of the same mother.


Appendix 2

TREES OF SOME NOTABLE YEMENI FAMILIES


AMRI FAMILY




ZABARA FAMILY



SHAMI FAMILY



WAZIR FAMILY



PASHA FAMILY

Ahmed (created Pasha by Turks)

